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FBIS-EEU-93-041 *4 March 1993*

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Izetbegovic Signs Military Document at Talks

AU0303212493 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Report by Slobodan Jankovic from New York]

[Excerpts] Are we going to see some progress made at the talks on establishing peace in Bosnia? Here, in the UN headquarters, reports emerged some 10 minutes ago that apparently Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the Bosnian Muslims, has finally agreed to sign the so-called military paper, which has already been signed by the Serbian and Croatian sides. If this is confirmed, and we will know soon, it would represent a visible step forward since, out of the complete Vance-Owen peace plan, only the maps would remain to be signed by the Serbs and Muslims. If this U-turn does indeed occur, then the plenary session of the three warring sides cannot be far away.

A few moments ago, a consultative session of the Security Council began to discuss the U.S. letter on the situation in Bosnia. This paper has still not been distributed among the reporters, and we can only guess its contents. It is quiet possible that both the letter and the session are connected with the above-mentioned signing of the military paper. This hints at a solution in the UN headquarters followed long and exhausting bilateral negotiations between Vance and Owen, and the representatives of the three warring sides. Izetbegovic has had five hours of negotiations in two turns today on the acceptance of the military paper, which would make it possible for talks to continue in a calmer situation on the ground, with more reason and less tension. [passage omitted]

Karadzic Map Proposal Rejected

LD0303195593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1918 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] New York, March 3 (TANJUG)—At the request of the United States, the United Nations Security Council will on Wednesday [3 March] afternoon hold a consultative meeting on the situation in the war-torn former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the U.N. headquarters said.

The details of the U.S. request will be announced during the day.

Cochairmen of the Geneva conference on the former Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen again talked with Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic and Bosnian Croatian leader Mate Boban on Wednesday morning. Their Tuesday talks lasted three and a half hours.

Vance and Lord Owen are to meet separately with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Karadzic on Tuesday proposed that an agreement be signed on the maps dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina into provinces, which are acceptable to all warring factions, be signed first, and that the disputed areas of Bosnia be placed under U.N. control and that the warring parties, then, in the course of time, resolve where they are going to belong.

Vance and Lord Owen, however, rebuffed Karadzic's proposal, saying they (?did not) think it was a 'productive way to go', the cochairmen's port-parole Freck Eckhard told TANJUG.

Karadzic told Yugoslav journalists on Wednesday that the conference was reaching its end, but that its success depended on what was expected of the second round of the New York talks.

(?Maybe) the Serbs are expected to accept the Vance/Owen maps, but they definitely will not do so. They will not even agree to the partial placing of heavy Serb weaponry under control, because it represents a 'strategic balance' against stronger Moslem and Croatian forces, Karadzic said.

Karadzic said that the second round could be considered successful if Izetbegovic agreed to sign a so-called 'military document' drawn up in Geneva. The document includes a ceasefire and the placing of all heavy weaponry under international control.

Izetbegovic, however, said he would agree to sign the military document only if the U.S. pledged to gather the Serbian heavy weaponry and place it under its control, but the U.S. has failed to support Izetbegovic's idea.

Karadzic Discusses Agenda

AU0203150293 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Mar 93

["Special" interview with Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by Belgrade Radio journalist Dragan Colovic in New York "last night"—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Karadzic] I would like to inform you and your listeners that last night we first met the Russian mediator Mr. Churkin and held two-hour talks. Later we met with the U.S. mediator, Bartholomew. We also (?met Vance) and spent almost 2 hours in a pleasant conversation.

Today's meeting with the cochairmen was also very long. We broached virtually everything that has been done so far. We wanted to clarify some things, such as the rights of the provinces to form associations and to combine their functions, something we consider to be a democratic right that cannot be alienated, a right that the Serbs will most certainly use. They were (?against) it claiming that there can be no state within a state, although we think that it can, and the United States is an obvious example of how a state can exist in a state. We adhered to our view.

We then discussed the maps. Our view is that the maps cannot be corrected because they are so bad that no correction can make them acceptable to Serbs.

We finally discussed a transitional government. We think that there should be a transitional body, not necessarily a government, but some coordinating committee that would help all three ethnic communities to function, help with the functioning of transportation, the economy, energy transportation, and so forth. The Muslims are strongly against it because they want to preserve the illusion of the legitimacy of the current so-called authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

This is why our talks lasted a long time, because we wanted to make everything clear, and establish what we will be doing in the days ahead and how long all this will last. [passage omitted]

Thinks Maps 'Most Important Issue'

AU0303174193 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1545 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by Slobodan Jankovic in New York; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Jankovic] Mr. Karadzic, tell us about these talks in New York. At what stage are they now?

[Karadzic] Well, they should be in the final stage, but it seems that the end of the road is the hardest bit. To reach the final stage, we should get some agreement, primarily on the maps, and then on some other issues on the establishment of peace. I personally think that the maps are the most important issue and that the worst fault of the conference is that it is nowhere near reaching an agreement on the maps. The Muslim side is also rejecting the maps but for reasons quite opposite those of the Serb side.

[Jankovic] Have you come up with any proposal regarding the problem with the maps?

[Karadzic] Well, we have proposed to the co-chairmen that the crisis could be overcome if we all accept the undisputed parts and sign those parts, while the disputed areas should be protected by the authorities that are already in place, together with the United Nations, and not only their observers but their police force, to reduce the number of the troops and to enable the people to start returning and express their wishes about where and in what they want to live in a referendum. [sentence as heard]

[Jankovic] How did the reinforcement of the peace team with the Russian and U.S. representatives influence the way the talks are going?

[Karadzic] I am not sure that there are any effects yet of their involvement. We met Churkin first. We wanted to meet the Russian first, and then Bartholomew. We (?did not inform) Churkin that we intended to meet him, but we informed Bartholomew about the (?real causes) of the crisis [words indistinct] to him as a person and a diplomat. We will see what transpires from the talks as they go ahead.

[Jankovic] Is there going to be a plenary session? Vance and Owen insist on that, but it is becoming more obvious as time goes by that there is still no chance of that happening.

[Karadzic] Well, before they call a plenary session they have to ensure some success, some acceptance. If they want to accuse someone of undermining the conference, then they have to ensure someone's rejection. If they want the conference to fail, they can always achieve that. If they want to blame the Serbs for the collapse of the conference, they can do that. All they need to do is insist on the maps, which are unjust and unacceptable, and we will reject them flatly, regardless of the consequences. No one has the right to force us to give our villages to someone else's provinces, to force our people to accept someone else's [word indistinct] authorities.

[Jankovic] The U.S. media are concentrating on the airdrop of the humanitarian aid. You had some comments to make on that operation in the United Nations yesterday.

[Karadzic] Yes, we have been very cautious about that operation; not so much about its goal as about the way it is carried out. We are convinced that if the planes fly within the range of the Muslim weapons, they will most certainly be shot down, and the Serbs will be blamed. That has been proven to be the case. The Muslims are lying that [words indistinct] that nothing has landed on their territory to force the U.S. planes to fly at a lower altitude, so they can then shoot them down, and the Serbs will be blamed. [Word indistinct] the Russian side is becoming directly involved in that operation, and I am afraid that both sides will fall for their stories about the drops being imprecise and [words indistinct] the Muslim weapons.

[Jankovic] One more question, Mr. Karadzic. Do you believe that anything serious will be achieved in New York by the end of the week?

[Karadzic] Well, something serious can be achieved only if it is not too ambitious. If the ambitions are limited, for example, to the establishment of peace.... [pauses] If the ambition is to remove the Serbian weapons, as the Muslim side keeps insisting, then that cannot be achieved since the Serbs will not be disarmed in stages; they will not give up their heavy artillery that makes the tactical balance in the conflict. [Words indistinct] the Muslim-Croatian coalition with more troops, more infantry. We are not interested in listening to anything about that as we simply will not allow ourselves to be placed into a strategically unfavorable position.

Danube Reopened to Shipping; Vessels Sail Off

AU0303190793 Sofia BTA in English 1825 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Vidin, March 3 (BTA) - One Russian and three Ukrainian barge groups sailed upstream past the port of Vidin (Northwestern Bulgaria) today, BTA learnt from the State Shipping Inspectorate in the town. The first ships sailing downstream, after the Serbian blockade of the river was lifted last night, could be seen at noon.

The state shipping inspectorate said the Bulgarian catamaran Khan Kardam has started upstream and is at the 1,065 km, bound for Passau. Khan Asparukh, yesterday started downstream from passau for Bulgaria. Now that the blockade has been lifted, 99 variously flagged vessels continued their voyage after being stranded at the Iron Gate lock for seven days.

Serbian Transport Minister Zarko Katic, who for several days now has been holding negotiations on the reopening of the Danube to traffic, said that if the lock of the Iron Gate 2 water power system is closed to Yugoslav ships, river shipping may be in for further complications, TANJUG reported today. The Trade Union of Yugoslav River Shipping Crews warned today that if its members continue to be denied their right to work, the Danube would be blockaded again as from March 10 until the matter is settled.

Zhelev Fears Expansion of Bosnian Conflict

AU0303185793 Sofia BTA in English 1523 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Sofia, March 3 (BTA)—In an interview granted in Sofia to the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI, President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria voices serious concern over the possibility of the civil war in Bosnia and Hercegovina spreading to the entire territory of the Balkans. The interview appeared in today's issue of the newspaper and was summarized by Bulgarian National Radio.

Dr. Zhelev points to the danger which the escalating conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina spells for the international community. He expresses the view that "under the circumstances, every passing day brings closer the time when the UN, NATO and other international organizations will be forced to resort to a direct military intervention in the former Yugoslavia."

The Bulgarian head of state assesses in positive terms the U.S. operation of parachuting relief supplies in some parts of the theatre of war, describing it as an "effective and important positive step" in the Yugoslav conflict. At the same time, he pointed out that a final settlement of the problem would require "concerted efforts by the EC, the United States, and Russia to bring pressure to bear on the belligerents."

However, any attempt on the part of the neighbouring Balkan countries to assume a mediating role or assist in any other way a peaceful settlement of the utomstly complicated situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would inevitably lead to an expansion of the war into their own territories, because there are strong, historically motivated international and religious differences in the Balkans, Dr. Zhelev believes.

Zhelev Addresses Diplomats at National Day Reception

AU0303185093 Sofia BTA in English 1652 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Sofia, March 3 (BTA)—On the occasion of Bulgaria's National Day March 3, the President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev gave a reception at the Boyana State Residence. Welcoming the invitees, he expressed special thanks to the 12 member countries of the European Community, which helped Bulgaria gain an associate member status. The president also thanked the ambassadors of the four countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) for their assistance for Bulgaria's association with that organization, and to all other diplomats for their contribution to the promotion of their respective countries' relations with Bulgaria. The attendees included National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov, government ministers, M.P.'s [members of parliament], leaders of political parties and trade unions, and prominent public figures.

BSP Criticizes Zhelev's Speech

AU0303213093 Sofic BTA in English 2002 GMT 3 Mar 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Text] Sofia, March 3 (BTA)—In a declaration circulated this evening, the Executive Bureau of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] criticized yesterday's statement by President Zhelev in connection with Bulgaria's National Day as a "puzzling attempt to suggest to parliament and the government that they should carry on the restorationist policy implemented so far by the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), including the field of agriculture."

The BSP sees a way out of the current complicated situation in Bulgaria in an immediate rallying of the efforts of parliament, the government and the authorities of local self-government for action for the recovery of Bulgarian agriculture.

The Socialist Party declares itself in favour of a suspension of liquidation councils and their replacement by bodies elected by the owners, which should complete the land distribution with the least possible delay.

Customs inspectors at the Kapitan Andreevo Checkpoint (Southeastern Bulgaria, on the border with Turkey) seized nearly one kilogram of heroin. The narcotic was hidden in the back seat of a Mercedes driven by Austrian Citizen Michael Pierber, the BTA correspondent in Khaskovo (Southern Bulgaria) reported today.

The number of Bulgarian asylum seekers in Germany sky-rocketed to 4,398 in February 1993, Bulgarian National Radio reported. The number has increased 462 per cent since February 1992.

Zhelev's Possible Link With Liberal Party Viewed

AU0303182893 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 25 Feb 93 p 6

[Commentary by Milena Nikolova: "Liberal-Conservative Union Strives Toward Political Scene"]

[Text] Recently Stefan Nikolov, deputy chairman of the Business Party, made a statement in which he expressed the businessmen's readiness to form an alliance with liberally-minded people. He apparently meant Petko Simeonov's Liberal Party, which is trying to find its place on the political scene. Even before the party was formed, talks were held between representatives of capital and the liberals, who were not yet organized in a party.

Obviously, the realities of our political life prompted the private businessmen to seek the support of politicians who are known to the public. Because of their disagreement with the so-called blue [Union of Democratic Forces] idea, they preferred people who billed themselves as liberals, i.e. something in between the socialists and the conservatives.

It is no accident that our president, who still carries the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] label, is our only member in the Liberal International. The new Liberal Party, with at least the verbal support of its businessmen-supporters, has asserted itself as a new refuge, ready in a heartbeat to embrace its leader. What remains now is to see whether the president, who as a rule avoids associating with organizations, which do not have the chance to achieve complete victory, and who a short while ago formally dissociated himself from his former colleagues, will decide to bring the Liberal Party within the Liberal International. There is still a long time until the election. For the time being, the businessmen-liberals enterprise appears to be a chimera and wishful thinking for the those involved. Perhaps after a while it will become apparent whether we will have politicians supported by businessmen, or whether this will remain a variant that exists in the civilized world, but has been rejected by the reality of our situation. Perhaps, if such a variant with money as the driving force still materializes, the president will decide, after his term of office expires, to join this formation. For the time being, according to sociological data, the Liberal Party remains a force without any special influence in public life. It is possible that money would push the party forward, as was the case with the SDS several years ago, when it dazzled the people with its extravagance. Perhaps then the Liberal Party's label will be acceptable to our current president, who urgently needs a safe haven for when his term expires.

Acting Foreign Minister Views Balkan Crisis

AU0303162693 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Feb 93 p 6

[Interview with acting Foreign Minister Dimitri Ikonomov by Ryszard Bilski; place and date not given: "Stop the War"]

[Text] [Bilski] The world, especially Europe, is worried about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the danger of war spreading to Macedonia and Kosovo. From Sofia's angle, what is the security situation in the Balkans like?

[Ikonomov] That question has been topical for quite some time now. I consider the Vance-Owen plan, which has recently gained the approval of the United States and Russia, as a genuine chance for a peaceful settlement of the crisis, especially a chance of preventing it from spreading to Macedonia, Kosovo, and neighboring countries.

[Bilski] Bulgaria has refused to take part in the UN Peacekeeping Forces, which would intervene in Bosnia-Hercegovina and other ex-Yugoslav Republics if the need arose. Why has the Bulgarian Government made this decision?

[Ikonomov] That is not just the view of the government, but rather all Bulgarians. No one in Bulgaria doubts the appropriateness of that decision. We think the remaining Balkan countries should follow suit. In this exceedingly complicated ethnic situation, one cannot take the risk of sending forces from our region, not even under UN auspices because that would merely open up new fronts. The history of the Balkans confirms this fear.

[Bilski] Do you think a military action would succeed?

[Ikonomov] It is difficult to forecast anything because I am no military strategist, but that is not the reason why I am avoiding a response to your question. Because of the explosive situation, it is peaceful resources, not military ones, that have to be applied in our region.

[Bilski] In the past few weeks you have held many talks with your colleagues from Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Albania on ways of restoring peace to the Balkans and laying the foundations for lasting stability. On what matters is there a concurrence of views, and in what matters a divergence?

[Ikonomov] The Yugoslav crisis and the corresponding dangers to the Balkans and Europe are assessed the same way in Athens, Tirana, Bucharest, and Sofia. Nevertheless we insist on an increased application of peaceful resources to stop the war and begin to heal the wounds. Greece and Romania agree with us about not taking part in the UN Peacekeeping Forces, which will ultimately receive combat tasks in the former Yugoslavia. Our only difference of opinion with Greece is the question of Macedonian recognition. Although Turkey does not rule out participation in this campaign, quite a far-reaching

and, I would say, promising convergence of views occurred during Turkish President Ozal's recent visit. Albania, which has a very realistic view of the situation in ex-Yugoslavia and the dangers inherent in participating in the UN forces, does not hide the fact that it would be very difficult for the government to stop the Albanian population rushing with aid if the conflict were to affect Macedonia, where there are Albanians, and Kosovo, 90 percent of whose population consists of Albanians.

[Bilski] President Zhelev has just started his official visit to Poland. What is its main purpose?

[Ikonomov] I understand this visit has been long awaited by Presidents Zhelev and Walesa. It was supposed to have taken place in the middle of last December, but our president asked for it to be postponed because Bulgaria was in the middle of a government crisis. The conclusion of three documents is foreseen—a basic treaty, plus cooperation agreements in culture and in science and education. I am convinced that the new democratic framework of our contacts will permit a better application of the economic prerequisites of cooperation.

Delegate Sotirov Defends 'Minority' Rights

AU0303190093 Sofia BTA in English 1536 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Geneva, March 3 (BTA)—Chief Bulgarian Delegate Vladimir Sotirov addressed the 49th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights.

"Once again, just as in a number of other cases, Bulgaria voices its grave concern over the human rights abuses and the pressure exerted on the minorities in all parts of former Yugoslavia and specifically on the Bulgarian minority," Mr. Sotirov said. "Many Bulgarians are afraid to declare their identity because of the psychological pressure, immediate threats and connived local bureaucratic arbitrariness prejudicial to the personal, material and professional interests of the citizens who categorically identify themselves as Bulgarians."

Mr. Sotirov expressed the hope that along with the other minorities in the former Yugoslavia, the condition of the Bulgarian minority will retain the attention of the UN and will be reflected in the findings of the special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

The Bulgarian delegate called attention to the fact that the return to democratic traditions in different areas and especially in East Europe finds practical expression in the radical revision of legislation and the creation of a national mechanism for verification of the observance of human rights and their protection.

Kruleva: Dimitrov Interfered in Intelligence Work

AU0203184093 Sofia BTA in English 1825 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Text] Sofia, March 2 (BTA)—Last week, testifying in a parliamentary hearing, the chief of the National Investigative Service [NIS] Ani Kruleva made scandalous disclosures about interference by members of the previous cabinet in the operation of the investigative authorities. The accused ex-ministers and the leader of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and former head of government Filip Dimitrov dismissed the allegations. The SDS blamed Mrs. Kruleva of "obeying political orders."

For the time being, parliament has passed no express resolution on the NIS chief's disclosures. An ad hoc commission of inquiry into the case may be formed this week or later.

The leader of the Socialist (ex-Communist) Party [BSP] Zhan Videnov told BTA today that the BSP does not view Mrs. Kruleva's testimony as a great sensation. "We have been sounding the alarm about these things for a year now," the Socialists' leader said. He described as "alarming" the current condition of Bulgaria's judicial system. Mr. Videnov believes that the Supreme Judicial Council has metamorphosed from an authority of crime control into an "authority of crackdown on political opponents." The Socialists' leader said that Mrs. Kruleva's disclosures raise face the minister of justice and the president with a question concerning Prosecutor General Ivan Tatarchev. Several months ago, when the prosecutor general demanded that ex-BSP leader Aleksandur Lilov be stripped of his MP [member of parliament] immunity, some Socialists said they would press for Mr. Tatarchev's resignation.

Petrov Views SDS Relations, Coming Conference

AU0303184293 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 25 Feb 93 p 10

[Interview with Georgi Petrov, "chairman of Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian National Union within the Union of Democratic Forces," by Sonya Stoyanova; place and date not given: "Georgi Petrov: I Support Signing New Political Agreement"]

[Excerpts] [Stoyanova] Mr. Petrov, how do you view Prof. Berov's government?

[Petrov] Unfortunately, it is a government of victims and executioners. I think that it was precisely this dynamic majority of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] that toppled Filip Dimitrov's first noncommunist government.

[Stoyanova] Mr. Petrov, what is the largest party within the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] in terms of membership and number of structures?

[Petrov] We, the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian National Union [BZNS], are the largest party within the SDS in terms of membership and structures. [passage omitted]

[Stoyanova] Do you think that a new political agreement should be signed at the forthcoming SDS national conference, and that this agreement should change the coalition's status?

[Petrov] I think that both things should be effected. I firmly support the signing of a new political agreement. [passage omitted]

[Stoyanova] Do you think that after the conference the SDS should appear with a new leadership?

[Petrov] My personal opinion is that at the present stage there should not be a change in the SDS leadership.

[Stoyanova] Who do you think should adopt the political decisions, the National Coordinating Council or the SDS parliamentary faction?

[Petrov] Of course the SDS National Coordinating Council must be the political entity because that is where the parties' leaderships are represented. However, if the SDS status is changed, the change must be in that direction, i.e., relations between the National Coordinating Council and the parliamentary faction must be clarified, and the faction must obey the political decisions adopted by the National Coordinating Council. I want to stress that it was precisely the National Coordinating Council that nominated the deputies, and it is an accepted practice throughout the world that deputies obey the political line of the political entity which elected them. [passage omitted]

[Stoyanova] What do you want to happen at the forthcoming national conference?

[Petrov] I would like to see a detailed analysis of the performance of Filip Dimitrov's government. In addition, I expect the conference to reach the conclusion that the SDS can regain power only through elections.

[Stoyanova] Mr. Petrov, do you accept the statements of certain SDS leaders, expressed as attacks and accusations?

[Petrov] No, I do not accept them. In addition, I think that blaming Filip Dimitrov, as former prime minister, for everything is immoral. I also reject Stoyan Ganev's statements. I consider them lacking in principle, seriousness, and substance. They do nothing but harm the SDS. What he did was ugly. [passage omitted]

DPS Leader Dogan Departs on Visit to Turkey

AU0403103593 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] Today Ahmed Dogan, leader of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], left on an official two-day visit to Turkey at the invitation of Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. The purpose of his visit is to secure investments and favorable credits for reviving the Bulgarian economy.

Delegation Leaves for Official Talks in Russia

AU0403112193 Sofia BTA in English 0916 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] Sofia, March 4 (BTA)—Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade Valentin Karabashev today left on an official visit to Russia. He will meet with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fedorov, cochairman of the Bulgarian-Russian Intergovernment Committee and with the ministers of finance, economy, and foreign economic relations, and discuss trade and economic cooperation between Bulgaria and Russia.

We will discuss two draft agreements, on the avoidance of double taxation and on reciprocal investment protection. The Bulgarian side handed them to the Russian Government last autumn, but nothing much has been done so far, Mr. Karabashev told reporters before leaving. He said the sides should step up work on these drafts. Bulgaria will also move a draft protocol on trade in 1993. The sides are faced with working out a payments system. The clearing system operative in 1991 and 1992 did not produce good results, especially in 1991, when Russia posted a deficit, which it has not made up so far, Mr. Karabashev said. The hardest and least pleasant issue the sides will discuss is Russia's debt to Bulgaria, as the former has not been very enthusiastic about recognizing the debt or declaring intentions to repay it, the deputy prime minister said.

Managers of Bulgartabak, Chimimport, Pharmachim and other large Bulgarian companies, who are leaving with Mr. Karabashev, will hold business negotiations in Moscow.

After Moscow, Mr. Karabashev will fly to Brussels, where Prime Minister Lyuben Berov on Monday will sign a protocol on Bulgaria's association with the EC.

Need for Change in U.S. Aid Projects Stressed

AU0403090193 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Feb 93 p 3

[CTK report: "More Flexible Relations With the United States"]

[Text] Most of the talks conducted by Czech Minister of Economy Karel Dyba during his working visit to the United States, from which he returned yesterday, concerned the policy of the new U.S. administration and its attitude toward the Czech Republic.

The Czech minister of economy was one of the first high-level representatives of a Central European country to hold talks with representatives of the new U.S. administration.

As Minister Dyba said after returning home, his talks in the United States concerned, among other things, the U.S. assistance program to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which has been implemented for two years under the auspices of the U.S. State Department. According to Karel Dyba, further cooperation should continue in a different spirit, which should help make relations between the two participating countries more flexible. The Czech Republic is interested in some programs being expanded and in some other programs being changed. It would also like to have more say in them, the minister of economy specified.

Klaus Sees Need for New Border Treaty

AU0303164293 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Feb 93 p 1

[Report by Radek Wanke: "Controls on the Slovak Border Will Become Stricter"]

[Text] Controls on the Slovak border will become stricter and closer to the concept of a standard border. That was the implication of Prime Minister Klaus' appearance at a news conference following the government session on Wednesday [24 February]. The change will concern both the movement of persons and goods, and for persons it should resemble the procedures in force with Austria and Poland. According to Klaus, it is evident that the original ideas for border formalities were oversimplified, and that "autumn 1992 saw a slapdash job made of the treaty. The facts of life rendered the treaty—signed 30 November 1992—on border formalities between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic obsolete." The prime minister added that he discussed this with Slovak Prime Minister Meciar during his visit to Bratislava last Monday.

A new treaty on customs procedures at border crossings and the joint exercise of customs protection will have to be signed, both prime ministers believe, according to Klaus. Consideration will have to be made about intrastate customs offices and payment of duty for goods transported. Regarding the movement of goods, Klaus gave minimum bureaucracy as the primary objective, so that it does not become more complicated than it is vis-a-vis other countries.

"In any event, we are talking about a joint solution and joint protection of the state border. Therefore, just one joint customs office is considered necessary for each border crossing. That is another thing that we agreed on in Bratislava," the prime minister summed up. In addition, what Klaus termed small-scale border traffic must be defined precisely yet liberally, and in a manner that accommodates both sides as much as possible. "If someone makes a once-in-a-lifetime trip from Trebisov to Karlovy Vary, or the other way round, let him undergo the same formalities at the border as if travelling to Austria," the prime minister stated. The problem is, however, in the definition of everyday communications between the citizens of the two countries, living on the opposite sides of the border, so as to prevent possible hardships and injury to neighborly relations between people. That is the task of the new treaty, Klaus said, as specified by the two sides on Monday.

'Insufficient' Border Cooperation Seen

LD0303174793 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] The Czech Government has reached the conclusion that the change of procedures on the border with Slovakia was inevitable, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said at a news conference after the cabinet session. However, the Interior Ministry document, which was submitted for the regular cabinet meeting today, was not properly drawn up, Klaus said. A group of ministers will discuss it again on Sunday, 7 March.

Vaclav Klaus went on to say that the Czech cabinet is concerned over the insufficient cooperation of the Slovak side on the issue of borders between the two states.

Hungarians, Czechs View Visegrad Group Prospects

LD0303202793 Budapest MTI in English 1822 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Prague, March 3 (MTI)—Prospects of cooperation between the Visegrad countries—the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary—stood in the focus of talks between Gyorgy Szabad, speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, and Milan Uhde, speaker of the Czech House of Representatives, in Prague on Wednesday [3 March].

In Uhde's view, the four countries should open the way for European integration by creating the foundations of a common economic order. He was opposed, however, to the Visegrad group acting in a way that could be interpreted as a pressure group, lobbying for the joining to Western structures.

Szabad said the European security mechanisms should enable the four states to join European integration. Hungary holds it important for the Visegrad states to intensify ties not only with one another but even with the stronger, external states, Szabad said. In his view, the eastern countries' integration into Europe will only be successful if it is earnestly wanted by the West.

The Hungarian parliamentary delegation led by Szabad has met members of the various parliamentary groups, and exchanged views on their experience in privatization, and on cultural and educational topics. The Hungarian MP's [members of parliament] regretted that the recent period had witnessed a decline in cultural cooperation between the two countries.

In a meeting with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czech parliament, the sides agreed that although, in a physical sense, Hungary and the Czech Republic had no common border, it would be proper to speak about fostering good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

Havel's Speech Seen as Criticism of Government

AU0303213293

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 24 February, Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech on 25 February, and Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 27 February carry commentaries on President Havel's 23 February speech in the Czech Parliament, all of which emphasize the affinity between Havel's words and opposition parties' criticism of government policies.

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 24 February on page 1 carries a 400-word Katerina Perknerova commentary entitled "Test." Perknerova says, among other things: "In my opinion, the president mainly wanted to emphasize the continuity of his thinking. It is possible, however, that the chosen tone of his speech served as a protective shell for what he wanted to communicate above all—his opinion on the nonexistence of a government stance on industrial, energy, education, and, to a certain extent, foreign policies. When he said that even the free play of market forces must follow certain rules or that the West will hardly be interested in the Czech Republic as some kind of a new outpost on the borders between two worlds, he was actually only reiterating the words of his friend, Civic Movement Chairman Jiri Dienstbier, as presented in RUDE PRAVO. However, Havel was also expressing the ideas of the opposition Liberal Social Union and the Czechoslovak Social Democracy. Incidentally, even while Havel was delivering his speech, Prime Minister Klaus was providing a certain nonverbal comment on it by devoting himself to reading some papers or to chatting with his neighbors. Finance Minister Kocarnik later told me that the economic passages of Havel's speech appeared to him 'somewhat centralist.' All the more interesting were the reactions of Jan Kalvoda (Civic Democratic Alliance) and Miroslav Vyborny (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party), who said that they did not have a single objection to the contents of the speech. Kalvoda was even satisfied that he differed from some members of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] on this point."

In concluding, Perknerova sees the above reactions to Havel's first speech to the Czech parliament as "an indirect test of where the president will find allies and where he will find opponents."

Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech on 25 February on page 3 carries a 700-word Martin Danes and Lucie Staudova commentary entitled "The Castle and Castles in the Air." The commentary interprets the foreign policy section of Havel's speech as a "relatively sharp criticism" of the government's approach to foreign policy.

The authors recall Havel's warning against "the gradual loss of the inner ethos" of Czech foreign policy and his emphasis on "coresponsibility for the fate of the human community." They see these remarks as "indicating that the old-new president may not have extricated himself yet from the building of castles in the air, something to which he occasionally succumbed in the initial phase of his foreign political career." They also believe that "inadvertently, the president set former Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Dienstbier as an example for the present government."

Danes and Staudova go on to recall Havel's statement that the Czech Republic "must not renounce its coresponsibility for stability in that part of Central Europe east of us" and his dismissal of the "illusory notion" that "the Czech Republic can be incorporated into western economic, political, and security structures more quickly only by extricating itself from the environment which surrounds it." According to the authors, "these words were a 'poke in the ribs' of Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec and the present government, who are enforcing the concept of the Czech Republic's independent path into West European institutions, without the burden of the partners from the so-called Visegrad group, who are increasingly lagging behind."

To conclude, the commentators say: "It seems that the public dispute between Minister Zieleniec and the president about foreign policy, which erupted shortly after the president's inauguration and later subsided, runs deeper. The ideas of Josef Zieleniec's ministry about future foreign policy are really quite different [from the president's]. According to these ideas, Czech diplomacy should finally lead this country out of the unstable zone of the European East. In his speech, President Havel stressed the exact opposite: the duty to cooperate and conduct a 'permanent political dialogue' with their eastern neighbors.

"This concept of Havel's is somewhat outdated today. Following Czechoslovakia's partition, the Czech Republic has separated itself from East Europe geographically and its economic and political separation from this region is well under way. Our foreign policy

must therefore stand on somewhat different foundations than it did six months ago: the Visegrad group is becoming less and less interesting to this country and, in many respects, it is becoming a needless association."

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 27 February on page 6 carries an 800-word commentary, entitled "The Fragile War Between the Castle and the Government," which compares government officials' and opposition representatives' reactions to the president's 23 February speech. Leschtina observes that representatives of the government coalition "were not exactly enthusiastic" about Havel's speech, while "the opposition praised the president for his emphatic warning against crime, corruption, intolerance, and indifference." According to Leschtina, even Prime Minister Klaus was conducting "subtle polemics" with Havel when he said that "the government would assess today's situation more optimistically. It would see a greater number of positive features than could be heard in the president's speech."

Summing up, the commentator says: "The president's first speech to parliament and the government elite's immediate reactions to it only confirmed that we will have to grow accustomed to some kind of permanent 'fragile war' between the Castle [the seat of the president] and the Straka Academy [the seat of the government]."

Confidence in Political Situation Increasing

AU0303145093 Prague CTK in English 1130 GMT 1 Mar 93

[Text] Prague, Mar 1 (CTK)—Confidence in the political situation in the Czech Republic has increased in comparison to last December, according to a survey conducted in February by the Institute for Public Opinion Research.

The survey, which polled 779 citizens of the Czech Republic, showed that confidence in the government is growing, but that confidence in the Czech parliament remains low.

Only 2 percent of those polled said that they were very satisfied with the political situation in the Czech Republic. In February, 36 percent said they were mostly satisfied, while last December only 21 percent said the same. In February, 15 percent of Czech citizens were very unsatisfied with the political situation in the Czech Republic, compared to 23 percent in December.

In February, 64 percent of Czech citizens had confidence in their government and 46 percent had confidence in the Czech parliament, compared to only 52 and 47 percent, respectively, in December.

The research showed that confidence in government and parliament increased in relation to the respondents' level of education. Among less educated respondents, 46 percent expressed confidence in parliament and 54 percent in government, while 56 percent of university graduates had confidence in parliament and 74 percent in government.

Confidence in the government was expressed by 68 percent of small town residents, compared to 74 percent of city dwellers. Prague residents, with 79 percent, had the greatest amount of confidence in the government.

Gas Pipeline Cannot Be Divided Prior to June 1994

AU0303204693 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Feb 93 p 14

[Report by Blanka Ruzickova: "No Agreement on Transit Fees Yet; The Transit Gas Pipeline Will Be Divided by a Repumping Station by 30 June 1994"]

[Text] Vladimir Dlouhy, minister of industry and trade, yesterday confirmed that the talks on dividing the transit gas pipeline have not been completed. As he said, Czech payments for the transit of gas across the territory of Slovakia remain a bone of contention.

The Czech Republic is ready to accept a fee of $1.10 for the transit of 1,000 cubic meters per 100 kilometers, while the Slovak side demands $1.40. German and Austrian customers pay between $1.30 and $1.70 for the transit of gas across the territories of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, according to Dlouhy.

Nonetheless, the Czech and Slovak delegations have finally agreed this week, according to Vladimir Dlouhy, that the Transit Gas Pipeline Company, which now operates under the Czech Gas Works, will be divided into two independent republican companies. The contracts with Russian suppliers and German and Austrian customers will be taken over by both republican companies, which may set up a joint nonprofit subsidiary for negotiations with foreign partners. This provisional arrangement will remain in force until 30 June 1994 at the latest when a repumping station will go into operation at the Moravian-Slovak border.

The property of the transit gas pipeline, which amounts to approximately 23 billion korunas according to calculations from late last year, will be divided according to the territorial principle—that is roughly a 1:1 ratio. The Transit Gas Pipeline company employs about 3,300 people in both republics.

Some 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas were delivered to the CSFR from Russia last year. Of this amount, 8 billion cubic meters were for consumption in the Czech Republic and 2 billion cubic meters were for Slovakia. These deliveries are paid for partly by transit fees for gas that goes to Germany and Austria. Another part of these gas deliveries is a form of repayment for the Federation's investment projects in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

At this week's talks between the republican ministers of industry, the Slovak side accepted the original Czech demand that gas deliveries for federal investments be divided in a 2:1 ratio. Regarding the Czech Republic's fees for gas transit across Slovak territory, the only agreement reached so far is that the fees will be paid in convertible currency.

Statistics Say January Prices Rose Sharply

AU0403092793 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 24 Feb 93 p 8

[Article by the Czech Statistical Office, Department of Price Statistics and Foreign Trade: "A Sharper Price Increase in January"]

[Text] Prices for all products rose sharply in the production sector in January.

Compared with the level of December 1992, the smallest increase in prices was in industrial products, 3.7 percent. A more pronounced—and basically identical—increase was recorded in other production spheres. Prices for construction costs rose 6.8 percent; prices for material and products used in the building industry 7 percent; drinkable water 6.6 percent; and sewage water management 9.2 percent.

Prices for agricultural products rose 7.2 percent in January 1993, compared with January 1992. Prices for animal farming products rose 5.6 percent, and for crop farming products as much as 21.2 percent, which itself did not have a larger impact on the rise in the price level in view of the season.

Prices for industrial products rose 12.2 percent compared to the same period last year; prices for construction costs 18.2 percent; and material and products consumed in the building industry 20.2 percent.

The sharp increase in drinking water prices, 148.1 percent, and sewage water management, 149.4 percent, had an impact on prices last year due to the liberalization of prices for the production sector, and to the fixing of new maximum prices for the public.

In the January price increase, there are reflected, above all, increased prices for primary materials, and also the consumer tax, which was included in the price of some products in connection with the changes to the tax policy beginning 1 January 1993.

Kocarnik Comments on Customs Union

AU0303165893 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Feb 93 p 3

[Interview with Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik, by "jis"; place and date not given: "One Question for Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik"]

[Text] ["jis"] What Slovak Government measures could cast doubt on the existence of the customs union between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic?

[Kocarnik] During our talks [in Bratislava on 22 February] both the Czech and Slovak sides unequivocally expressed their desire to stay in the customs union. I consider the disquieting signals sent out by the Slovak prime minister in his [21 February] television speech to have been more of a general philosophizing than specifically proposed measures by the Slovak Government. Vladimir Meciar told us at the meeting that what he said did not concern the Czech Republic. If the Slovak Government contemplated the introduction of some measures, it would have to inform the Czech side about them, under the provisions of the customs union treaty. The Slovak side is now exploring ways of improving its balance of payments. This can be done, on the one hand, by means of certain economic measures or, on the other, on the basis of administrative measures. We, too, took a number of regulatory measures after the introduction of internal convertibility, such as mandatory terms of payment and other steps aimed at stabilizing foreign exchange reserves. Measures of this sort are possible even within the framework of the customs union. Should, however, steps be taken that significantly restrict the attained level of liberalization, the further existence of the customs union would naturally be threatened.

Defense Minister's MiG-29 Remark Called 'Naive'

AU0303172893 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 26 Feb 93 p 5

[Commentary by Dusan Neumann: "The MiG-29 and Ministerial Naivete"]

[Text] Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys recently declared in parliament that "it is unnecessary to use MiG-29 aircraft since we are one of the producers of state-of-the-art combat aircraft." (LIDOVE NOVINY 12 February) Such a belief is incredibly naive and betrays a total ignorance of airforce hardware.

If the Czech Army is to have a fighter airforce at all, it must be equipped with machines capable of competing with the weaponry of an enemy. Let us leave aside who this enemy could be, but it seems he would most likely be equipped with Russian MiG's and YAK's. Czech L-39 and L-59 trainer aircraft, with all due respect to their makers, are simply no match for them.

I have seen a joint display of MiG's and U.S. F-15 and F-16 aircraft. The Russian aircraft surpassed the U.S. ones in certain parameters. Top U.S. pilots also spoke about MiG performance with professional respect. Although they are more primitive and less well equipped electronically than the U.S. aircraft, their flight capabilities are excellent. The MiGs' only weakness from a civilian point of view is that they are uneconomical. For instance, making use of the excellent shape of the fuselage and equipping it with better engines and the corresponding electronic equipment would be worth taking into consideration. The Czech Air Force would thus acquire world class aircraft.

The Pentagon commits $16 billion per annum to military aircraft hardware research and development alone. When you add to this the construction and operation of test aircraft, we come to the giddy sum of $35 billion. And the majority of prototypes only end up on paper. No one is currently capable of competing with the U.S. in this sphere. They have still not shown the world the Stealth TR-3A Manta (apparently, 30 have been built) or the Aurora, reputedly capable of reaching a speed of Mach 6. There are already rumors about flying prototypes of an exotic "watermelon seed" propelled by external combustion and capable of flying at eight times the speed of sound.

In comparison with such grandiose programs, developing a Czech military aircraft seems something akin to perfecting a schoolboy's catapult. At the same time, it would be more useful to continue to develop and manufacture training aircraft, to maintain their market, and to reassess the role of the Czech Air Force and equip it so it is capable of deterring a possible enemy. And most of all: It would be more useful not to talk nonsense.

Differences Between Defense Officers Denied

AU0303171393 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Feb 93 p 2

[Report by "jem": "No Army Purge Is in the Works"]

[Text] Prague—The Ministry of Defense has not prepared any directive, the implementation of which would mean an across-the-board purge among Czech Army officers, Jiri Sila from the ministry's Information Service said yesterday. He went on to say that the information that the ministry's leading staff, including Chief of General Staff Karel Pezl, disagreed with Defense Minister Antonin Baudys' personnel policy was not true. According to Jiri Sila, only background materials designed to improve the work of the corps of commanders had been drafted at the ministry. He added that it was not true that the dismissal of officers over the age of 45 or graduates of Soviet military schools was being considered.

Slovaks Want Measures To Ensure Against Assimilation

LD0303185293 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] According to the Matica Slovenska Institute for Slovaks Abroad, the Czech Republic should adopt a law on national minorities. The institute's spokesmen said at a news conference in Bratislava today that the situation of Slovaks living in the Czech Republic is more critical than that in Hungary. More than 300,000 Slovaks live in Bohemia. They are the biggest minority in this country. Matica representatives said that legislative measures of Czech Government were the only way of protecting the Slovak minority from Czech assimilation.

Knazko Says Foreign Policy Starts Slow; Hard To Change

LD0303195893 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Interview with Slovak Foreign Minister Milan Knazko by correspondent Gabriela Nemkiova on 3 March; place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] After a working meeting with the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Gabriela Nemkiova asked Slovak Foreign Minister Milan Knazko several questions.

[Nemkiova] The assessment of the Foreign Committee chairman was more than positive. He even said that he did not regard your ministry as one of the weakest links in the government. He also said that he would propose that you not be recalled. Are you surprised at this assessment?

[Knazko] Mr. Laluha is one of the most capable policy analysts and I regard him as a very considerate man able to seek well-balanced and harmonious solutions. In any case, I hold Mr. Ivan Laluha's personal view in high esteem. [passage omitted]

[Nemkiova] The more or less positive assessment of the president voiced during his visit to your ministry and the follow-up visit of Foreign Committee representatives can have in fact a positive impact on government's negative stand towards your trip to Geneva or possibly to Brussels. Do you think that there can still be some change in this respect?

[Knazko] As far as Brussels is concerned, I have already said that I would initiate a special session of the cabinet so that we could re-examine this decision and this stand, because of the need to be aware of the importance of this meeting, when for the first time in history all ministers of foreign affairs are due to meet. They are irreplaceable in this respect. No substitute can be sent there because it would show our low interest in this cooperation and we, in Slovakia, cannot afford to to that. I regard the vote that I should not attend this event—and this vote was taken without analysing the purpose of this meeting—as irresponsible vis-a-vis Slovakia's future in the sphere of its foreign relations. Regardless of the fact that I might be recalled on the 10th or 12th [of March], but after all, I would not go to Brussels as a private person. Of course, I am saying this only as an example now. Our foreign policy must not be influenced by internal political events or domestic political relations. That is something that we will have to accept. Even while there is change of governments in underdeveloped countries, foreign policy undertakings are simply sacred. We must not make these mistakes, especially not in the beginning. Our start was very unfortunate and will be difficult to remedy.

Ministers Outline Privatization Plans

AU0303193893 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Feb 93 p 2

[TA SR report: "An End to the Monopoly on Tobacco, Spirits, and Salt?"]

[Text] Bratislava—Interested parties from home and abroad will be given equal consideration in the enterprise privatization process. Enterprises in all sectors of the economy will be privatized; only the railroads, post office, and arms industry will remain in state hands. Slovak Minister for the Administration and Privatization of National Property Lubomir Dolgos said this yesterday at the Private Investment in an Independent Slovakia conference.

Ninety foreign and 50 domestic businessmen are participating in the event, which began in Bratislava's Hotel Forum on Wednesday [24 February]. In the second wave of privatization—in which 500 enterprises have so far been included—priority will be given to standard methods, that is, public tenders, public auctions, and direct sales. The minister pointed out that great emphasis will be placed on settling the debts of the enterprise being privatized. He also stressed that some of the shares in the privatized enterprises will be earmarked for coupon privatization.

According to estimates, some 516 billion korunas will be needed in the years 1993-2000 for the overall restructuring of Slovak industry. Forty to 50 percent of this sum will come from domestic sources; it will be necessary to obtain the remainder in the form of investments or foreign credits. This statement was made at the conference by Economy Minister Ludovit Cernak. More than 350 state enterprises with property worth some 140 billion korunas are included in the second wave of privatization among the sectors supervised by the Economy Ministry.

Finance Minister Julius Toth said at the conference that price increases of 13-20 percent are to be expected in Slovakia and that prices will increase by a maximum of 20 percent during the course of the year. The main aim is to eradicate state subsidies on prices—in 1992 the market determined 95 percent of prices—and replace them with economic prices.

Fifteen billion korunas should be invested before 1995 in telecommunications in Slovakia. This will substantially improve the quality of the telecommunications network, which is essential for business development. Minister for Transportation, Communications, and Public Works Roman Hofbauer told the conference participants about the opportunities for investing in this sphere. Constructing highways, equipping Kosice and Bratislava Airports, constructing a railroad in South Slovakia, and participating in the privatization of river transportation on the Danube are some of the other opportunities in which foreign investors can become involved.

Conference Chairman Zdenko Kovac explained to participants the purpose of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office (PU SR) in keeping with the law on protecting economic competition and its role in deciding the result of public competitions. He said the PU SR has proposed that a new law be adopted on abolishing the state's monopoly on tobacco, spirits, and salt.

Kovac Supports Knazko in Conflict With Meciar

AU0303165593 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Feb 93 p 3

[Interview with President Michal Kovac by Maria Sisulakova; in Bratislava on 24 February: "I Am Satisfied With Knazko"]

[Text] President Michal Kovac yesterday paid a visit to the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose chief is the target of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's criticism. He met with the ministry's leading staff, including Milan Knazko.

[Sisulakova] Can you identify with Minister Knazko's foreign policy concept?

[Kovac] I had an opportunity to familiarize myself with it even earlier. Now I confirm that I have no objections to it.

[Sisulakova] Do your views on some issues differ from the minister's views?

[Kovac] All kinds of suggestions used to be addressed to me, such as that Slovak diplomats should be summoned home for a conference. As it turned out, however, the ministry is in contact with individual missions abroad and such a conference would therefore be costly and, most likely, not very efficient. The existing contacts are adequate, which had made me change my opinion.

[Sisulakova] Wherein do you see the ministry's problem?

[Kovac] We still have not managed to enhance Slovakia's credibility in the world because some internal events have been incorporated into Slovakia's image and, instead of improving the image, are making it worse.

[Sisulakova] Is the ministry to be blamed for this?

[Kovac] I do not think that this is the ministry's fault, and I did not think so in the past either.

[Sisulakova] Does this mean that the information with which you came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be put into the category of white noise [informacni sum]?

[Kovac] Yes, as far as some of the information is concerned. However, this information did not have such an effect on me. I realize that it is not easy to build a ministry while at the same time having to ensure the fulfillment of its duties. I am now pleasantly surprised.

[Sisulakova] Will Milan Knazko accompany you on your trips abroad?

[Kovac] In a number of states, his participation in the president's trips will be inevitable.

[Sisulakova] How will you react when you receive the proposal that Knazko be recalled?

[Kovac] We do not know whether this will actually happen. The prime minister has expressed that desire. Wait for the outcome.

[Sisulakova] Does Knazko meet your ideas regarding a foreign minister?

[Kovac] Yes.

Meciar Explains Cancellation of Geneva Trip

AU0303214893 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 2 Mar 93 p 2

[Report by Michal Stefanek: "The Slovak Government Held a Session"]

[Text] After the government session [on 1 March], Prime Minister Meciar replied to reporters' question as to why the government did not approve Slovak Foreign Minister Knazko's visits to Geneva and Brussels by saying: "In this sphere, information and disinformation frequently alternate."

According to him, the government considered it necessary that the Slovak Republic be represented at the conference by a person who has more experience in that area. He said that the cabinet members first proposed Minister of Justice Toth. "Later, we decided that it would be best if Foreign Ministry State Secretary Lisuch went, and Knazko stayed at home," Meciar stated. He added that another reason was that the trip would take place immediately after the inauguration of the Slovak president, and Knazko had some duties to carry out there.

Referring to Minister Knazko's reaction, Meciar stated that, having heard the government decision, the minister excused himself as he did not feel well. Later he also apologized to the cabinet members in writing. The prime minister did not speak about the reasons for canceling Knazko's trip to Brussels.

Government Rejects Czech Gas Pipeline Proposal

AU0303144193 Prague CTK in English 2043 GMT 1 Mar 93

[Text] Bratislava, Mar 1 (CTK)—The Slovak Government has rejected a Czech proposal on the joint operation of the Transgas natural gas pipeline company, Government Spokesman Bohuslav Geci told a press conference after today's government session.

Geci said the government resented that the Czech side withheld the Slovak share of hard currency carrying fees and was unwilling to transfer them to the Slovak budget.

The Czechs have thus taken advantage of Slovakia by earning interest and furthermore, they can distribute these funds to benefit the Czech Republic, Geci said. He added that this problem must soon be taken up by the two premiers and appropriate ministries.

The government also refused to name Adolf Hejduk to the rectorship of Trnava University. Acting Rector Hejduk, a political opponent of the Slovak ruling party the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), was never confirmed in the post and the Slovak culture and later education ministers repeatedly tried to close the school down or make it a campus of the Comenius University in Bratislava.

The university managed to survive the ministerial actions which were considered to restrict academic freedom, and Geci said today that the government cannot confirm Hejduk in his office since the acting rector would be then proven to be in the right.

The government also discussed an aborted visit of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation two weeks ago. Geci refused to elaborate on the subject. He called the government's conclusions confidential and intended only for the Slovak National Bank.

He stated that the IMF opinions did not completely correspond to the reality at the disposal of the Slovak banking managers. Geci added that only now was the Slovak banking situation being resolved, since it was veiled by the existence of a single (Czech and Slovak) currency until February 8.

Knazko Briefs Press on Foreign Ministry's Activity

AU0403110693 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 26 Feb 93 p 1

[Report by Bedrich Zagar: "Standing Conference To Be Set Up"]

[Text] Slovak Foreign Minister Milan Knazko yesterday gave a news conference on his ministry's activities in the immediate future. He provided new information saying that—in order to avoid misunderstandings with the government and the Foreign Committee of the National Committee of the Slovak Republic, and to achieve wide social consensus in matters of foreign policy—he proposed setting up a standing conference to deal with the Slovak Republic's foreign policy.

As another example of his activity, Minister Knazko cited his trip to Geneva, where he made a speech in the UN Human Rights Commission, and on 8 March he will participate in a meeting of foreign ministers of the Vizegrad Four, and in a meeting of the CSCE three leading countries. In cooperation with other sectors of the state administration, the foreign ministry is drafting its plans for activities this year. At the beginning of March, there will be a meeting with representatives of compatriot associations all over the world, who will also be received by supreme representatives of the Slovak Republic.

Then Minister Knazko answered reporters' questions. He rejected accusations that his ministry was being passive in the matter of the Gabcikovo dam controversy since its activity does not stand comparison with Hungarian activity. He also did not share the view that there are differences between Prime Minister Meciar and the foreign minister over foreign policy. "We drafted principles of the concept of our foreign policy. All [ministerial] sectors had an opportunity to state their opinion. My own ideas are also contained in this concept," Knazko said and added that if Mr. Meciar is of a different opinion, then Knazko would like to hear it. Minister Knazko said, with satisfaction, that Prime Minister Meciar had interpreted, in no uncertain terms, the standpoints of the foreign ministry in Western security organizations, standpoints that ensue from the said concept. This concept had been a subject of "purposeful, unjustified, and, above all, unqualified criticism." Regarding the prime minister's visit to Brussels he said that the prime minister's program was almost identical with the program of Knazko's visit, a visit that did not take place.

M. Knazko explained his opinion on the Hungarian parliament's standpoint, in which it is said that the Slovak Republic—and its predecessor, the CSFR—committed an unprecedented violation of the territorial integrity of Hungary and several international treaties. "I would like to say on this subject that territorial integrity has not been violated—in no case," Knazko said and continued by saying that the state border between Slovakia and Hungary has not been moved at all, only the transport route has been moved into a side channel [derivacni kanal]. Article 18 of the Treaty on the Construction of the Gabcikovo-Magymaros Water Dam System provides for that. The treaty also amends the character of the state border in Article 22.

Meciar Rejects 'Klaus Form of Economic Policy'

LD0303215093 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 2000 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar announced today that his government is departing from the so-called Klaus form of economic policy. This policy has produced a 30 percent economic decline in Slovakia, he said. At a meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] tonight, Meciar said that the proper basis is political stability and the halting of further deterioration of the social position of the Slovak population. The Slovak government wants to attain this goal through a program of vigorous measures designed to immediately introduce order on the free market. One of these measures should be

to stop imports of second-rate goods paid for in Slovak koruny, Meciar said. The basis should be the Slovak currency's stability, not its devaluation.

The HZDS chairman also rejected calls for social unrest and said that it is essential to put an end to the fighting between political parties and individuals in Slovakia. The time when it was sufficient to oppose things is over, now it is necessary to stand for things, Vladimir Meciar said. At the same time, he stressed that—I quote—no one has the right to negate the basic political interests of the state and to work against them, regardless of if he conceals this by efforts aimed at plurality and democracy. The basis of democracy does not lie in the forming of a coalition government, Meciar said. Power rests in unity, not in numbers, he added.

The HZDS meeting, which was held tonight in the Bratislava Sports Hall, was also attended by Milan Knazko and Rudolf Filkus. Neither of them spoke, but Knazko was welcomed with just as loud chanting and applause of HZDS supporters as was Vladimir Meciar. The hall was not very full.

Meciar To Sign Economic Agreements in Moscow

AU0303211993 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Feb 93 p 7

["Excerpt" of an interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "In Moscow Mainly About Oil; Prior to Vladimir Meciar's Trip to Moscow"—reprinted from the 26 February issue of Bratislava SME in Slovak]

[Excerpts] [SME] Regarding their treaties with Russia, which are now being drafted, Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw insist that the preambles of these treaties mention Russia's responsibility for brutal military interventions and that the interventions be condemned in them. Will Slovakia insist on a similar clause?

[Meciar] The question is whether it is Russia that is responsible for this intervention or the former USSR. Are we going to have these clauses in the preambles of treaties with the other republics of the former USSR as well? If yes, then we are also going to have it in the treaty with Russia. What must not be ignored, however, is that Russia is the successor to the obligation to pay damages. It has not, however, taken over the commitments arising from this, on which there must be agreement. The other issues will be discussed. The Russian side let us know that it is not interested in having such a clause included in the preamble as it does not feel responsible for this political mistake of the USSR leadership. [passage omitted] The documents I will be signing in Russia will concern trade exchange. The agreement on wider-ranging cooperation, the so-called political cooperation, will be the subject of further negotiations, in view of the fact that unequivocal agreement has not been reached on this issue, and will be postponed until the nearest acceptable period. We have always been interested in good relations with Russia and are interested in them now. Oil and gas will continue flowing from the east to the west and the countries of transit can only profit from it.

[SME] How far has the preparation of a general political agreement with Russia progressed?

[Meciar] This agreement has already been consulted in the government. The views on it vary. There are more liberal views, as it were, to the effect that Russia is not responsible for the mistakes of the USSR. I cannot imagine other republics of the former USSR, such as Belarus or Lithuania, accepting a clause on their responsibility for the 1968 occupation.

Ministry Official: Koruna Should Remain Unchanged

AU0403093093 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 24 Feb 93 pp 1, 13

[Article by Stefan Burda, director of the foreign trade department at the Ministry of Economy: "Devaluation Is No Solution"]

[Text] It is logical that the stability of the Slovak koruna is dependent on balanced foreign currency flows, and these flows are dependent on the foreign trade balance. We must consider the importance of how the trade balance develops, particularly in discussions about devaluation. We will also give the territorial breakdown of the Slovak and the Czech Republics' foreign trade, compiled on the basis of customs statistics published by the Federal Statistical Office (the Czech Statistical Office, today).

Slovak exports rose 1.9 percent in 1992, compared with 1991, and Slovakia's share in exports from the former CSFR rose from 29.3 percent to 30 percent. In the European area, we recorded an increase in exports in 1992—to Germany 25.8 percent, Austria 29.7 percent, France 57.6 percent, Italy 10.9 percent, Switzerland 60.5 percent, and exports to Hungary rose too, 60.5 percent. The increase in exports alone is a positive trend. It is important that this applies to advanced market economies from which we can expect prompt payments.

Slovak imports declined 5.3 percent in 1992, compared with 1991, and Slovakia's share of CSFR imports declined from 33.7 percent to 28.4 percent. We consider this to be a positive trend, since the import of mineral fuel and other raw materials from the former USSR declined 23.3 percent, while the import of final production from the European Community rose 37 percent.

Because of this development, the Slovak Republic's trade deficit declined 7.5 billion korunas compared with 1991, and it is an important fact that the Slovak Republic had a surplus of 2 billion korunas in trade with countries with advanced market economies. From the convertible currency balance's point of view, this development is very favorable. The Slovak Republic has "drained" the said 7.5 billion korunas from the CSFR's central foreign currency reserves. If the indicated trends

persist in 1993, we can expect that the Slovak Republic's exports will continue to grow some 4 percent (profit from the natural gas transit pipelines included), which will bring—if imports stagnate (but not their structure)—a trade surplus with third countries (apart from the Czech Republic).

As it ensues from customs statistics published by the Czech Statistical Office, Czech foreign trade began to develop in 1992, compared with 1991, contrary to the Slovak Republic's foreign trade. Exports declined 1.2 percent, imports rose 21.5 percent, and the large surplus in 1991 turned into a large deficit in 1992. The Czech Republic burdened the central source of foreign currency reserves with about 40 billion korunas. Here, apparently, is the place to look for reasons for the short supply in foreign current reserves.

Several notes regarding the development in the payments balance: It is difficult to acquire final data, because a great part of payments for imports in foreign currencies and cashing for exports by Slovak entrepreneurs is dealt with by the Prague-based Czechoslovak Commercial Bank, which is subject to Czech law. Despite that, from unofficial results, it can be seen that in January 1993 we received for Slovak exports 9.7 billion korunas. If we approximate and extend these figures over the entire year of 1993, we would get an increase in exports of 18 percent. Just the same as in the case of the trade balance, neither will this result give reason for discussions about devaluation. If information on the depletion of foreign currency reserves is the basis for such considerations, then there is only one possible explanation: Slovak entrepreneurs receive korunas for their exports, while foreign currency remains mainly in the Czechoslovak Commercial Bank.

The results of and trends in the foreign trade balance are indicating that the Slovak koruna should be left untouched (for at least six months). This is the time necessary to mobilize all the Slovak foreign currency reserves and flows, get them under our own control, and then work with them.

A specific problem is, after the division of the CSFR, the mutual trade between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Since there are no customs statistics available on the mutual movement of goods and services between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, all studies are only tentative. Despite this, from the documents published by the Czech Statistical Office, it is possible to give approximate figures on the trade balance between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic for 1992:

The Slovak Republic's exports to the Czech Republic: 81.8 billion korunas; the Slovak Republic's imports from the Czech Republic: 96.6 billion korunas; and the overall balance: - 14.8 billion korunas.

The decisive and the most important items in our deficit balance with respect to the Czech Republic are mainly: beverages and tobacco (approximately 7.8 billion korunas); wholesale and mediation of business deals [zprostredkovani] (7.4 billion korunas); machines and transportation machines (1.6 billion korunas); coal and electricity (1.1 billion korunas); assorted raw materials (1 billion korunas).

By devaluing we would make our exports cheaper not only to the Czech Republic, but also to all countries with a market economy. These countries would have the chance to buy us out. Moreover, this would make our imports more expensive, which could bring about unwanted inflation. We would also restrict our access to modern technology and machines, which we necessarily need to implement the planned changes to the economic structure.

If we considered revaluation of the Slovak koruna, we would arrive at an interesting answer. According to logic, we would expect an increase in the Czech trade surplus. On the other hand, according to the treaty on payments, we would have to pay for their surplus in convertible currencies, plus interest. Czech Prime Minister Klaus made no error when he said that it does not matter in which direction the Slovak koruna would move. He will be dissatisfied only if it does not move at all.

KSU Says Hungarian Armament 'Destabilizing'

AU0303144793 Prague CTK in English 1602 GMT 1 Mar 93

[Text] Bratislava, March 1 (CTK)—Hungary's armament isn't an internal matter of that country alone, but raises grave anxiety in Slovakia and the Christian Social Union (KSU), said KSU Chairman Jan Klepac at a press conference in Bratislava today.

KSU considers armaments in Hungary to be destabilizing and, as Klepac pointed out, able to condition a conflict even somewhere else than on the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Klepac informed that he is going to work for the Slovak president as his aide on questions of foreign policy. According to him, the head of the president's office will be barred from membership of any political party, while the other officials will not be scrutinized so closely.

No Increased Threat Seen From Yugoslav Army

LD0303200093 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Excerpt] The southern Slav crisis was on the agenda at the meeting of the National Assembly's Defense Committee. Krisztina Antalffy reports:

[Antalffy] Along the southern borders of Hungary the danger is no worse than it was some days ago when the Deutsche Rundfunk radio reported that Yugoslavia was perhaps considering some form of counteraction against states taking part in the Bosnia action. This was said by Laszlo Szendrei, political state secretary of the Defence Ministry, after a closed session in which Chief of Staff Janos Deak advised the National Assembly's Defense Committee on topical defense issues. According to Laszlo Szendrei, the German radio report was not based on fact and the message was not necessarily aimed at Hungary. No major organizational movement of the Yugoslav Army has been observed, and there is no reason to place the Hungarian Army on increased readiness.

To avoid misunderstandings, Hungarian officials have stepped up contacts with the relevant organs of the Yugoslav General Staff. [passage omitted]

Irish Foreign Minister Meets With Jeszenszky

AU0403140093 Budapest MTI in English 1358 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Text] Budapest, 2 Mar (MTI)—Bilateral ties, the South Slav crisis and Hungary's endeavours to integrate into Europe were in the focus of talks between Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky and Irish counterpart Dick Spring on Tuesday [2 March].

Spring's visit to Hungary is his first abroad since he took office as foreign minister.

The visit, aimed at intensifying bilateral ties, expresses the importance Ireland attaches to Hungary and Poland, from where he arrived in Hungary, Spring told the press after the talks.

Answering questions, he said Ireland supported Hungary's integration efforts, but added the European Community itself struggled with internal difficulties concerning the Maastricht Treaty. He hoped the differences would be smoothed out and said the first step forward was to continue talks with EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. Regarding Hungary's integration endeavours, he praised the country's significant progress made over a short period of time.

Hungary has an important role "on the map of Europe," he added.

Asked by MTI, Spring said his talks with Jeszenszky had touched upon the South Slav crisis as well. Ireland is concerned over what is happening in the former Yugoslavia, and hopes the Vance-Owen peace plan may resolve the crisis and create peace. Spring said the EC keeps the issue of the South Slav crisis on its agenda, the next time it will be discussed is at a foreign ministerial meeting in Brussels next Monday.

Hungary seeks to establish permanent contacts with Ireland, Hungarian Foreign Affairs Spokesman Janos Herman said. An important stage of building ties will be a visit by the Irish prime minister to Hungary, probably in the second half of 1993.

Also, Hungary pins hope on developing economic ties. Although Hungarian-Irish trade has been modest recently, it is starting to grow, amounting to nearly USD 4 million over the first two months of this year. A further boost is expected from a future bilateral agreement on avoiding double taxation.

Editorial Views Domestic Power Struggle

AU0303215593 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Feb 93 p 3

[Editorial by Istvan Tanacs: "Everyone Into the Center"]

[Text] It is the sweeping election victory of [Lithuanian President] Algirdas Brazauskas that sealed Istvan Csurka's fate. The results of the Lithuanian elections also made it obvious to Hungarian political forces that the electors do not envisage their future as constantly singing the national anthem and denouncing the neighboring nations on an empty stomach. Therefore, if there are free elections, the forces of radical nationalism will probably be defeated there. The frantic support seen at the gatherings of the populists gives a false picture, because the majority of people are sitting at home and desire peace and prosperity.

Csurka was correct in seeing that either he manages to seize power within the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], thus acquiring control over the enforcement agencies and introducing a dictatorship, or his efforts will be doomed for a long time. A real chance existed for the former possibility, but Csurka failed, and so he has to go, as [MDF liberal deputy] Jozsef Debreczeni said in our 24 February issue. He has to go because the center of the MDF does not want a dictatorship, but it wants to win the elections. In the wake of the Lithuanian example, fear of the left has increased and the leading political forces are forging ahead toward the center, pushing one another out of the way.

A new picture can gradually be seen, in which a number of things are outlined. The Hungarian Way circles are slowly and gradually being pushed out of the MDF. The free use of the MDF's telephones and faxes are being taken away from them and so is the possibility of pumping taxpayers' money from the banks and companies that are close to the government into their own foundations. Their people will not be allowed anywhere near the public media. Csurka can finance his newspapers from their sales and his movement from the membership fees paid by his devotees!

However, another intent emerges from the debate and agreement between the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]: The plan to exclude the left wing and to prevent a Lithuanian election result. It is only sensible for the liberal parties to treat the left wing as an ally while Istvan Csurka and his team are ranting on the extreme right and the general public is forced to see him as a real specter, a threatening danger. However, if Csurka and his team find themselves in an empty space and are isolated, then the center led by [Prime Minister and MDF Chairman] Jozsef Antall will not have the appearance of being identical with them, and the stubborn need will also cease to exist, which, because of the peril from the extreme right, has forced the two liberal parties to cooperate with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP].

Jozsef Antall and [FIDESZ faction leader] Viktor Orban probably agree now that before they can turn against the left wing, Csurka has first to be pushed to the periphery. Now [SZDSZ Chairman] Ivan Peto has also been convinced not to give any kind of moral support to the MSZP before the elections. Let it be seen what the MSZP can do on its own—if it is impossible to leave it out of government, it will be enough to talk to it after the first round of elections. In addition, we have the situation of the hand-operated media. As Tamas Katona [political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office] has also said, the media law is not urgent for the MDF. Why would it be urgent when the government is now in a bargaining position because it can make it a matter of negotiations who can talk on television before the elections, at what time, and for how long and, since the liberal parties blew the media law, they will be forced into this kind of bargaining behind the scenes.

A person of a left-wing disposition who is not very much interested in whether the MSZP will come to power and will be able to dish out positions to its followers who have fasted long, has to say that these events prove the strength of the MSZP and what is happening is good for the country. Returning to the center expands the horizons of democracy and helps to dissolve the suspicion of West European countries as regards Hungary.

In addition to the possibility of governing, it is also a success if significant political forces are made to recognize that it is only possible to win the elections with moderate, realistic, and socially sensitive programs, and the election promises will be remembered by a strong opposition and a sober public.

Interview With MSZP Chairman Gyula Horn

AU0303214593 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Feb 93 pp 1,12

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Gabor Miklos, in Kaposvar; date not given: "We Are Open"]

[Excerpts] It is natural that the two liberal parties cooperate—Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] declared during a forum held on local television in Kaposvar soon after the news of an election alliance formed by the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] was announced.

After the forum, Gyula Horn gave us an interview.

[Horn] In my opinion, it is obvious that a liberal majority will not emerge at the 1994 elections, because the two parties are not strong enough for this. This means that the creation of a new government will also require the participation of other forces. I am convinced that the MSZP will also play a role in this. This does not mean that we want to become part of the government at all costs; it only means that they will not be able to make important political decisions without us.

[Miklos] Will the MSZP modify its strategy in the wake of the SZDSZ-FIDESZ alliance?

[Horn] We do not have to modify our strategy. We continue to be open toward all the democratic parties. The SZDSZ initially suggested that we should jointly discuss their 15-point proposal. We are ready for that, and we will negotiate with the FIDESZ in April on issues affecting this country. I think that, despite the current agreement, both the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ will continue to preserve their independence. The MSZP has not yet committed itself to any other party. At the same time, with the exception of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the MSZP has not distanced itself from any party. [passage omitted]

[Miklos] How do you see the position of the opposition in Hungary?

[Horn] The way I see it, the SZDSZ has been constantly struggling with action problems. In my opinion, their biggest problem is that they cannot decide whether to do away with the classic liberal concept in their economic-social policy or not. This cannot be applied very well in practice in our region. They also hesitate about whether to move toward those social values and requirements whose marked representation could lay the foundations of the future of a social-liberal government in Hungary. We also see that the scandals of their self-government representatives and mayors and the struggles of some of their local organizations are hindering the activity of the largest opposition party in Hungary.

Quite correctly, the FIDESZ does not hide the fact that it wants to be the ruling party or part of the government in 1994. It knows that it can count on good parliamentary positions, but it can hardly count on an absolute majority. They are almost certain about the fall of the current government coalition. In my opinion, this is the reason for their firm rejection of the position of the three opposition parties represented in Parliament on concrete issues. According to their declarations, the FIDESZ does not have much confidence in the vitality of the social-liberal version. Because it wants to be a ruling party, the FIDESZ is searching hard for personalities that can be

used in the election districts. They know that they can count on results primarily in election districts based on voting lists. The series of interim elections proves this. It is understandable that the FIDESZ would not sign any agreements today that, in its view, could weaken its election chances. However, I am surprised that the SZDSZ is answering this challenge. I do not think that the latest series of loyalty declarations, by which they have adjusted to the FIDESZ on every essential issue, will increase the election chances of the SZDSZ.

[Miklos] This debate is often connected with the MSZP, and yet you keep silent.

[Horn] We speak up if we are asked to. Indeed, it is strange that they do not ask our opinion while they are analyzing us. Why does any party think that the MSZP would like to form an alliance or later a coalition with it without any preliminary agreement? There can be no such thing! The situation prevailing three years ago cannot be repeated in 1994, namely that a government coalition emerges without a responsible coalition agreement, a coalition dictated by one party.

[Miklos] The MSZP has increased in its prestige today and it has become interesting. What is the reason for this?

[Horn] People engaged in politics are aware of the increasing influence of the socialists. These people think that the MSZP will achieve results with which it will be able to participate in forming the new government or, in opposition, in making important decisions. I must admit that cooperation with the socialists is still uncomfortable for the other parties. [passage omitted]

[Miklos] What would you do if you became the ruling party next year?

[Horn] We primarily need a situation analysis, a program. No one can claim that the 1990 election program can still be used. However, we can already say that we are in favor of private property, but only when it shows social responsibility. Only an agreement between capital and labor can lead to a peaceful transition. Economic freedom is a justified requirement for capital, but it must accept social partnership with the employees.

[Miklos] Will the Hungarian trade unions be partners to this?

[Horn] Look at their programs. For example, it is not true that they are demanding the artificial preservation of bankrupt and unviable firms. They also want a structural change. They add that we should save the viable firms and somehow safeguard the domestic economy. We also agree with this. Besides, I dare say that the trade unions are our natural election allies. [passage omitted]

[Miklos] Will you tell the voters what they can expect?

[Horn] In my opinion, only the most sincere description of the situation will help in the serious conditions of 1994. We can have no illusions: There will be no savior government in 1994, and there will be no miracles. Unpopular measures will also have to be taken because, otherwise, this country becomes impossible to govern. It does not matter which party will produce the prime minister. Professional expertise and human honesty are what matter. [passage omitted]

'Situation' Develops Around Bos Power Station

AU0303134993 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Ivan Scipiades: "Risky Attempt"]

[Text] Emotions have flared up again regarding the Bos hydroelectric power station after the relative calm and silence of several months. Several people in the parliament's Environmental Protection Committee called the results of the Hungarian Bos-diplomacy a fiasco, and they also criticized the Foreign Ministry. Prior to this, the Environmental Protection Ministry and parliament's Environmental Protection Committee hurled accusations at each other. Statements and messages aimed at emotions and insults are again on the rise. There is a "situation," and a rather serious one at that.

Both Hungary and Slovakia achieved something that can be regarded as a victory at the talks aimed at temporarily settling the Bos debate (of course not on the same issue), and both countries also forced each other to take measures. Hungary's achievement is that Slovakia will probably have to accept the compromise proposal concerning the distribution of water because, if it rejects it, it would say no to the EC and not to Hungary. However, the other side's achievement lies in the fact that it succeeded in delaying this step until the rebirth of flora and fauna in spring. In other words, Hungary failed in securing an agreement on the distribution of water before spring, while the Slovaks maneuvered Hungary into a situation in which it is forced to build a submerged dam on the Danube floor to maintain an adequate water level, even with a fraction of the amount of water flow demanded by Hungary. The water level increase through the submerged dam is in line with the Hungarian-CSFR state agreement of 1977 on the basis of which the construction of the Bos-Nagymaros system began and which Hungary regards as invalid, while Slovakia regards it as valid.

It is risky to begin the construction of the dam. The risk is that it might succeed. What if there will be no ecological catastrophe involved, as the Hungarian Government claims? What if this system will really solve the problem of the Szigetkoz desiccation irrespective of Bos, as the Slovak Government claims? What if the situation will not deteriorate despite the dam? Both the believers in an ecological catastrophe and the believers in an ecological panacea are able to refer to a whole team of experts, even to justify political arguments. However, an international court (that will refuse to deal with the

technical, ecological, shipping, and other issues as political, national, or spiritual categories) might regard such a solution as the optimal solution, or a solution with the least damage.

For the experts and decisionmakers, the issue of the dam or dams means a choice between short term and long term, symptomatic and radical solutions, and various disadvantages accompanied by certain advantages. This is the reason for the new war of nerves that, according to all the signs, will escalate in the coming weeks. The decisionmakers and people who want to have a say in the decisions will bombard public opinion with penetrating pseudo-arguments.

Emotions will not solve anything here, especially the artificially stirred emotions of the population.

Editorial Analyzes U.S. Airdrop in Bosnia

AU0303161593 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 2 Mar 93 p 7

[Editorial by Gyorgy Fodor: "Nema Nista" (Serbo-Croatian for "There is none")]

[Text] After weeks of preparations, in the early morning of 1 March three U.S. cargo planes set off for Bosnia and dropped a few tons of food, medicine, and chewing gum to the starving people in the areas cut off by the fighting. The plan was introduced by weeks of propaganda campaigning and, as a culmination, Bill Clinton signed the orders for the go-ahead. Chief of Staff Colin Powell also appeared in public and, finally, some 1 million leaflets were scattered over the suffering southern Slav areas, letting everyone know that the U.S. crates were coming.

However, until the early evening of 1 March, none of the U.S. containers could be found. Radio amateurs in the cut-off areas—they are the only communicators left now—keep sending messages to each other: "Nema nista"—nothing anywhere. There is no shortage of black humor either: "The Americans could also send some ointment—our necks are hurting from constantly staring up at the sky."

It is an old U.S. law that, come what may, the show must go on. The change of presidents certainly cannot interrupt this show, especially if the newcomer is also hungry for stage success. Somehow Clinton had to continue the active policy over the matter of the southern Slav crisis. The warships are already there; it is not time to send in the soldiers yet; the flight ban has already been ordered; all he was left with was dropping containers by parachute.

Washington decided to maintain the facade of action, and it is almost unbelievable that not even one of its allies shook its head in disapproval. The toadies clapped at the sight of so much courage, and all the average American could see in his mind's eye was that down under in Bosnia, huge parachutes were descending with American chicken and rice into the open arms of the masses of starving people—Three Cheers for America!

The layman who was brought up on various war stories is calculating. How much do 1 million leaflets cost, and how much is the fuel for the airplane that carries them? How much does it cost for a mere three Hercules planes to take off, and how much are the containers, their contents, and the parachutes worth? Where does an almost one-ton parcel dropped from 3,000 or 4,000 meters fall? According to some reports, the containers can scatter over an area of four square kilometers—according to others, during training exercises, it was possible to land them within a 100-meter radius circle. According to some, the "accelerated" (slowed down) parachutes can be hitting the ground at a speed of as much as 100 kilometers per hour, while others think that it will be less than 30 kilometers per hour.

However, winds may blow, snow may fall, and the whole thing would only have any meaning if people down on the ground were expecting, searching for, and distributing the parcels in an organized fashion. Otherwise the principle of "might is right" may apply, and there is little probability that the sick, starved, frozen, and weak old people, women, and children will be staggering over the difficult terrain just to retrieve a bit of chewing gum. On the other hand, some might be lucky: If a 750-kilogram container falls into their garden then they can open up a shop, and they can sew as many as 100 bomber jackets from the parachute fabric.

Figuratively speaking, Bill Clinton probably intended his food parcels for domestic consumption. What is important is there are not many customers for this in Bosnia. These containers do not banish the hunger, do not reduce the tension, and do not extinguish the fires of war. Even if one or two packages are found, "nema nista" still applies.

And what about the fact that the U.S. planes can overfly us? Yes, there could be one danger, namely that the containers might fall on our heads....

Statistical Office Publishes Data on Economy

AU0303193293 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 26 Feb 93 pp 1,4

[Unattributed report: "According to the Central Statistical Office, the State Debt Has Decreased by $1.4 Billion"]

[Text] The process of transforming the economy and society which had begun in the previous years continued in 1992, the latest report of the Central Statistical Office [KSH] states. In 1992, for the third year running, the convertible currency current account balance again ended with an income surplus. The net debt decreased by more than the surplus of this balance, from $14.6 billion at the end of 1991 to $13.2 billion at the end of November 1992. A 2 to 3-percent reduction of the gross debt and approximately 10-percent increase in gross

demand lies behind this. According to the Hungarian National Bank's [MNB] estimate, the amount of working capital coming in through the banking system was similar to that of 1991.

The population situation somewhat deteriorated but it was basically similar to previous years. According to preliminary figures, the population stood at 10,312,000 at the end of the year. The birth rate still does not guarantee the replacement of the population and the death rate is unacceptably high. In addition to this, the number of marriages continued to decrease.

The change in organizational and proprietor relations is one of the most important characteristics of the economy; two main trends can be observed in this. One is that some of the old large companies were broken up into smaller economic units, and the other is the appearance of a large number of new, mostly small economic organizations. In both cases, private capital—including foreign capital—has the main, often exclusive, role. As a result, the number of economic organizations with an independent legal status increased from 15,000 at the end of 1989 to more than 69,000 by the end of 1992. The number of these organizations was 16,600 more in 1992 than in 1991. In three years, the number of limited liability corporations multiplied many times, the number of joint stock corporations also increased a number of times, but the number of companies decreased. The number of partly or wholly foreign owned economic units increased from 1,350 at the end of 1989 to 9,117 by the end of 1991. In 1992, another 4,100 such enterprises began operations.

In agriculture, approximately a tenth of the members left the cooperatives that were being transformed. The agricultural cooperatives wound up a significant part of their non-agricultural activities.

Several new economic organizations did not prove viable, and thus many ceased to exist or changed their structure after a relatively short time. In addition to this, under the new conditions, quite a few large enterprises had increasing production problems, an increasing number of them became insolvent, and this occasionally also affected the activities of their profitable partners. In the wake of the bankruptcy law that came into force in 1992, from 23 January to the end of December, bankruptcy proceedings were started against 2,300 economic organizations with legal status, and liquidation proceedings were started against more than 2,000.

The gross domestic product [GDP], which expresses the economy's overall performance, stagnated at the end of the 1980's, decreased by 4 percent in 1990, and decreased by almost 12 percent in 1991. According to expert estimates, the decrease was more modest in 1992, with GDP 4 to 6 percent lower in 1992 than in 1991. Low domestic demand, inadequate structure and quality of production, and organizational and structural changes played an equal part in the reduction of the GDP. The proportion of the state sector continued to decrease in the economy, while the proportion of the private sector increased so as to be responsible for as much as a quarter of GDP in 1992.

The economic recession mainly affected agricultural production. Following the 4 percent decrease in 1990 and 5 percent decrease in 1991, production decreased by some 23 percent in 1992. After the large-scale, 19 percent decrease in industrial production in 1991, the decrease was 10 percent in 1992. During the various months, production was around the—low—December 1991 level but the speed of decline gradually eased throughout the year. In 1992, the construction and installation activities of the construction industry, which had been in continuous decline in previous years (by 17 percent in 1990 and 8 percent in 1991), remained at the 1991 level. The fall in production strongly influenced the performance of goods delivery, which was 16 percent below the level of 1991. (The level of reduction had been much higher, some 36 percent, in 1991.) The national economy used 11 percent less energy in 1992 than in 1991. This is a process that began a number of years ago: Energy consumption was 5.5 percent lower in 1990 and 5.2 percent lower in 1991 than in the previous year. Industry's energy consumption decreased by 20 percent, more than production.

The stagnation or even decrease in effective demand in Hungary significantly influenced the economy's performance. The number of registered unemployed had reached 663,000 by the end of the year. The increase in unemployment slowed down, with the number of unemployed increasing by 326,000 in 1991 and 257,00 in 1992. The number of pensioners increased by 118,000, and nominal pensions increased by 13 percent, which is below the increase of consumer prices.

Investment activities were again limited in 1992. According to preliminary figures, a total of 536 billion forints was spent on investment, which, using current prices, is 12 percent more than in 1992 but 8 percent less than the 1991 level if we use comparative prices. The reduction is smaller than in the previous two years because the amount of investment decreased by 10 percent in 1990 and by 12 percent in 1991.

Sejm Reconvenes, Approves Government Reports

LD0303194493 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] One hour ago the Sejm resumed its session which had been adjourned on 20 February. Among other things, the deputies are hearing a government report on setting up the Carpathian Euroregion. Over to our correspondent.

[Unidentified correspondent] The Sejm session which was adjourned on 20 February began 10 minutes late. First, a government report on the implementation of the accord on restructuring the Lodz region, concluding with the Lodz Solidarity, was noted. In another vote the deputies approved a government report on actions taken to halt risks to children's mental and physical development. On the other hand, a government report on the collective dispute between the Council of Ministers and trade union confederations operating in the education community was rejected.

The next item on the agenda aroused stronger emotions. A debate began—or to be more precise was resumed—on a government report on the circumstances and reasons for setting up the Carpathian Euroregion. In subsequent votes it was decided not to limit the number of speakers—at present 38 deputies are scheduled to speak—but to reduce the duration of speeches to three minutes.

Next, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski took the floor. The head of diplomacy presented the history of the creation of regions in Europe and how they are appraised there. They are appraised very highly. He denied that the creation of Euroregions was connected with the liquidation of borders. Polish foreign policy will be pursued in the direction of developing local democracy and cross-border cooperation, Skubiszewski emphasized.

The deputies speeches have now begun.

Rejects Carpathians Euroregion Plan

WS0403134093 Warsaw SIS in Polish 1044 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] By a margin of 12 votes, the Sejm rejected the government's information on the conditions for establishing the Carpathians Euroregion. It was primarily the deputies of the right and center right that voted to reject the information. Therefore, the two speeches by Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski in the Sejm were to no avail. In his speeches, the minister tried to persuade the deputies that there was nothing dangerous about the idea of Euroregions. They only facilitate cooperation in border regions.

The deputies who opposed the establishment of the Carpathians Euroregion near the borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Ukraine argued that national interests could be jeopardized, which, according to them, could result in a loss of national identity.

Today's Sejm decision will certainly not expedite the process of the integration of Poland with the European Community.

ZChN Congress Confirms Support for Coalition

AU0303145493 Warsaw PAP in English 2147 GMT 28 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 28—The Christian-National Union (ZChN) will seek to improve the profile of the 7-party ruling coalition in Poland, Sejm speaker and party president Wieslaw Chrzanowski told reporters in Warsaw on Sunday [28 February] at the ZChN 3rd congress.

Prof. Chrzanowski, earlier voted ZChN president for the third time by 122 votes to 35, with one abstention, said that there was no set of well-defined principles underpinning the existence of a coalition which brings together political groups of such differing political philosophies. However, although such coalitions are transitional in nature, they are not just a temporary measure, he claimed.

He stressed that a declaration approved by the congress, calling for closer cooperation between Christian, nationalist and peasant parties, did not mean that ZChN would seek to create such a government. Chrzanowski also added that ZChN would seek continuity in its policies. "I have never been a revolutionary, but the party programme should always be open to modification," he said.

Asked about the possibility of widening the coalition to include the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants Party (PSL), Chrzanowski said that he saw no possibility of the SLD joining the coalition, and that the atmosphere for discussions with PSL was currently not good.

The two-day congress of the ZChN elected 10 members to its Main Board, the majority of the nominations having been made by Chrzanowski. The most prominent appointees were party press spokesman Ryszard Czarnecki, and Stefan Niesiolowski, leader of the ZChN parliamentary caucus.

However, the ZChN leadership failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority to approve its proposal to liquidate the party's Main Council and create in its place a body uniting the ZChN Main Board and the parliamentary club.

Also, delegates approved a motion calling for the authority of the president and the state authorities to be respected. In a letter to President Lech Walesa, ZChN delegates stressed that the presidency is "the guarantor of constitutional balance, and an authority for national unity at times of great difficulties." Public attacks on the president undermine his authority and weaken Poland's international prestige, the letter states.

Adjourns After Late Session

WS0303121093 Warsaw SIS in Polish 1406 GMT 1 Mar 93

[Text]

The Adjournment of the Third Congress

Wieslaw Chrzanowski has stated that the congress of the Christian-National Union [ZChN] has not ended, but only adjourned. He said that the session continued until 0130 and due to this late hour the session had to be adjourned. The date of a continuation session was not decided. Wieslaw Chrzanowski said he was confident that the congress would conclude this month.

Policy Assumptions of ZChN

A resolution on policy assumptions of ZChN was approved. As far as the ideology is concerned, no significant changes were introduced compared to the ideological program adopted at the first congress of ZChN. As far as the program is concerned, ZChN sees a need to carry out file reviews and decommunization.

Session of the Principal Board

This week the principal board of ZChN will convene. At the session the treasurer of ZChN, as well as other persons, will be elected.

Talks With the Prime Minister

Wieslaw Chrzanowski stated that he was going to have talks with Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka on prolonging the leave of Minister of Justice Zbigniew Dyka.

Walesa Against Changes in Television Council

WS0303133093 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 3 Mar 93

[From the "Wiadomosci" newscast]

[Text] According to the president, in the new situation that developed after the Law on Radio and Television came into force, changes in the management of the Committee for Radio and Television are the least necessary. President Walesa voiced this opinion during this morning's meeting with Janusz Zaorski, head of the Radio and Television Committee. In the president's opinion, the National Council of Radio and Television, which is being established, should first of all issue licenses to private stations and thus make it possible for them to start legal broadcasting.

[Begin Presidential Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski recording] The president emphasized very clearly that in the new situation that has developed, no changes should be made, especially at the level of those who manage the institution which is now undergoing transformation. Its achievements so far have been considerable, and they should be protected. Perhaps the institution needs correcting or supplementing, but certainly it does not need more revolutions. [end recording]

Chairman of Council for Media Appointed

WS0403103593 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 0700 GMT 4 Mar 93

[From the "Panorama" newscast]

[Text] Maciej Ilowiecki has been appointed the chairman of the President's Council for Media and Information. The council's task will be to issue its opinion on new laws on information and the role of mass media in a democratic state, as well as to take care of journalists' professional skills.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Slawomir Matczak] The Council consists of the most prominent Polish journalists and scientists who deal with media and their influence on society. According to them, the first priority is to introduce a new press law concerning the protection of personal rights and personal honor. The council members suggest that an amendment to the independence of the press be adopted into the Constitution. They also think that the rights and duties of journalists should be defined, a code of ethics should be introduced, and a large-scale journalist training program should be started, because their skills are rather poor and therefore, they are often accused of manipulation.

[Council Chairman Maciej Ilowiecki] We have at last achieved full freedom. However, we are still in a bad situation as far as the responsibility for our reporting is concerned, and well, also as far as the relation to the state is concerned.

[Deputy Council Chairman Maciej Wierzynski] Young journalists are very talented. I really envy many of my younger colleagues. And so I think that we have the right conditions to remedy the situation, on condition, however, that good professional training is provided. [end recording]

'Polish Action' Party Holds First Conference

AU0303150793 Warsaw PAP in English 2119 GMT 27 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 27—Antoni Macierewicz, leader of the Christian National Movement "Polish Action" (RChN-AP), said at his party's first conference today that "Poland's sovereignty is threatened in the spiritual, political and economic spheres. We are heading toward a Poland II and PRL II (the PRL was the Polish Peoples Republic)."

Macierewicz, who was elected RChN-AP chairman at the conference, declared that the priority for the party was decommunisation and the exposure of former collaborators with the communist secret police. This concerned the presidency especially, added Macierewicz.

He stressed that "our strength lies in the traditional values of religion, the family and the nation. Without them there is no independence."

At a press conference, Macierewicz said that Polish Action is in the "Coalition for the Polish Republic" Political Alliance, which has been formed with the Movement for the Polish Republic, Movement for the Third Republic, and the Christian Democratic Labour Party. "Within this coalition we are also conducting talks with the Centre Accord on creating one pro-independence bloc," he said.

Macierewicz denied that the conference had been deliberately planned to clash with the Christian-National Union (ZChN) conference.

Former Premier Jan Olszewski was a guest speaker at the conference. Olszewski maintained that the only protection against authoritarian rule in Poland was the unity of the centre-right.

Macierewicz claimed that the RChN has 4,000 members.

Polish Defense Minister Visits Netherlands

AU0303150093 Warsaw PAP in English 2259 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Text] Gilze-Rijen, Netherlands, March 2—Polish Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz completed his official visit to the Netherlands today with a "safe landing" on an F-16 flight simulator at the Royal Dutch Air Force base at Gilze-Rijen, near Breda (southern Holland).

The Polish visitor also inspected the F-16 fighter bombers at the base, and discussed with base personnel the Dutch training programme for military pilots.

Earlier, at a meeting at the Defence Ministry in the Hague, Onyszkiewicz was given details of Dutch plans for reductions in the size of the country's armed forces. Ground force personnel numbers will be reduced by 34 percent by the year 2006, while overall, the armed forces will be reduced by 44 percent, to around 70,000 (including civilian personnel).

Also today, at the Military Academy in Breda, Onyszkiewicz delivered a lecture on the transformation of the Polish armed forces.

While at Breda, Onyszkiewicz laid a wreath at the Polish cemetery of honour at Breda, and met with representatives of the Polish community in the Netherlands. These included Second World War veterans from the First Polish Armoured Division, which liberated Breda in the spring of 1945, and from the First Independent Parachute Brigade, which participated in the ill-fated British attempt to force a Rhine crossing at Arnhem in September 1944.

Onyszkiewicz later flew to Brussels, where he is to sign on Friday the text of a Polish-Belgian treaty on military cooperation.

Spokesman Gives Reasons for Walesa's Condition

LD0303220193 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Audio only]

[Text] President Lech Walesa fainted this morning in the Belweder Palace and was taken for medical tests. The fainting was caused by last week's viral infection. In the afternoon Lech Walesa returned to the Belweder and took up his duties.

After he fainted, the president was taken to the Teaching Hospital of the Military Medical Academy on Szaserow Street for medical tests. The first to learn about the state of the president's health were the members of the Presidential Media Council, in whose inaugural meeting he was to have taken part.

[Begin recording] [Presidential Spokesman Drzycimski] The last few weeks, and in particular the very hard day yesterday with many meetings and talks held by the president of the republic in Bratislava, highly intensive work for many months, 2-3 hours' sleep a day, the lack of a longer period of rest for more than 2 years—all these caused this morning's fainting, and he is now undergoing medical tests. [end recording]

The president's spokesman reported that the state of health of the president, who returned to the Belweder this afternoon, gives no cause for concern.

Walesa Talks With President Clinton on Phone

LD0303215493 Warsaw PAP in English 2135 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Warsaw, March, 3—President Lech Walesa spoke by telephone with President of the United States Bill Clinton Wednesday [3 March] evening, the Polish president's press office reported.

White House spokesman [Director of Communications] George Stephanopoulos reported that during the conversation, which had taken place at President Walesa's request, the two leaders discussed the economic reform efforts in Poland and the upcoming summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Stephanopoulos added that Presidents Walesa and Clinton also discussed sending a U.S. delegation to the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising on April 19.

Danube Traffic Busy After Lifting of Blockade

AU0303165493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1516 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—An intense traffic was reported last night and the following morning of March 3, through the Romanian lock of the Iron Gates II dam, the only one serviceable at the moment.

After the Yugoslav navigation agency from Prahovo port announced yesterday, March 2, the removing of the 12 barges, which barred the navigable channel at kilometer 856, eight out of the 22 ships and convoys sailing under different flags and stranded during the seven-day blockage have passed the lock upstream and downstream, said Romanian Transport Ministry officials.

This is the third blocking of the Danube's navigable channel over the last 30 days. First time on January 31 the [FRY] Bihac pusher boat barred for 15 hours the navigable channel upstream of the dam. Second, on February 10 the Petrovaradin tug, also under Yugoslav flag, blocked the traffic for 20 hours refusing to sail back upstream after the customs control revealed that the ship's cargo was meant for export, thus defying the UN Security Council embargo. This third time, according to the Yugoslav authorities' statements, the blocking was done by the Yugoslav navigators' trade union.

The local competent authorities were operating to ensure a fluent traffic through the lock. However, the vessels sailing under Yugoslav flag are forbidden to pass the dam through the Romanian lock according to the economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro.)

Yugoslav vessels waiting downstream of Iron Gates II dam have been stranded in Prahovo port on the south bank of the river and so far they have not renewed requests to be granted permission to pass through the dam, eyewitnesses said.

FRY Vessels Denied Passage

AU0303185493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1809 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—Wednesday, 3 March, up and downstream sluicing of all the 16 ships and convoys under various banners was completed around 1500 local time. Some of the convoys had been waiting for over a week at kilometer 856. The information comes from Iron Gates II dam manager Iorgu Diga.

Yugoslav ships Orasac and Detelinara, awaiting passage in the Yugoslav port of Prahovo on the southern bank of the river have repeated their request for passage through the Romanian gate but approval was denied.

Yugoslavs Threaten To Resume Blockade

AU0303203493 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Our Belgrade correspondent Dana Popescu has informed us that merely one day after the lifting of the Danube blockade, which slowed down the traffic of 22 vessels and barges, representatives of the [Yugoslav] river shipping trade unions announced that next week they will again block traffic on Europe's most important river shipping route.

A communique of the mentioned trade unions points out the fact that the blockade was lifted to make negotiations with Romanian Danube authorities possible. If they are denied their right to work, they will resume the blocking of all vessels beginning 10 March 1993. Their action will continue until the issue is solved, the Yugoslav Danube shipping trade union's communique concludes.

Russian Proposals on Yugoslav Crisis Noted

AU0303205193 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1921 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Simona Miculescu informed the press at the Wednesday, 3 March news briefing about State Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu's forthcoming visit to Germany over 11-12 March following the invitation of Germany's Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of External Affairs Klaus Kinkel.

During the visit the two sides are expected to tackle major issues of international resonance, European developments in the first place, as well as the ways to boost bilateral relations.

Foreign Minister Melescanu is also supposed to meet with the German federal minister for environment, the federal minister for international cooperation, members of the Bundestag's committee for external policy, the German Foreign Policy Society, the German Industrialists' Union, and the leaders of the Romania-born Saxons' and Swabians' organizations.

Simona Miculescu also announced the visit to Romania over 8-10 March of three rapporteurs from the Council of Europe: F. Konig (Austria), G. Jansson (Finland), and Th. Pangalos (Greece) [all names as received], who are to make a report to be added as the last piece to the file for Romania's admission to the Council of Europe. The guests will have contacts with representatives of Parliament, the government, political parties, ethnic minorities, religious denominations, and mass media.

The Romanian Foreign Ministry, as the coordinator of the Interministerial Committee for Relations with Moldova, together with the Industry Ministry and the Commerce Ministry, have taken the necessary action to speed up the 96 million lei aid requested by the Government of the Republic of Moldova in order to buy medication and

medical equipment for the oncology institute in Chisinau, spokeswoman Simona Miculescu told the weekly news conference.

The Foreign Ministry will fully support the development of cooperation in research programs as well as the participation of Romanian companies in the consumer goods fair to be held in Chisinau over March 24-28, said the speaker.

The Romanian Foreign Ministry took note with interest of the contents of the Russian Federation's proposals for a solution to the Yugoslav crisis in the 24 February 1993 letter handed by the Russian Federation's permanent representative to the United Nations to the UN Security Council chairman, announced Simona Miculescu.

The Romanian Foreign Ministry considers these proposals as an approach able to contribute in the international community's effort to settle the conflict in rump Yugoslavia soonest, and that they come as an addition to the other initiatives intended to install peace in the area, spokeswoman Miculescu said.

President Iliescu Briefs Press 23 Feb

AU0403101393 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 25 Feb 93 p 3

["Statement by Ion Iliescu at the 23 February News Conference: "All Political Forces Are and Have To Be Interested in Preserving and Consolidating the Domestic Stability of Romania, the Law-Governed State, and Democracy"]

[Text] The time since the elections and our last news conference marks a certain period of settlement of our social and political activity and a certain normalization of social life. First I want to mention the normalization of political activity with the resumption of the parliamentary activity, giving the parliamentarians some leeway at the beginning until they acquire a certain routine. I do not want to dramatize the more impulsive events that characterized the first debates. I believe things will be channeled in the right direction as soon as discussions focus on basic questions. At the same time, we are also witnessing the consolidation of the state governed by law and the operation of state institutions within a normal framework. The foundations for the coherent continuation of the economic reform process are being laid. I think that a basic element, which all of you were able to observe, is the interest in preserving and consolidating the domestic stability of our country at a time of great unrest in neighboring areas, including military confrontations. The element of stability and balance that Romania represents in this area is of interest to wider circles. This has also permitted us to take significant steps toward reestablishing traditional political, economic, and cultural relations between Romania and European countries, West European countries, and toward our integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.

In this context, I would also mention our recent visit to Brussels, the significance and importance of which was commented on by politicians and the domestic and international press. First, I would like to emphasize that I am not talking about a spectacular change, but the result of a process that has taken place throughout this period of developing our relations and correcting the opinion about Romania and about the processes taking place in Romanian society. During all the meetings I had, Romania's importance as an element of stability in this area in Europe and in the general process of European stability and integration was emphasized. Together with our partners in dialogue, we emphasized the new framework of relations in a changed Europe, the disappearance of adverse elements, which were generated by Europe's division into two opposing blocs, and the development of a new concept of security and stability throughout Europe. We also stressed the changed role played by certain bodies such as NATO and WEU, as well as the need to increase the political role of these institutions and of the concept of all-European security. As stressed during our meetings, the problem of an immediate expansion of NATO, and thus our joining it, is not posed. The concept of partnership with NATO nonmember countries has been developed and consolidated, including through the institutionalization of the council of cooperation with NATO nonmember countries. On this occasion, we discussed developments and positively assessed Romania's active presence and activity within this cooperation council.

At the WEU we noted that our visit was the first paid by a chief of state to the command of this organization. Here a similar concept has been developed and a parallel body has been set up, a cooperation forum with the participation of nine WEU nonmember countries, this being a result of a meeting held last summer in St. Petersburg, which was also attended by Romania. We consider our contacts, discussions, and dialogues at the NATO Council and the WEU Council as a significant political event—which marked the development of our relations with these bodies—and as a positive and constructive element for consolidating the uniform framework of ensuring the security of our continent and of each country separately. As we say—equal security for all European states.

During the meetings at the EC, with both Mr. Delors and the president of that body's parliament, Mr. Kleptsch, we emphasized the importance of signing the accord on Romania's association with the EC and we discussed the procedures that will follow to have this accord ratified by the European Parliament, the 12 parliaments of the member countries, and Romania's Parliament.

We view this event as marking a new situation making greater demands on the Romanian economy. Our association with the EC is not only combined with advantages, but especially with very great demands on our country's technological and economic competitiveness. This will require a higher standard of productivity and product quality, and thus the greater competitiveness of

our technology and economic indicators. As a journalist noted, one earns more money in Europe, but people work harder and more efficiently, and they achieve better product quality. We have the necessary skills to achieve the same, but more effort is needed at all levels, beginning with people of national importance. The government has created a group that specializes in questions pertaining to our association with the EC and in European economic relations. First, it is necessary for us to be very well acquainted with laws on internal relations within the EC and on the Community's relations with other states. There are more than 400 laws issued in this period. It is a primary, an elementary condition for our specialists, government bodies, economic institutions, units, and agencies, as well as for our economic experts, lawyers, and managers to be acquainted with the legal framework and be able to solve problems and overcome a certain inertia or attitude of indolence in dealing with problems. To join the normal rules of the market means that we must all adjust to each and every rule of the market, which may sometimes be very tough.

It goes without saying that during our contacts a subject of general interest was the events in Yugoslavia. There was great interest in Romania's position and assessment, including the problem of the Danube embargo. We noted that there was general understanding for our position and assessment in connection with the need to pursue political solutions, and for our concerns to avoid an escalation and expansion of the conflict both in Yugoslavia and to neighboring areas. Together we acknowledged the importance of the U.S. administration's decision to involve the United States in the process of normalizing the situation and solving the Yugoslav conflict; we appreciate the cautious way in which these problems are being dealt with and the stress placed on the importance of seeking political solutions.

Our visit was an opportunity for bilateral contacts with government authorities and economic officials in Belgium where we found an open atmosphere and interest in developing bilateral cooperation. Apart from the meeting with the Belgian prime minister and president of the Senate, I would like to mention the discussions at the Belgian Federation of Entrepreneurs where we noted that they have already gained some experience, because we came across the representatives of certain companies that are represented in Romania and value cooperation with Romanian, joint actions, and forms of cooperation in production, and expressed their interest in expanding these relations. In Anvers we held lengthy talks in connection with port activity—it is one of Europe's big ports—and cooperation with the port of Constanta; we also discussed a few questions regarding the establishment of direct relations in order to learn from the experience of a very busy port. Throughout these discussions, we realized the importance for the Romanian bodies, the Romanian partners to promote a very active spirit to use this favorable atmosphere for developing our economic relations. What I would also like to term a positive event during this visit and former ones is the congruence of opinions and consensus expressed by all political forces in connection with the major issues and basic trend of our country's foreign policy, including its integration in the European bodies. This was noted both during our presence (we had four parliamentarians in our delegation from four major parties represented in Romania's Parliament), but also during our parliamentary delegation's visit to Strasbourg, as well as during the assessment of certain events that occurred during this period.

I would like to say a few words about domestic issues. I think that the way we have coped with this difficult winter on the whole is very important for the period following the elections. It has been a test for the new government, which got organized and approached the concrete problems of the economic activity in this period. I think this is a first successful test of fire for the government. Some problems have been solved in a better way than one year ago. At the same time, sustained work has been carried out to draft the 1993 budget in keeping with the difficult economic problems faced by the national economy; this is serious material, it is a strategy of substantiating the government program and of continuing the reform process. I have noted that the press is already in possession of this material and has begun to publish it; it is going to be submitted to parliament. The government is still working to finalize it, but in any case, after perusing it, I think that it shows, apart from the government's capability to draft a fundamental work, a serious, detailed, coherent, uniform, and conceptual framework substantiating the continuation of the reform process, our approach to the essential problems of our economy, and the continuity and coherence of the reform process.

It is a document that corroborates—especially for the short- and medium-term—the government's economic policy and guarantees the continuity and coherence of the reform process. Similarly, the program is not a unilateral program, but represents a theoretic and political opening, and a positive platform for dialogue with all political trends. It is a political platform for dialogue and cooperation with the parties, trade unions, and employers. Without wanting to comment on it in any way, I would like to emphasize just a few features. This program will be discussed in Parliament, during dialogues with the parties and with social partners. What is important are the immediate measures regarding the problems of the year 1993, bearing in mind the decisive role, I should say, played by the current year for the economy. It is, perhaps, the most difficult year because it incorporates the difficulties that emerged in our economy in the past three years, which, on the one hand, include the effects of the crisis in the system the Romanian society started at the end of 1989, and, on the other, the crisis elements characteristic of the transition period; and this, from many points of view, which are common to all countries going through this transition process. Thus 1993 reflects an accumulation of these elements, namely a decline in production, inflation, and unemployment that affect broad segments of the population—

hence the high social costs of the transition process. Thus the concerns and difficulties confronting broad segments of our citizens—leading to protest actions and demands—as well as the questions raised by certain trade unions are understandable. It is important to hold negotiations and discussions on these problems as part of the efforts to seek common solutions to all these problems. I believe that 1993 can mark a turning point in halting the economic decline and relaunching the national economy. For this purpose we need both understanding and constructive discussions.

In connection with the discussion of these problems, it is normal to have controversial opinions on certain conceptual questions and on tangible problems and solutions regarding especially the current period, but also the prospects of promoting the reform process. Thus, a wide area of communication, dialogue, and cooperation is opening for making proposals and suggesting solutions and optimal measures, which are needed at this time or in the future. The positive side of this material is that it attempts to find solutions for 1993 problems that fit into a short- and medium-term program, which, in turn, can become a platform for launching a more extensive and long-term program, a national strategy regarding our long-term economic development. This strategy has also to be tackled and clarified from a theoretical viewpoint in order to understand our current specific economic structures, unravel the causes of the current deadlock in the economy, seek long-term solutions, and define strategic objectives, including the structure of our future society, and in order to comprehend the concept of the social market economy. What does this represent, namely the content of the accumulation that is taking place? We do not have to repeat—there are certain assertions in this respect—the primitive accumulation of capital by the world economy throughout some three centuries. We performed this accumulation—within a different context—over a period of some 50 years, namely in the context of the socialist economy with all its limitations and results. These are achievements of our economy and a realistic assessment of these elements is necessary for our future development. We have the advantage of having accumulated our nation's creative potential, which reflects in the general standard of culture and education of our population, and that cannot be compared to postwar Romania. Thus we should not return to concepts and ideas that were valid last century or the beginning of the current century. We have a completely different platform on the basis of which to start off our development process and we have the intellectuals, especially technical intellectuals. The long-term strategy of our development process has to establish how we will be able to capitalize on this creative potential of our nation, which becomes an essential element of our current technical progress and of any economic progress. Otherwise we risk to be placed next to the poorly developed countries. Capitalizing especially on the creative element, the creativity of intellectuals, and even incorporating artistic creativity and intellectual creativity in the entire economic development process is a feature characteristic of world economic development at the end of this century.

Privatization is an element of this reform program and I have noted that it emphasizes the importance of encouraging and supporting small and medium-size enterprises, and smallholders. At the same time, however, we have to examine this requirement and element of the economic reform process and program with its features characteristic of present-day economic development in which the role of small and medium-size units is blended with the process of concentrating property and capital. I have held talks with the representatives of small nations in the EC, who talked about the issues they are confronted with, namely the elimination from the economy and the bankruptcy of small enterprises because of massive competition and pressure on the part of big companies and the concentration of capital. How are we to deal with this problem—here is a problem that requires a long-term strategy. The market economy, competition, and privatization are compulsory elements. However, we have to have a clear view of how the entire problem looks from a social point of view so as not to push our society toward mass pauperization and to ensure the component elements of appropriate social protection, as well as the basic elements needed by our society. From this point of view, I think that the government program is a realistic program that mentions two fundamental elements. There are two limiting factors in the concept of any reform program, which is valid only to the extent to which these factors are realistically dealt with. As I was saying, there are at least two limiting factors: resources—material, financial, human, domestic and foreign resources. Thus, we have to bear in mind the specific resources available in the national economy and see to it that measures and objectives match these resources. The second limiting factor of any reform program is represented by social costs. Thus, to the question of resources we have to add the social aspect with the inherent social protection measures. We also have to see to it that the solutions sought for immediate problems be combined with and integrated in medium-term ones, and we have to ensure the coherence of all aspects of the reform. It is my impression that the conditions exist for reflection, dialogue, confrontation, and possible finishing touches. Thus, there is a single important question to be solved at the national level—how to avoid the intensification of our status as a poorly developed country and how to avoid discrepancies vis a vis the developed countries. The entire world development today shows the intensification of discrepancies at the international level between the developed world and the poor world. Which one will we join in the future? Here is a subject for reflection that gives us cause to think about solutions and about all aspects of our development process—the development patterns, economic structure, production structure, and the structure of all branches of the national economy to match the specific aspects of modern development. Actually, the entire history of modern economic development went through certain

stages of development, beginning with man's use of natural resources, that is, the primary sector of the economy; the next stage was the development of the secondary sector and an economy that incorporated human labor, the processing of nature's products, the development of industrial civilization with its two distinctive stages: An economy based on the incorporation of natural resources and then the accumulation of capital in a later stage. The specific features in the second part of the 20th century are the incorporation to an ever greater extent of intellectual creativity as a decisive factor for present-day development; at the end of this century and during the next, the economy will be characterized by a new feature, namely all aspects of human activity and intellectual activity will blend. What is our position in this stage of development? This position encompasses the so-called socialist accumulation that ensured a certain accumulation of material resources, productive resources, but which preserved and intensified our discrepancies vis-a-vis present-day technological progress. How will we match what constitutes the main characteristic of the development process at the end of this century? These are just a few subjects that, I believe, may form the subject of discussions apart from discussions on the strategy that forms the basis of the government program. This is a broad subject and platform to be discussed by all those who have something to say in connection with the strategy of our long-term national socioeconomic development. In this context, I think it is possible for many of our specialists—intellectuals of various colors from the area of research, culture, production, as well as political and social forces—to become involved in this activity. It is a convergence platform whose major subject of national interest may bring together our nation's creative forces. In this sense, I think this program, or this strategy that corroborates the government program, is an open invitation to a national discussion of these issues of national importance because we cannot tackle the tangible problems of the economic activity of one year if we ignore our long-term goals. What does this timespan represent for the future development of Romanian society? Here is a subject we should all think about; I think that, despite the political differences that naturally exist during a democratic development process, it is necessary to seek a convergence platform for discussion, for expressing contradictory views and options that will, however, contribute to the crystallization of a long-term useful national development concept. This is how I view the importance of this material that offers such a platform for reflection.

Iliescu on Democratization Process

BR0303160093 Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD in Dutch 19 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Freddy De Pauw: "Romanian President Iliescu Believes End of Tunnel Is in Sight—Visit to Brussels Highlights Democratic Progress"]

[Text] Brussels—"For Romania, this could be a year during which all tensions might come to a head simultaneously. Perhaps 1993 will be our most difficult year ever, but there are signs of an upturn and we should have put the worst behind us by the end of the year." This is what Romanian President Ion Iliescu told us during an interview in Brussels. Today, Iliescu returns to Bucharest after a two-day visit to Belgium including talks with Belgian, NATO, and EC leaders about the changes in Romania and its relations with the West. "I am highly satisfied," said Iliescu, who spoke very warmly of his discussions with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner and EC Commission President Jacques Delors.

"Naturally, the contacts that I had this time would have been of the question three years ago. Europe is no longer divided into military blocs and NATO's role has changed quite markedly, the Alliance now playing a major role in political rapprochement within Europe. So we also talked about Romanian participation in the NATO Cooperation Council, through which nonmembers of the Alliance cooperate with others."

During his visit to the EC the day before yesterday, Iliescu signed Romania's association treaty with the EC. Referring to this treaty, he observed that "although Europe is no longer split into military blocs, it is divided by economic barriers, which may prove more difficult and take longer to break down. So we must create an atmosphere of rapprochement if we are to achieve true European integration." Recently, one of Iliescu's pet subjects has been to refer to the danger that much of East Europe will descend to "Third World" status if the economic dividing wall is not brought down.

Communist

Iliescu says that recriminations, in both Romania and abroad, that he has a communist past which he cannot shake off are completely unfounded. "It is political speculation. People forget that for the last 20 years of communist rule, I was very much on the periphery; there is no mention of other leaders at the top of the regime." Iliescu stresses that many other East European leaders, such as Yeltsin in Russia and Zhelev in Bulgaria, had a much more active communist past and that nobody is making a fuss about that.

"Over the past three years we have laid the foundations for a modern constitutional state. We have held free presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. The new constitution guarantees democratic rights and freedoms. However, our biggest problem is switching from an ultracentralized, planned economy to a market economy. In other countries, such as Hungary and Poland, reforms had already been under way for several years. Our industrial structure was also very primitive, in the sense that our factories had to produce everything and no account was taken of the international division of labor required by a modern economy."

Iliescu believes that this may make the situation in Romania somewhat more complex than elsewhere. "The

old structures were broken up, but there was nothing there to replace them. Moreover, when CEMA fell apart, we lost not merely our energy sources and raw materials, but also our sales markets. First, we were hit hard by the Gulf Crisis, and now there are conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and a blockade, which also indirectly affects our economy. Our industrial production is halved compared to three years ago, we have high inflation and one million unemployed. This creates social tension, so 1993 will be a difficult year. But I think we will hit the bottom this year and be on the road to recovery by the end of the year."

Rules of Democracy

Iliescu believes that it would be wrong to make too much of the social unrest in Romania, which this week included a workers' demonstration in Bucharest which called for his resignation. "Surely that is normal in a democracy, just as the rules of democracy also allow for the formation of coalitions in parliament if no single party has a majority. It is vital that we achieve a joint platform for economic reform and that the people accept our economic policy. This requires political and social understanding, and good relations with the trade unions."

Can Iliescu count on the opposition for support? After all, recently he accused the leaders of the Democratic Convention of opposing Romanian interests by pressing Washington not to grant Romania "most-favored-nation" status. "No, I did not accuse anyone, I merely said that an official U.S. Congress report contained documents expressing the views of the opposition movement on the matter, including a letter from the chairman of the Democratic Convention in which he put forward his case against receiving that status." The chairman in question, Corneliu Coposu, denied having signed any such declaration.

Earlier, the Romanian president also accused Hungarian lobbies of acting against Romania's interests at international level. It is often said that Romania's road to the EC runs through Budapest and that the Hungarians could block it in order to press for better treatment of Hungarians in Romania.

Iliescu denies that the Hungarian minority has any reason to complain. "Under our constitution and laws, the rights of our 1.7 million Hungarians comply with all international provisions. In fact, they even go further, because they have specific rights as an ethnic grouping. Incidentally, Romania is perhaps the only country in Europe where every minority is represented in Parliament.

"In addition to the 39 Hungarian members of parliament, all the other minorities—numbering 13 in all—also have parliamentary representatives. Where else is this the case?" asks Iliescu proudly. He has every reason to be glad that the recent Hungarian Democratic Union congress elected the moderate Bela Marko as its chairman, rather than the radical priest Laszlo Tokes, who probably would not have been grateful to Iliescu for sending a message to that congress.

Iliescu Expresses 'Understanding' at Rally

AU0303175093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1455 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—Wednesday, March 3, in Aviatorilor Square in Bucharest a protest rally began organized by the Familia Federation of the hydroelectric workers' trade unions together with representatives thereof from all over Romania.

The participants request that the Hidroconstructia SA commercial company be switched to private energy company status and privatized during 1993, that it be financially unblocked and that its debts to its purveyors be compensated for, and that the Renel RA national public corporation (electricity company, editor's note) pay its debts—amounting to about 5 billion lei—to Hidroconstructia SA.

Passing by on his way to the presidency, President Ion Iliescu stopped to talk to the participants and expressed his understanding towards their problems. The Romanian president asked the chairman of the Federation to forward the studies on that company's situation so that a solution may be found together, especially to the introduction in the country's budget of the sums necessary for the refloating of the 30 hydroelectric sites now stopped.

The demonstrators organized a walk through the streets of Bucharest and intend to have a dialogue with government representatives as well.

Roman Pleads for 'Vast' Western Aid Program

AU0303184893 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 25 Feb 93 p 3

[Part three of the interview with Petre Roman, president of the National Salvation Front, by Octavian Stireanu; place and date not given: "The Loss of Trust in Reform and Democratization Is Now the Greatest Danger"]

[Excerpts] [Stireanu] In Great Britain, you had talks at government and parliamentary headquarters, but what about the parties, did you meet anyone of any consequence?

[Roman] I had meetings at the central offices of the Conservative and Labor Parties. [passage omitted]

[Stireanu] What is the level of attention paid by Great Britain, or rather by political officials in the government or the Parliament, to the situation in the region in which Romania lies? I am asking this because certain stories are being published in our press or the public perception is that a new kind of "allocation" of interests has been instituted, namely, France is responsible for "dealing" with Romania, Germany for Hungary and Poland, Great Britain for Czechia and Slovakia, and so forth. In the

current political folklore, which is quite abundant, such suppositions are already in circulation.

[Roman] I do not think that Great Britain is specializing in a single zone. [passage omitted] Personally, I am appealing everywhere for more general assistance from the developed world, the Western and democratic world, for the former communist countries.

[Stireanu] What is the meaning of this plea of yours?

[Roman] I am not talking about the former Soviet Union, where the problems are much more complicated and require a special approach. I am only referring the other countries in the region and I am using a very straightforward argument, namely that until World War II these countries were perfectly integrated in the Western world: Poland's economy was on a par with Italy's, Czechoslovakia was economically stronger than France, and Romania was stronger than Greece. Then came the break of 1945, which, as far as Romania was concerned, was totally at odds with the characteristic features of the Romanian nation. It is obvious that I was able to maintain that we were in a sense abandoned after the war. Of course, we cannot put ourselves in the position of those who conducted the negotiations at the time. Nevertheless, since Romania had been a de facto ally from 23 August 1944, we probably deserved better treatment. Well, it was not to be.

Coming back to the present, it is obvious that the loss of trust in the process of reform and democratization in all the former communist countries is, in my opinion, a very great danger, not only for us, but also for the Western and developed world, since any kind of trouble in the area can lead to situations wherein the Western world must take a stand; just take the situation in Yugoslavia as very negative example in this respect. [passage omitted] Therefore, I plead for an all-encompassing and vast assistance plan, which should ensure a transition, an economic transition of these economies to a better situation. [passage omitted]

Anyway, I do not believe that Great Britain is not interested in Romania. On the contrary. The very fact that I was invited on such a substantial visit, with many contacts, to Great Britain, somehow proves the contrary.

Tokes Accused of Preparing Domestic Conflict

AU0303155093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1340 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—"Ethnic purification in Romania is the figment of a sick imagination, pervaded by Chauvinism, irredentism, and revanchist spirit. The promoters of such an idea are again playing on the ultra nationalistic and separatist feelings of certain Romanian citizens of Hungarian origin and of obedient foreign circles, exerting a gross blackmail on Romania's general policy and on its decisionmakers" reads a statement released by the Steering Committee of the "Marasesti Marasti - Oituz" Foundation for Patriotic Culture and sent to ROMPRES.

According to that Foundation the series of statements made by reformed Bishop Laszlo Tokes is a psychological preparation for a domestic confrontation and for international support in case of conflict.

PDAR's Surdu Rejects Tokes' Remarks

AU0303191593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1733 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—The president of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (PDAR), Victor Surdu, condemned the recent statements made by pastor Laszlo Tokes claiming that in March 1990 "an anti-Hungarian pogrom" had been planned in Tirgu Mures and that Romania is conducting an "ethnic cleansing policy similar to that in Bosnia and Hercegovina."

"Such allegations," Victor Surdu told the press at the weekly press conference of his party, "are civic untruths which prejudice Romania's image in the world and her interests, they can have unpredictable and dangerous effects on the peaceful coexistence of all the Romanian citizens irrespective of their ethnic allegiances."

Need To Normalize Ties With Hungary Stressed

AU0303155793 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1257 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—"The price of reconciliation should be represented by and paid with the two countries' effort in their bilateral relations to align to the European standards," stated the Romanian foreign minister, Teodor Melescanu, to the daily AZI referring to the process of normalisation of the Romanian-Hungarian relations. In his opinion, mutual "political concessions" would lead to further disputes and "that is why, our relationship should consist in our alignment to European structures, truly acceptable from a political point of view for Romania as well as for Hungary." The Romanian foreign minister appreciated that "the normalisation of the relations between the two countries is an objective for an integration within European structures, and a way to achieve this objective."

Referring to the current geopolitical context in southeastern Europe, Teodor Melescanu stressed that as far as Romania was concerned "presently, the fundamental aim in our relationship with the neighbouring countries is building confidence," an objective to which "all others should subordinate." The recent creation of the so-called "Euro-Carpathian zone" between Hungary, Ukraine, and Poland is an initiative which, in the opinion of the Romanian head of diplomacy, cannot be presently perceived as a contribution to building confidence and security. "Without denying the major importance and even the potential of suchlike cooperation in the future, I believe that such an initiative should be placed after the concept of confidence-building," said Romania's foreign

minister. "For the time being I am not truly convinced that the idea of an 'Euro-Carpathian zone' could be correctly perceived in the Romanian society, while from a juridical point of view, the participation in that 'zone' of suchlike 'Carpathian entities' is not legally possible in Romania. So, there is also a juridical problem, and moreover we are not open to suchlike experiments."

Asked about the opinion on the idea of "borders' spiritualisation," Teodor Melescanu answered that, personally, he believed that "the process of Romania's integration and that of the other countries of Central Europe within Western European structures leads definitely to a 'spiritualisation' of borders," which means "a certain uniformity of the regulations, of laws, of the possibilities to invest, to test and to find a job. The borders can become cultural ones, of national, spiritual and cultural identity and not economical, political or military, as they were seen some years ago," said the Romanian foreign minister.

Need for 'Influx of Capital' in Economy Expressed

AU0303194393 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 26 Feb 93 p 3

[Fourth of five-installment interview with Petre Roman, president of the National Salvation Front, by Octavian Stireanu; place and date not given: "Economy Should Profit From, Not Be Burdened by Industry"]

[Excerpts] [Stireanu] In England, you talked with both the ruling party and the opposition one. What is their perception of the political game being played in Romania?

[Roman] Of course, there are still some question marks about the outcome of the 27 September 1992 elections. Not so much about their fairness—although there are unfortunately some unclarified aspects in this respect as well—but rather about the political will of the present, new parliamentary majority to continue the reform and democratization process. [passage omitted]

I said that we should wait and see whether the government proves commitment to the continuation of privatization and industrial restructuring. The government should mainly give priority to the sectors capable of taking the economy out of its current impasse—that is, to the sphere of privatization and large-scale industry, which, for the time being, needs an influx of capital to ensure a certain degree of performance, efficiency, and profitability. Without this influx, the economy will suffer rather than profit from industry. [passage omitted]

[Stireanu] Let us return to mainland Europe, Mr. Roman....

[Roman] Indeed, from England I returned to mainland Europe, as you said—that is, Spain. I first met with the president of the Valencia Regional Council and then delivered a lecture at the Jaume University. [passage omitted] From Spain, I went to Luxembourg, as guest of the EEC's commissions headquartered there, and also met with Mr. Gaston Thorn, the first EEC president. [passage omitted]

Training of Moldovan Coup Instigators Denied

OW0303181293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1646 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Romanian Government rejected rumors about training fighters to implement a coup in Moldova and unify the two countries. A statement distributed on Wednesday [3 March] in Bucharest emphasizes that these falsifications "are aimed at the destabilization of relations between two Romanian states and inflict damage on relations between Romania and Russia, Ukraine, and other countries."

The Romanian authorities voiced this official statement due to the publication of an article in the Chernovitsy newspaper "Bukovina." The article asserted that together with Moldova's Popular Front, Romanian special services are training combat groups composed of volunteers which participated in the armed conflict in the Trans-Dniester Region last summer. Circles close to the President told our Interfax correspondent that a confidential meeting of Mircea Snegur with the leader of the Romanian security service, Teodor Maguryan, is scheduled for Wednesday in Chisinau.

Spiroiu Discusses Army Doctrine, Prospects

AU0403094793 Bucharest COTIDIANUL 24 Feb 93 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu, Romanian minister of national defense, by Doina Basca; place and date not given: "The Television Announced That Terrorists Were Coming"]

[Excerpts] [Basca] Mr. Minister, everybody is frantic and asking about when a white paper is going to be written and when will the real investigation regarding the [December 1989] revolution be conducted. There has recently been a great interest in the Otopeni drama, too. Can you tell us anything else about it?

[Spiroiu] First of all, I would like to tell you that for the past two years the Ministry of National Defense has been conducting a complex investigation into this subject. A white paper will be published around the middle of the year. I would like to tell you that the Ministry of National Defense, through the commission that has been established to conduct this investigation, has cooperated with the parliamentary commission that is in charge of this issue. [passage omitted]

[Basca] Mr. Minister, we are at the beginning of the year. What are your prospects?

[Spiroiu] Indeed, on the basis of the programs approved by the Supreme Council for the Country's Defense as

early as January 1991, the National Defense Ministry proposed a reform plan to the Romanian Government. The tradition in our army did not accept a bloc-type doctrine. We have our own doctrine, and this made us have our own defense industry; shortly, Romania and the Romanian Army will have a totally different situation compared to the other armies that were Warsaw Pact members.

[Basca] And who established this doctrine?

[Spiroiu] This doctrine was established by military analysts. They were examining things, starting from everything that was useful in the military theory (even as early as Sun Chi's theory 4,000 years ago). Likewise, the work of certain modern strategy experts such as Liddel Hart and even of certain specialists, Romanian officers in the interwar period such as Florea Tenescu and Mircea Tomescu, were also used. This was the basis for working out the national military doctrine that we had up to the 1989 revolution. I would also like to add another thing that makes us different from the other Warsaw Pact armies. As early as 1959, when the Soviet Army withdrew, and later, in 1962, when the controversy between the Romanian Labor Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union appeared, we did not have any military personnel trained in Moscow. The other armies had such personnel.

[Basca] So, did Ceausescu have the military doctrine that supported his attitude in 1968?

[Spiroiu] No, he did not. After that we proceeded to work out a new doctrine. Therefore, the process started then and lasted until 1980, when one can say that this doctrine became a concise one, meaning that the whole system of military combat regulations had been worked out on the basis of the same doctrine. We continue to have a defensive doctrine, including an all-around border defense doctrine, without regard to a certain enemy. Not even when we were members of the Warsaw Pact did we consider Italy, France, Greece, or Turkey as our enemies.

[Basca] How long did the establishment of the new structures take?

[Spiroiu] Such an integration cannot be carried out rapidly because of the conservatism specific to military bodies. We are carrying out this restructuring under unfavorable geopolitical military circumstances, and we cannot permit ourselves to achieve restructuring by dismantling previous structures. The training process and combat training have been carried out at a very good pace. In practical terms, in the past year we succeeded to get more training than in the first two years after the revolution. We have succeeded because of the very good management of the means available to us, despite deprivation and lack of appropriate dwellings. Thus, even if we could ensure dwellings for the Army, we would still need 5,000-6,000 apartments each year, because this represents the coefficient of natural losses, and not 60,000 apartments as EVENIMENTUL ZILEI reported. Last year, we paid great attention to military training, because we wanted to avoid what happened in the eighties when the Army was virtually left without any resources for training and was taken away from its regular mission.

[Basca] Apart from the intensive military training carried out last year, what other major undertaking can you mention?

[Spiroiu] Infractions of the rules of discipline decreased by 38.4 percent in 1992 compared to 1991. This is a phenomenon that has not happened in the armies of any of our neighbors. On the other hand, we saw to it that the Army did not get involved in politics. Our balance sheet showed that up to December 1989 the material loss yearly was between 12 and 14 million lei. Since then prices have increased tenfold, but we end last year with less losses than the 12.5 million equivalent. And let us not forget that up to 1989 the police kept a tight reign on our society and the party organizations were also watching, they even examined our losses three or four times yearly. There were also counterinformers. Currently there are no political bodies or counterinformers. That is all over. The Army is living in a society penetrated by corruption, infractions of the law, robberies, and crime. Still, under these circumstances, infractions have dropped by 38.4 percent and the percentage of losses has been maintained at the same level or even reduced. All this proves the solid training of the Army and the fact that Army personnel have succeeded in becoming an example. There is a big fuss and an investigation is carried out for each stolen pair of boots.

[Basca] Can one talk about an improvement in the Army's supplies?

[Spiroiu] Without allotting the sums from the budget that are necessary to achieve the development and modernization programs that we have prepared and studied and without allotment for the defense industry, we cannot have improvement.

[Basca] What about the Air Force's equipment?

[Spiroiu] As you know, in recent years we purchased some MiG-21 aircraft. We are now interested in modernizing these planes, starting the manufacture of the Romanian IAR-99 Falcon, refurbishing the Romanian IAR-93 with new equipment and weapons, and acquiring more helicopters. It would be good if we were able to either purchase or manufacture—through a cooperative venture—a plane of the MiG-29 type. The Russians also have MiG-31 aircraft, but we would be content with MiG-29's, which should suffice for our area.

[Basca] What kind of aircraft equipment is in the possession of the countries around us? I am talking about Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia...

[Spiroiu] Right now, it is compatible with our equipment. It is very important than none of the countries in this region should receive new equipment.

[Basca] Is this a tactical or strategic conclusion? What should I make of it?

[Spiroiu] In my opinion, given the situation prevailing in all the countries of this region, as well as in West Europe, none of them should received military assistance at this time. There are already enough suspicions. Any assistance, no matter how insignificant it may be, will cause emotions and reactions that may lead to another arms race among the former Warsaw Pact countries.

[Basca] Last week was wotmessed hectic diplomatic—and not only that—activity in Bucharest. Did the two viewpoints of Turkey and Greece harmonize at all?

[Spiroiu] The contacts were not in the military sphere. Nevertheless, during the visits to Bucharest by the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, something very interesting became apparent; namely, that Romania and the Romanian Army have excellent relations with the respective ministers and chiefs of staff. The Greek and Turkish chiefs of staff have visited Romania on several occasions since the revolution. The Greek chief of staff Mr. (Verivakis), has visited Romania twice. Our chief of staff has visited Greece. Dogan Gures, Turkey's chief of staff, has also visited Romania, while his Romanian counterpart paid a visit to Turkey at the invitation of Turkish Minister of National Defense Nevzat Ayaz. Likewise, Greek National Defense Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis visited Bucharest last year. I will probably honor an invitation to go to Athens. We have cooperation agreements with the two armies. An agreement has been concluded with the Turkish Army at governmental level. There is a similar accord with the Greek Army, that is still valid. There are exchanges between various Army branches; a delegation of the Infantry Troop Command visited Greece; and there are ties in the sphere of supplies. I would say that there is a balance in our relations with the two armies, since Romania is equidistant vis-a-vis these two Balkan countries and is promoting a policy that, as far as I know, suits both the Greeks and the Turks. We all want a diplomatic and political solution for Yugoslavia.

[Basca] How long can the war last and how large is the Serbs' armaments stockpile?

[Spiroiu] I cannot estimate that, but let us not forget that during World War II they managed to check the German troops, who had conquered part of Europe and even of North Africa. One should not count on things dying down by themselves, through an exhaustion of resources. In spite of the measures taken to observe the embargo, the best thing would be for a solution to be found at the negotiating table. In my opinion, military intervention could create incentives for other parts of Yugoslavia to display expansionist tendencies. I am thinking of the Kosovo, where there are Albanians, and of Macedonia, which is a disputed territory.

[Basca] Ukraine is clearly a nuclear force.

[Spiroiu] The international community is endeavoring to ensure that this nuclear arsenal is placed under control. Ukraine has not yet signed the appropriate treaties.

[Basca] There are dangers....

[Spiroiu] That is why I said that we cannot afford to make changes in a militarily tense region.

[Basca] On the other hand, Ceausescu, at one point, wanted to manufacture nuclear weapons.

[Spiriou] These are simple speculations. You know that the matter has been investigated. We discovered some quantities [as published], in the range of milligrams. A governmental commission dealt with this matter. The situation was different. Some research was done in obtaining nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations; the necessary units for this purpose were built in the country. Of course, it is possible that the researchers involved in these labors have tried, out of curiosity, to obtain several grams or milligrams of such substances resulting from the enrichment of fusion materials, to the extent that they can be used as such.

[Basca] Why weren't you included in the official delegation that went to Brussels?

[Spiroiu] The decision was made at the presidential level, where it was decided that the president should be accompanied by the chief of staff. As a matter of fact, I will go to Brussels on 29 March. I was also invited by Mr. Manfred Woerner. I have been in Brussels twice. [passage omitted]

[Basca] Let us go back to the budget. The portion allocated to the Ministry of Interior is very large. The changes in equipment are quite visible.

[Spiroiu] Nevertheless, their budget allocation is still pretty small. Their equipment is less expensive than ours. There is no doubt that they have changed their appearance quite a lot. The Ministry of Interior people have changed their uniforms. They had to change them all, rather suddenly. They did it faster than we did. Maybe industry helped them more than they did us, since everybody wants to be on good terms with the police and the Ministry of Interior, which also controls the economic police. They have changed their uniforms and their cars (they now have Renault 19's) while we are still driving are Dacias. For instance, General Keller, in Cluj, still drives a five-year-old Dacia in which he barely fits, given his size, while the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] inspector drives an Opel Vectra and the Ministry of Interior inspector a Renault 19. However, the Army's equipment is much more expensive than such cars. So, faced with the choice of either changing our uniforms or buying night-vision equipment or a license to manufacture bullet-proof vests, we had to choose this path. One tank costs as much as 900 Renault 19's. Therefore, we felt obliged to allocate more money to equipment.

[Basca] Still, the public is passing its own judgments. Instead of replacing the old Socialist Republic of Romania passports, the Ministry of Interior decided first to change its uniforms. Changing 1 million passports was cheaper than buying one single automobile.

[Spiroiu] As a simple citizen, to quote you know who... [hint to Ceausescu's words at his military trial during the 1989 revolution] I might think like that, too. However, as minister of defense, I cannot concur with accusations brought against the Ministry of Interior, which, after all, has difficult tasks to fulfill. We should not create dissension. We are equally concerned with ensuring the social protection of the Army staff, at least as much as the people from the Ministry of Interior. And we will surely do it.

[Basca] Throughout the Army's history, did the border guards ever fall under the Ministry of Interior or to the Army?

[Spiroiu] They alternately belonged to both. When we overcame the Soviet model of the fifties and began to renationalize the Army and to make it Romanian again, the border guards were transferred to the Army, in 1961-62. At the end of 1989, when those huge border crossings occurred, the powers that be decided that good cooperation did not exist between the forces of order inside the country and the guards on the border, due to the fact that they belonged to different ministries. One of the last measures taken by the dictatorial family was to transfer the border guards to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the revolution of 16-21 December found the border guards under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, and they were consequently transferred to the Ministry of National Defense. A decision was taken later to move them back to the Ministry of Interior. In the majority of democratic countries, the state borders—not its defence—are better ensured by the Ministry of Interior, which can exert control of the border guards, the border police, and the territorial police, thus lending more coherence to guarding the borders and preventing illegal crossings. Given the aforementioned reasons, I believe that they should fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior in our country, too. The current situation, with the embargo against Yugoslavia, has shown this is the right decision.

[Basca] If the border guards had belonged to the Army, they could have intervened only after approval from Parliament. As it is, they were able to intervene on their own, since they belonged to the Ministry of Interior.

[Spiroiu] The Army did not get involved. No armed conflict has broken out between Romania and Yugoslavia. Therefore, it was only a matter of guarding the borders.

Data Released on 1990-92 Emigration

AU0303174493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1509 GMT 3 Mar 93

[All figures as received]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 3/3/1993—Answering requests from the Romanian Senate for data referring to the latest statements made by Reformed Bishop Laszlo Tokes about an alleged "ethnic purification" in Romania, the Romanian Ministry of the Interior released the following data:

1. The number of Romanian citizens who have applied for and were granted the right to settle abroad over January 1, 1990 - December 31, 1992 was:

a) In 1990—144,543, of whom 95,900 German ethnics, 25,583 Romanian ethnics, 18,821 Hungarian ethnics, and 4,239 other ethnics.

b) In 1991—43,544, of whom 18,307 Romanian ethnics, 16,767 German ethnics, 7,494 Hungarian ethnics, and 976 other ethnics.

c) In 1992—34, 583, of whom 17,922 Romanian ethnics, 8,845 German ethnics, 6,673 Hungarian ethnics, and 1,143 other ethnics.

2. Of the Romanian citizens who applied for and were granted the right to settle abroad, the following numbers actually left the country:

a) In 1990—96,929, of whom 60,072 German ethnics, 23,888 Romanian ethnics, 11,040 Hungarian ethnics, and 1,929 other ethnics.

b) In 1991—44,160, of whom 19,307 Romanian ethnics, 15,567 German ethnics, 7,494 Hungarian ethnics, and 1,792 other ethnics.

c) In 1992—33,889, of whom 16,269 Romanian ethnics, 9,951 German ethnics, 6,700 Hungarian ethnics, and 963 other ethnics.

In conclusion, over 1990-92 a number of 222,670 Romanian citizens applied for and were granted the right to settle abroad, of whom:
121,512 (54.5 percent) German ethnics,
61,812 (27.7 percent) Romanian ethnics,
32,983 (14.6 percent) Hungarian ethnics,
6,358 (3 percent) other ethnics.

Of those, 174,978 Romanian citizens actually settled abroad over that period, of whom:
65,590 (48.9 percent) German ethnics,
59,464 (33.9 percent) Romanian ethnics,
25,234 (14.4 percent) Hungarian ethnics,
4,690 (2.8 percent) other ethnics.

The difference between the two overall figures is accounted for by the persons who are in the process of carrying through the various formalities to obtain visas of the states where they wish to settle.

Muslims, Serbs Agree on Plan To Open Corridor

LD0403150493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1253 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] Belgrade, 4 Mar (TANJUG)—Representatives of the United Nations and of the Muslim and Serbian sides in Bosnia-Hercegovina yesterday agreed on the outline of an agreement which would lead to opening a corridor facilitating free movement for civilians and the wounded from the Zepa, Cerska, and Srebrenica area, a TANJUG corresponedent was told today at UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] Headquarters in Belgrade.

The "blue helmet" headquarters stressed that at yesterday's talks UNPROFOR Commander French General Philippe Morillon; Colonel General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Army of the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina; Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency loyal to Alija Izetbegovic; and Victor Andreyev, representative of the UNPROFOR Civilian Sector, reached no final agreement. They only drew up a draft.

Once open, the corridors should be supervised by representatives of the United Nations and the Serbian side, UNPROFOR says. The "blue helmet" headquarters stressed that the UNPROFOR and UNHCR are making efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the population of eastern Bosnia.

Refugees Granted Safe Passage

LD0403143893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1347 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] Zvornik, 4 Mar (TANJUG)—The Serbian republic [of Bosnia-Hercegovina] Army's Zvornik Garrison Command issued a statement today to all Muslims in the Konjevic Polje area, to the effect that "everyone who wants to leave is guaranteed safe passage out of the zone of combat activities," a TANJUG correspondent has learned from Serbian military sources.

The statement says that the Serbian side will provide its own vehicles for transport along the line of Konjevic Polje-Drinjaca-Zvornik-Caparde-Memici. The Serbian side streses in particular that it does not want suffering and innocent victims, and that it will secure unhidered departure for those who have fallen victim to Alija Izetbegovic's policies by fighting for his aims.

The statement points to humanitarian concerns as the principal motive which has again led the Serbian side on this occasion into helping the Muslims, although it will no longer live together with them. In future they will live side by side, it is added, among other things, in today's statement addressed to Muslims in the Konjevic Polje area by the Zvornik Garrison Command.

Trucks Waiting for Evacuation

AU0403084693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] took urgent measures to receive the wounded from Cerska and Konjevic Polje. The UNHCR representatives are currently in Banja Koviljaca in western Serbia where 12 trucks transformed into ambulance vehicles are waiting for the aggressor from Serbia to allow them to enter Bosnia.

Twelve Swedish trucks are supposed to set off for Milici, a town just before Konjevic Polje, this morning while another 20 Belgian trucks are waiting in Gorazde to join the rest if necessary.

According to the initial plan, the wounded from the nearby villages—1,500 according to the report by Bosnia-Hercegovina authorities—are to be evacuated in Tuzla.

Aid Convoy Reaches Gorazde

LD0303213593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] A convoy of 11 trucks with 65 tonnes of humanitarian aid reached Gorazde this afternoon. UNHCR [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees] spokeswoman Alenka Lisinski confirmed this in Zagreb.

Zepa Residents Receive Aid

AU0303185993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Report by unidentified ham radio operators in Zepa]

[Text] There is joy in Zepa! We have found 11 more containers with food, and we hope to find the rest. There is great happiness and gratitude to the United States and everyone who helped. The airdrop operation to Zepa has brought joy to its people. In the hope that it will not stop here, and [words indistinct] the delivery of food, we are extremely grateful. We thank all those who have taken part in this, and we hope that this will continue. These are the ham radio operators of Zepa on the behalf of the Zepa War Presidency.

Aid Delivered To Konjevic Polje

AU0403085293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] The U.S. transport aircraft early this morning completed their fourth mission in the action of delivering food and medication to the residents of eastern Bosnia, REUTER reports.

A correspondent of this agency, who was present in one of the aircraft, reported that Hercules aircraft landed in Rhein-Maine base near Frankfurt at approximately 0300 this morning.

At the same time AFP reports, quoting a representative of the U.S. Army in this base, that the containers with food and medication were dropped above Konjevic Polje.

Srebrenica Official on Aid

AU0303140493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Interview with Murat Efendic, member of the War Presidency of Srebrenica Commune and of the Srebrenica, Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Kamenica subregion, by correspondent Senada Cumurovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Cumurovic] Alarming reports from the Srebrenica, Cerska, Zepa, and Konjevic Polje area continue, the latest being that many are wounded and that many civilians are fleeing villages that were completely burned down and destroyed. Since you are naturally also in contact with ham radio operators, you probably have some new information for us and our listeners. Let me say once more that we are talking to Murat Efendic, member of the War Presidency of Srebrenica Commune and of the Srebrenica, Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Kamenica subregion.

[Efendic] Well, mostly at the beginning, when the project of dropping the humanitarian aid from the air started and the project [words indistinct] every evening and every day [words indistinct] gazing at the sky, waiting for the aid to land where it was most needed. Konjevic Polje residents were lucky today—that is, this morning. The report that we received at 0700 was incomplete. At 1140, we received a complete report that 18 packages have landed and that they are in an area that Konjevic Polje citizens can access. However, the aggressor, as soon as he noticed that the packages were landing on the territory defended by the Bosnia-Hercegovina Armed Forces, started making it impossible for the residents to approach this area and practically [words indistinct] that has arrived. The entire area is under artillery fire [words indistinct]. Infantry attacks in the direction of Cerska and Konjevic Polje supported by armored-mechanized means—tanks, howitzers, and mortars—resumed this morning. Therefore, it is practically impossible to reach any of the packages (?to distribute) the humanitarian aid in the form of food and medication as quickly as possible [words indistinct] to be used. [Words indistinct] Konjevic Polje and probably also Srebrenica as a free territory.

This morning alone 18 civilians died on the territory of Konjevic Polje as a result of shelling while [word indistinct] were wounded. The outcome of the overnight shelling is not known, but the figure is probably considerably higher than the one quoted.

I held talks with Hajrudin Avdic, president of the War Presidency of Srebrenica Commune, and he issued a final appeal to the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and the Government, as well as to all humanitarian organizations like the UN Protection Force and UN High Commission for Refugees, asking them: Why is Srebrenica absolutely never mentioned in any concept, any plan for delivery of humanitarian aid? They are asking that these people be told whether humanitarian aid will come to Srebrenica, either by air or by land. If aid does not come in a day or two, then there will really no longer be any need to send it to anyone. On this occasion, Avdic appeals to the Presidency and the Government to speak out and (?address) the people in eastern Bosnia, especially in Srebrenica, Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Kamenica, and tell them what their chances are, what their future is, and will they live to have humanitarian aid delivered.

I would like to thank the United States in the name of all ethnic communities in eastern Bosnia—that is, from the towns I have mentioned—since the United States was the only one that tried to do something concrete for [word indistinct] that is disappearing. We again appeal via the Srebrenica war presidency that the United States persevere in their wishes and good intentions to help save the people in this part of Bosnia. It seems to me that they are the only ones who are trying to achieve something. All previous actions were practically only lip-service and dead projects on paper that never materialized.

[Cumurovic] According to the information from Cerska [words indistinct] thousands of [words indistinct] demands. Are there any (?indications) that these refugees will be evacuated from the region and receive medical treatment somewhere else?

[Efendic] This project...[changes thought] We have been demanding this for a long time. We [word indistinct] those who should realize this, but the mandates of all these institutions are negotiating mandates. Thus, they must obtain the consent of the aggressor side, which wants to practically destroy these people. They must give the go-ahead for the evacuation of people and the wounded. It was reported last night that General Mladic [commander of the Army of Bosnian Serbs] is demanding that the people from eastern Bosnia and these regions—Srebrenica, Konjevic Polje, Cerska, and Kamenica—lay down their arms. Only then can the corridor be opened. We tell them that these people will never surrender, they would rather die [words indistinct] lose anything by surrendering to the aggressor, regardless of the fate the aggressor intends for them.

[Cumurovic] How many villages have been burnt down in the Cerska region in the last two to three days?

[Efendic] Practically the whole of Cerska is burning—Mt. (?Udric), Mt. (?Skuglic), and the villages that were burnt [words indistinct] and hamlets. They were reported in yesterday's news and they are: Mumilovici, Djuricici, Hodzici, Potok, Gusteri, Novo Naselje, (?Djelici), Musici, Merhatovici, Celebici, Hakalasi, Cosici,

and Sejmerovici. They were burnt out by yesterday. The arson of what remained in Cerska region continues today.

Ministry Spokesman on Airdrops

AU0303163193 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Report by Predrag Smoljan on news conference by Miroslav Jancic, spokesman for the Bosnia-Hercegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Sarajevo on 3 March—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Smoljan] The official spokesman for the Bosnia-Hercegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Jancic, was very positive about the results of the talks between President Izetbegovic and U.S. Vice President Al Gore and other officials in the U.S. Administration. He assessed as very constructive the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on further intentions and involvement of the United States in the solution to the Bosnia-Hercegovina crisis. Sincere gratitude was expressed for the spectacular delivery of aid by U.S. planes to the endangered places in eastern Bosnia.

[Jancic] We welcome the desire expressed by Russia, Germany, and Turkey to participate in the airdrops of humanitarian aid alongside the United States. While Turkey and Germany have already participated, each in its own way, in the alleviating of the war suffering in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the direct involvement of Russia is a significant novelty, and we see it as a concrete (?involvement) of this country in the solution to the Bosnia-Hercegovina crisis, as was agreed with Washington last month.

In that regard, I would like to comment on the latest piece of news we received this morning that the humanitarian airdrops might be suspended because the land routes for humanitarian aid are allegedly passable to these regions. I am authorized to say in this regard that we are in favor of the continuation of the delivery of humanitarian aid to the endangered parts of eastern Bosnia, regardless of the means in which it is done.

Unfortunately, we have to say that the aggressor is doing all that is in his power to neutralize the humanitarian aid to the endangered free territories, the same way as he is trying to undermine the talks in New York, ignoring in advance a considerable number of possible solutions. We can give as an example the aggressor's brutal treatment of the civilian population of Cerska, his ruthless attempts at capturing the northern corridor, and the continuous and heinous bombardment of Sarajevo while the talks are under way. That is why the Bosnia-Hercegovina delegation's view in New York is justified that a military agreement has to be reached first, which would put a stop to the killing and destruction. Only then can the maps and other political issues be discussed. [passage omitted]

Commentary Considers Airdrops

AU0303162193 Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 93 p 9

[Commentary by Stjepo Martinovic: "To Feed a Hungry Victim, and Also a Satiated Aggressor...."]

[Text] All questions are finally answered: The Americans will drop food from the air to the "Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats in besieged enclaves" within a "temporary, limited, and unilateral action"—of a completely civilion character. There will not be any armed fighter plane escort, but Hercules transport planes will fly beyond the range of Serbian antiaircraft artillery, "some 3,000 meters high." This is the height—twice the distance that an American veteran of such actions described as "guaranteed only to hit Earth"—from which American aircraft will drop one-ton packages, which have been announced as heavenly help, but also as a danger (because such "bombing" killed several hundred Kurds) by dropping leaflets in "the Croatian and Serbian language" (and I guess also in corresponding alphabets).

Furthermore, although this is an American action, both in design and in realization, it is going to be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations—and it is just this organization (or rather certain Butrus-Ghali suggestions to Bill Clinton) that can be given credit for the conceptual and executive framework of the operation. This operation includes the "delivery of supplies to Serbs in Croatian Krajina," although they are not besieged, so that the UNHCR [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees] trucks could not reach them (which can be proven by one look at the vouchers given to Mrs. Ogata's drivers).

Thus, when one puts together the entire mosaic of the "parachute operation," we bump into three inevitable questions. First, is Washington really prompted into this "high risk action" by humanitarian reasons alone—or by the desire to soothe its own conscience, as it wants no military intervention to stop the war, and to use a surrogate to "show the victims that America want to help them, that it want to make an additional effort?"

Second, is the "parachute operation" really the only possible response of the greatest superpower (and the United Nations) to the chetnik terrestrial frenzy—or has the airborne alternative been accepted along the line of least resistance, instead of extending the blue helmets mandate to escort relief convoys, enabling them alone to eliminate obstacles on Bosnian roads? Third, what is the parody regarding airdrops for the "Croatian Krajina" for—unless it is a triumph of (to put it mildly) exalted altruism?

As for the first question, let us express our slight doubt in the primarily humanitarian motives of the new U.S. Administration, because "humanitarian nightmares" have existed elsewhere, absolutely urging air drops—and

there has not been a single Hercules in sight. Notwithstanding the lack of fighter escorts, American transporters in Bosnian skies will obviously set a precedent. And when they are once broken ... it will be easier to accept the U.S. Air Force in some other role. At the same time, the humanitarian "bombing" will come in handy for some time as a public relation substitution for a real stroke against Serbian artillery around Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica,....

These speculations have partly answered the second question: Namely, the "parachute operation" can have a certain erosive effect on chetnik blockades, because they will be thrown out of the game in a humiliating manner. Nevertheless, the main motive of the Serbian "presence"—to make the regions in which the "ethnic cleansing" have been conducted airtight—will not be overcome, but only increased as there probably will be fewer land relief convoys putting pressure on check points.

As for the airdrops for the rebel Serbs in Croatia, after we put aside the question of relief goods for creators of the criminal "decroatization" policy in the occupied Croatian regions, the only logical answer is that the UN secretary general is demonstrating again his absurd and cynical equalization of victims and aggressors. Of course, it is true that in the UN-protected areas there are victims who deserve humanitarian help—but they are not the Serbs who hitched themselves to Milosevic's cart, attacked their own country, and committed crimes against their Croatian fellow citizens. The chance of dropping the aid from 3,000 meters only to those Serbs who are victims of chetnik terrorists, who dragged them into the rebel adventure, is just as great as the odds of a Hercules above Knin hitting the White House with a package!

All in all, if we classified all the crucial parameters of the "parachute operation," it would be hard to resist the impression that it is another exhibition of altruism whose preachers speak only of helping the hungry—and not a word about why those miserable people are in need for humanitarian help, who deprived them of their homes, safety, peace, bred,.... Such abstract righteousness, particularly because of an irritable blindness for the sources and protagonists of violence, mostly resembles all the good intentions with which a road to hell is paved.

Serb Delegation Leaves for Talks on Camps

LD0403130993 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1032 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] Belgrade, 4 Mar (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Serb Republic [in Bosnia-Hercegovina] left for Geneva this morning to resume talks on the closure of detention camps and prisons in former Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Health Minister Dragan Kalinic, who heads the delegation, said on his departure that one of the topics to be discussed in Geneva will be the resettlement of people who want to move out of besieged towns, regardless of their nationality.

The warring factions in former Bosnia-Hercegovina signed an agreement on 1 October last year on unilateral and unconditional closure of all prison camps, as well as a recommendation by the cochairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia to enable civilians a free passage out of the besieged towns. The action to close down prison camps was halted due to unwillingness by Muslim and Croat authorities to implement the agreement.

The Serb side has closed down three prison camps holding 5,053 prisoners. The Muslim and Croat sides have not only failed to close any prisons, but have also failed to abide by an agreement to free 1,740 Serbs in exchange for 3,000 Muslims and Croats released from the former prison camp in Manjaca.

The Serb and Croat side have been willing to implement the protocol on the free movement of the population in the Sarajevo area, but the Muslims did not agree, with the pretext that such action would enable ethnic cleansing.

In addition to minister Kalinic the Serb delegation at the talks will include Miroslav Popovic, a liaison officer in the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]. The Muslim side will be represented by Kasim Trnka, and the Croat by Asim Kurjak. They will be talking to Cornelio Sommaruga, president of the ICRC, Thierry Germond [name only as received], and EC observers in Croatia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The talks will last for three days.

Canadian Peacekeepers Exchange Fire With Snipers

LD0303212193 Montreal Radio Canada International in English 2000 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Canadian peacekeepers have exchanged gunfire with snipers in war-torn Bosnia. There are no reports of casualties on either side. The Canadians defended themselves after they were fired upon while travelling in light armored vehicles between their bases at Visoko and Kiseljac near the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. The Canadians are preparing to provide armed escorts for United Nations convoys bringing relief to civilians in Sarajevo who are besieged by Serbs.

Muslim Offensive Reported in Sarajevo

LD0303194993 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1920 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Pale, March 3 (TANJUG)—Fighting was resumed in the Sarajevo battlefront on Wednesday [3 March] afternoon. The attack of Moslem forces on the Bosnian Serb positions near the suburbs of Ilijas is still in progress.

Several mortar shells launched from the Moslem positions fell on the suburbs of Rajlovac, but caused no casualties. Two Serb soldiers were injured by a sniper from the direction of Sokolj.

Heavy artillery fire was heared in Vogosce during morning hours. Moslem extremists fired at Serb positions in Blagovac and at the Pretis factory complex. Civilian and industrial targets were damaged extensively by shells filled with inflamable mixture. No casualties were reported.

New fighting broke out in the northwest part of the Sarajevo region. Moslems opened artillery fire from Mojmilo at the suburbs of Nedzarici and Kasindolska street injuring one civilian.

Serb soldiers repulsed successfully this morning's combined attack of Moslem artillery and infantry on Hadzici, the Bosnian Serb army information centre reported.

Battles Reportedly Abating Along Drina River

LD0303183593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1523 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Belgrade, March 3 (TANJUG)—There were no greater clashes between Bosnian Serbs and Moslem units loyal to [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic in the majority of the battlefileds in Bosnia-Hercegovina by noon Wednesday [3 March], said TANJUG correspondents citing local Serbian military authorities.

TANJUG correspondent from Doboj (northern Bosnia) said, calling on the local Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina Army command, that battles had abated along the Drina River. The military authorities in Doboj claim that it was quiet on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning.

According to the same source, there weren't any stronger clashes in the area of Teslic (north Bosnia), but Moslem formations occasionally opened infantry and artillery fire. There were armed skirmishes in the Maglaj area, but members of the Bosnian Serb Army did not return fire, said the military authorities in Doboj.

In Sarajevo, Tuesday night and Wednesday morning passed with occasional firing by the Moslem Army from infantry and artillery arms on Serbian positions and settlements, said the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA, calling on a statement issued by the Sarajevo- Romanjia corps of the Bosnian Serb Army.

Serbian settlements in the southwestern suburbs of Sarajevo were hit by over 50 artillery rockets fired in the night between Tuesday and Wednesday from Moslem positions at Visoko, said SRNA. Regular Croatian Army units and Croatian-Moslem formations under the command of local Croatian forces, opened fire along the whole of the Hercegovina battlefield, said the military authorities in Bileca on Wednesday. At least 60,000 members of the Croatia [word indistinct] are engaged in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, mostly in Hercegovina and in central Bosnia.

The Croatian Army opened artillery fire on three Serbian villages in the Trebinje part of the eastern Hercegovina battlefield on Tuesday night, said the statement. Artillery fire was opened against Serbian positions in the Capljina-Stolac and Mostar-Nevesinje battlefields in Hercegovina, it was announced in Bileca.

Muslims, Croats Sign Agreement on Presidency

LD0403020293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0112 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] New York, March 3 (TANJUG)—Moslems and Croats from Bosnia-Hercegovina agreed Wednesday night [3 March] on the questions pertaining to the provisional authority in this war-shattered former Yugoslav republic.

The two sides agreed on a transitional presidency made up of nine members, with three representatives from each of the three constituent peoples—the Serb, the Croats and the Moslems.

Since Bosnia-Hercegovina was being demilitarized, commander of the armed forces will not be member of the transitional Presidency.

Under the agreement, the Presidency will have a rotating system for the post of president, according to which the change will take place every six months starting with Moslem the representative, followed by the Croat and ending with the Serb.

The Presidency will adopt decisions through consensus, through a majority of seven votes or through a simple majority—depending on whether the issues cut into the constitutional matters or less significant questions were involved.

If the transitional Presidency cannot agree on the needed majority for some decision, under the agreement the cochairmen of the Geneva conference on the former Yugoslavia will have to be consulted, and their view would be binding.

Also, the Croat-Moslem agreement contains also the statement under which the future provinces would be an integral part of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and not national territories.

Bosnian Moslem leader, who also currently heads the rump Bosnian Presidency Alija Izetbegovic and his Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic, on the one side, and head of Bosnian Croats Mate Boban, and Mile Akmadzic, prime minister in Izetbegovic's government, on the other, have signed the agreement at the U.N. Headquarters in New York.

The views of the Bosnian Serb delegation on the provisional authority remains to be seen.

HVO Stresses Humanitarian Aid Convoys

LD0303180493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Dispatch from Hercegovina by Slavko Rako]

[Text] Supplies of food and other goods in central Bosnia, and especially in the municipalities of Vares and

Busovaca, were discussed at a session of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Mostar today. It was affirmed that the delivery of humanitarian aid to these areas has recently become difficult. It was concluded that a convoy with aid for the municipalities of Busovaca and Vares should be organized, and that the convoy's passage should be secured by the UN Protection Force. Failing this, the HVO's defense department will assume the responsibility of protecting the convoy. The HVO believes that the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid should be part of the overall activities aimed at restoring mutual trust between Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia and stepping up the joint struggle against the Serb aggressor.

A decision was taken at today's session of the HVO to form offices of vice presidents of the HVO of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna in Travnik and Orasje.

Concerning the situation on the battlefields in southeast Hercegovina, there have been no reports of serious provocations by the Serb aggressor.

Commentary Charges Muslims With 'Provoking Croats'

AU0303162093 Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 1 Mar 93 p 1

[Commentary by Zeljko Kruselj: "Izetbegovic Has the Next Move"]

[Text] International public opinion has suspected not only the Bosnia-Hercegovina Croats but their mother country of constantly damaging Muslim-Croatian relations. The reasons have usually amounted to rumors about "secret" Serbo-Croatian deals regarding the "division of Bosnia-Hercegovina." Although such rumors have never been proven, nor have events on the Bosnia-Hercegovina front favored them, a black cloud has remained over the Croats. Muslim "war games" in central Bosnia, however, disprove such speculations best. As soon as the Vance-Owen plan on dividing Bosnia into 10 provinces was announced, the Croats were informally classified as "subsequent occupiers," notwithstanding the fact that central Bosnia was not occupied thanks to the timely organization of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. Since they had not been capable of resisting Serbian units, however certain Muslim leaders felt very capable of "handling the Croats," and on the territory that has been apportioned in Geneva to Croatia as its sphere of interest. Near Gornji Vakuf and Busovaca a dozen Croatian villages were burned, while the people were expelled and some even slaughtered. The Muslim leadership, particularly the military leaders, announced that it did not give up on the idea of "a civil Bosnia-Hercegovina," regardless of the constitutional principles officially signed by Alija Izetbegovic. It was expected that the visit of Turkish President Ozal would help normalize of Muslim-Croatian relations, particularly after Ejup Ganic suddenly appeared in Zagreb. Basically, everything was arragened, but it appears as if the local Muslim leaders did not care. Sefer Halilovic, chief of the General Staff, managed to dodge the meeting with representatives of the HVO General Staff, proving that he actually did not carze for any normalization. What they have lost in Serbian conquests, they would gladly compensate by taking from the Croats. While Serbs were taking over the strategic Sarajevo suburb of Azici, in central Bosnia 25,000 Muslim soldiers were "entartaining themselves" by provoking the Croats. That was actually the main reason for the HVO to temporarily close the borders against arms and equipment shipments to the Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Now, Izetbegovic has the next move, if anybody in Sarajevo asks him anything at all.

Arms Reportedly Purchased From Prostitution Profits

93BA0637A Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 93 p 7

[Article by Serbian Republic News Agency: "Prostitution Is Flourishing in the Muslim Regional Clubs"]

[Text] Srpsko Sarajevo, 11 Jan (SRNA)—The News Service of the General Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic yesterday delivered to the news media a press release stating the following:

"We have reliable information that the Una Muslim Regional Club in Zagreb (whose purpose is to collect aid and purchase arms and military equipment) is organizing prostitution by Muslim women in order to obtain money to purchase arms, patterned after the brothels that already exist in Vienna and other cities of Europe, where Muslim women are abused for the same purposes."

This is yet another proof of the abuse of women for political purposes and purposes of war, the press release goes on to state, and it is being done in an extremely inhumane and criminal manner. The Muslims are using their female population to achieve political and religious ends, and they are representing this before the world as the act of the Serbs.

"When the Muslim side published lies to the effect that 'the Serbs have raped 100,000 Muslim women,' they probably wanted to distract attention from these brothels.

"Although the Muslim-Croatian coalition has fewer and fewer common ties on the battlefield and have even become each other's enemies in several regions of the former Bosnia-Hercegovina where they are fighting one another for territory and power, they have understanding and are cooperating well on the field of combat, politics, and trade against the Serbs," states the press release of the News Service of the General Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic.

Possibility of Postwar Economic Cooperation

93BA0618A Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by S. Risovic: "Whether and When Banja Luka Economy Will Reestablish Business Contacts with Croatia and Slovenia: Economy After the War"]

[Text] *If the war in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] were to end, connections between Banja Luka enterprises and Croatian and Slovene companies would be quickly restored, because even before the war nearly 70 percent of the capacity of the Banja Luka economy was dependent on the market of those two republics.*

Banja Luka, 30 Dec—Nearly 70 percent of total economic capacity, especially in industry, was dependent on business ties with Croatia and Slovenia, but the outbreak of war and the blockade on roads suddenly severed all ties. Under the newly emerged circumstances, however, where the war is raging furiously in the territory of the former Yugoslav republic of B-H while Slovenia and Croatia, with the help of the international community, have already fixed their state borders, it is worth applying the logic of economists to considering how to overcome all the obstacles and somehow revive business ties with them.

"Will 'Univerzal' work with companies from Croatia and Slovenia? My response is in the affirmative, but it all depends on when the war is stopped and how the question of cooperation between the Serbian Republic [of Bosnia-Hercegovina] and, say, the Republic of Slovenia will be resolved. The circumstances are changing substantially, because that cooperation, if it happens, will be exclusively according to the letter of international regulations," emphasizes Andjenko Grahovac, the director of "Univerzal," a unique company known for its production of hydraulic jacks and garage equipment which has easily adapted even to the new conditions of conducting business. In fact, "Univerzal" is the only company of this kind in the FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia, so that its market is wide-open in Serbia and Montenegro as well.

The secessionists from the northwest of the country shattered Yugoslavia, but at the same time the unified Yugoslav market, if it was in fact ever unified (?). But it will be hard for the Slovenes to clear a path for entry into Europe over night, and for the Croats even more so. Many Slovene companies, even through circuitous routes through Austria and Hungary, are maintaining business cooperation with individual Banja Luka enterprises. It is true that there are very few examples of successful ties, but to cite an example, Banja Luka's TAS maintains business ties with Ravna Iron Works even today, and as soon as the war is over, TAS stresses, cooperation with "Varostroj" in Lendava and "Kolor" in Mevoda will be restored.

"Naturally, as soon as relations are settled on the state level, there will been no reason whatsoever not to restore the previous, very good level of business cooperation with Zagreb's 'Koncar' and with certain other companies in Croatia. In this situation, TAS relies primarily on the economic subjects of Serbia and Montenegro, but also on business ties with Macedonia, especially with the Skopje Iron Works," says Mirko Risojevic, the director of TAS.

Banja Luka's "Kristal" has also done a lot for Slovenes. For days, business people from "Jelovica" asked "Kristal" to continue sending glass for "Jelovica," not even asking about the price, "but since all ties have been severed, the Slovenes will have to wait until the war is over."

"The economy will take care of itself. Regardless of what the inter-state relations are, even if indirectly, business cooperation between the borderland companies and companies in Croatia and Slovenia will be reestablished. The only thing is that the same mistake should not be repeated, by depending so much on the northwestern market. You see, it is not simple to replace the lost market in Croatia and Slovenia. In a certain sense, conditionally speaking, it is even good that we have not had enough electricity, because if we had, I do not know where we would have gone with many products, since—I repeat—ties with the northwest have been severed but they have not yet been established with the east. Our long-term orientation must be the unification of the economic capacities of the Serbian Republic, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Serbia, and Montenegro, the unification of the market, and then, guided exclusively by economic logic, business cooperation will be established with Slovenia and Croatia," emphasizes Predrag Radic, president of the SO [Serbian Opstina of] Banja Luka.

Fighting Continues in Northern Dalmatia

AU0303152793 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Report by Damir Kozul from Benkovac]

[Excerpt] The strong Ustasha offensive that started yesterday noon is continuing on the north Dalmatian front. Ustasha forces are attacking with all available weapons, along the entire line of the front. In some places the shelling of the Serbian positions and the civilian targets has been going on for a full 24 hours. There is hardly a Serbian village between Maslenica, Biograd, and Vodice that has not been exposed to horrific shelling. Benkovac was shelled at 0715 this morning itself. Obrovac has also been subjected to every day attacks.

The fiercest artillery-infantry attacks today were near upper Zemunik and some other Serb villages south of Benkovac. The Serbian army is responding to all attacks fiercely and accurately and the line of front has not changed. There is no information about casualties in the units of the Serbian army yet. [passage omitted]

Government Crisis Worsens in Krajina

AU0303170093 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by S. Radulovic: "Formal Problems, Real Plundering"]

[Text] "The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina will discuss current political problems at its next meeting, scheduled to take place after the Krajina delegation returns from New York." This decision, reached at the last Government meeting, which has been described as a "working meeting," indicates that the differences at the top of the Krajina authorities are still current and that it can be expected that the narrowest circle of Krajina authorities will finally go public with clear attitudes regarding the events that have caused various commentaries and uncertainties.

If the announced debate is limited to establishing formal facts in connection with the removal from power of Defense Minister Stojan Spanovic, Information Minister Dusan Ecimovic, Deputy Prime Minister Veljko Dzakula, and Transportation Minister Savan Grabundzija, then the real reasons for the differences will remain undisclosed, and the numerous questions broached by Milan Martic will remain unanswered. Of course, disputes about "the legitimacy and constitutionality" of the removal procedure are not unimportant, but answering these questions will not end the real reasons for the conflicts, nor will it solve the "enigma" of the alleged refusal to welcome Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan to the Krajina, which has drawn more public attention than the behind-the-scenes conflicts of the Krajina authorities.

There is a growing opinion that political disagreements are not the only reasons for the conflicts, although it still remains unknown to what extent political issues influenced the development of events prior to and following the removal of certain officials. Could it be that the real reasons are the cases brought up by Martic, and having to do with officials' apartments, smuggling, lawlessness....

Even before the outbreak of the latest armed clashes in southern Krajina, there were "rumors" of organized smuggling, crime, and the connection of certain officials with war profiteers. It is a fact that hundreds of criminal charges were brought mainly against "small fry," but even they managed to evade the long arm of the law owing to deficiencies in the legal system. The assistant minister of trade in eastern Krajina was removed from power because of illegal transactions involving oil and wheat. It was promised that criminal charges would be brought against him, but the case was soon forgotten, while a report on malversations involving oil in Mirkovci is long overdue.

It is no secret in the Krajina that in certain municipalities in Kordun and Banija, there are bands of smugglers connected with smugglers in the Cazin Krajina. There have been cases of armed clashes between these bands, all in the name of "protecting" their respective smuggling turfs. Almost daily, Radio Kladusa reports on the "black market" and updates the prices of flour, cigarettes, and other commodities that are most often smuggled. The prices are, of course, in German marks.

The war has once again made topical the problem of war profiteers, and the military authorities have reacted. In the Banija region, several bands of smugglers have been discovered, and in southern Krajina military authorities have discovered smugglers and plunderers, who after the outbreak of clashes managed to clean out deserted houses and take off with loads of plundered merchandise without being disturbed.

Just when it was expected that this would reap results and prevent further robberies, Minister of Justice Vojin Susa wrote a letter in which he accused the army of creating a "parallel military legal system" that was in contradiction with the regulations of the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Goran Hadzic, which say that in conditions of a state of war, all military legal matters are to be dealt with by civil courts. This was justified by the fact that the military legal system is not regulated by appropriate laws.

The Defense Ministry received a memo on 6 February, saying that at the moment military legal organs could not be established because there was no legal basis for this, whereas the consequences of illegally establishing military legal organs might lead to the total collapse of the existing legal system. So says Minister Susa.

Once again, the formal reasons which need to be respected are foremost, but what remains is the question of what have the civil courts done to prevent what the military authorities tried to prevent. If the military authorities are blamed for illegally trying to establish

military legal organs and if it is thought that this will "lead to" the total collapse of the already established legal system (which is obviously not fully established since the military segment is missing), then it is up to the Ministry of Justice to answer the question of what has been done in order to overcome the chaotic situation within the legal system and to unmask those who are using the war and the establishment of the Republic of Serbian Krajina as a front for unprincipled hoarding of wealth.

Nuclear Waste Reportedly Dumped in Serb Regions

LD0303204693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1938 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Geneva, March 3 (TANJUG)—Croatia has drawn up a plan to store nuclear waste in areas completely or predominantly populated by Serbs. Some of these regions are controlled by the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR].

Croatia has already been secretly dumping nuclear waste in western Slavonija, i.e., Sector West of the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA).

The UNPROFOR has been deployed in areas within the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia where the Serbs make up the majority population. Upon Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, the Serbs there set up the Republic of Serb Krajina.

Head of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's permanent mission in Geneva Vladimir Pavicevic submitted extensive documentation about Croatia's intentions and activities to the Director of the Human Rights Center Ibrahim Fol and cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen.

One of the documents the F.R.Y. mission submitted was the report on storing nuclear waste the Croatian Government drew up for the symposium currently held in Tucson, Arizona.

The Yugoslav mission warned that Balkans and Europe would meet with ecological disaster if Croatia carried out its plan, since the natural configuration of the locations did not meet even minimum conditions either from the geological nor the seismological point of view.

The F.R.Y. will do its utmost to regularly inform the international community of the developments and expects of it to take action to prevent the implementation of this monstrous plan.

Daily Assesses Turkish Role in Peace Process

AU0303121393 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 93 p 13

[Commentary by Mihailo Nicota: "An Outing to Croatistan"]

[Text] It could be said that the meeting between President Tudjman and Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which took place in Zagreb on Sunday [21 February], is the first direct consequence of Turkish President Turgut Ozal's two-day official visit to the Croatian capital. Moreover, it can already be said that the Zagreb outing of the Turkish state-diplomatic-economic "caravan" at the end of the Balkan "expedition", was a historical event, as was the entire six-day tour which, prior to Croatia, had included Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania.

The unusually large entourage, numbering 150 Turks—Ozal's associates and advisers, generals, high officials, members of parliament, businessmen and journalists, which were driven around Zagreb in buses- - in coming to us, in fact the only non-Balkan lap on their Balkan tour, implies that Croatia figures as an important factor for the peaceful outcome of the grave war crisis on our territories. The "outing to Croatistan", as the Turkish visitors described this visit, obviously deeming it to be one of intimate and close friendship, has without doubt laid solid foundations for universal dialogue and concrete agreements.

We must not forget: This is so far the most spectacular state visit to the independent Republic of Croatia, of such magnitude and, probably, achievements. The Croatian-Turkish dialogue, which has been going on for several months - Stipe Mesic [member of the Croatian Defense Council] and Zdenko Skrabalo [foreign minister] have already visited Ankara (twice) - and the first agreements reached in Zagreb will continue to thrive, intensely and with substance, when President Tudjman returns the visit to Turkish President Ozal, as was announced in the joint statement.

Many observers and commentators throughout the world were surprised, some were shocked, and some were frightened by the sincerity and openness of Ozal's speech delivered at the news conference in Zagreb. Therefore, it is not surprising that a certain comrade Drecun, in Sunday's Serbian Television News, did his utmost to prove that Ankara, with the help of Tudjman and Germany, had begun its crusade for a new conquering of the Balkans and the establishing of a "neo-Ottoman Empire", as well a "Muslim fundamentalist state" in Bosnia.

However, all serious commentators were unanimous on three points. First, in the dramatically altered circumstances, in the middle of a triangle between the former Soviet Central Asia, the Balkans after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the Levant, Turkey sees a historical opportunity to grow into a regional power, to take care of an important job for the United States, not by way of

military conquests, but rather by diplomatic and economic means, primarily as a calming and peacemaking factor.

Secondly, the Turkish president, unlike many other western politicians, has directly and openly pointed a finger at Serbia as the only guilty party in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and currently the only factor that could cause the war to spread in the Balkans, which therefore needs to be stopped. Thirdly, he has called attention to Croatia's important role in the calming of the situation on this territory and its role in Bosnia-Hercegovina's future as an independent state. That is why he has called Tudjman to invest all of his influence and reputation in bringing about a quick calming of the conflicts between the Croats and the Muslims, whose alliance is strategically important for ending the war. We believe that is the reason for Ejup Ganic's immediate invitation to Zagreb.

Yugoslav Daily Alleges 'Fascism' on the Rise

93BA0632B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 93 p 7

[Article by M. Jaksic: "Croatia Is Rehabilitating Ustashism and the Independent State of Croatia"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 11 Feb—Under the headline "Ustashi and the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] in Tudjman's New Change of Clothes," the Slovene newspaper REPUBLIKA has today published an article in which it proves with a number of facts that "rehabilitation of Ustashism and Pavelic's Independent State of Croatia" is on the scene in Croatia. The immediate occasion for this article is the proposal of the Zagreb Opstina Assembly that Marshal Tito Square be renamed Mile Budak Square, "which did not pass"—the paper writes—"but Mile Budak, a war criminal, has nevertheless gotten his square, because on one well-known Zagreb square where there are several university departments, Djuro Salaj, Croatian antifascist and trade union fighter, had to give up his name to him."

The prestigious Slovene newspaper, which sees this compromised decision as "hypocritical," familiarizes its readers with the full-fledged campaign to rehabilitate the "war criminal Mile Budak," recalling first of all the fact that the Croatian state has set important steps in motion so that Mile Budak is given his place in the syllabi and school textbooks, "although at the time of the notorious NDH he was minister of religion and the schools in the Pavelic government, placing his signature along with that of Ante Pavelic on the racial laws." In one of those laws, which he signed along with the leader on 4 July 1941, there is a passage, according to REPUBLIKA, which reads as follows:

"People of the Jewish race may not in any case or any form have any influence on development of the national and Aryan culture, and therefore they are prohibited from any participation in the work of organizations and institutions of social, youth, athletic, and cultural life, especially in literature, journalism, art, and music, the theater, and film," further adding that "this is only one among the many significant documents written by Mile Budak, a man who was a war criminal beyond any shadow of a doubt." According to that newspaper, "nowhere in the world is there such an example of rehabilitation, backed up by Budak's name being given to a street in the middle of higher educational institutions. It would not be any surprise at all, then, if we soon were to hear demands for some street to be named after Ante Pavelic," REPUBLIKA writes.

REPUBLIKA goes on to say that "all this is happening under the disguise of reconciliation of all Croats, although it is not possible to overlook the fact that the aim is actually rehabilitation of the Independent State of Croatia, because, among other things, everything associated with the Partizans and the antifascist movement is being satanized in Croatia." Further citing that "monuments from the antifascist struggle are being destroyed all over Croatia," the Slovene newspaper also points to one of the most recent examples of violence to the symbols of antifascism:

"A few days ago, Ante Gavranovic, president of the Croatian Society of Journalists, was informed that the memorial erected in 1966 with the names of 'members of the party technical department, journalists, and printers' who gave their lives in the fight against fascism has been removed from the journalists' center. The actual communication sent to Gavranovic read: 'Better that you do it yourself before someone plants a bomb on your premises.'"

REPUBLIKA, however, cites "many examples even worse," among them singling out this one: "The uniforms of the Croatian Army were called the Ustasha uniforms in their color, the entire military technology has been taken over from the period of the NDH, and President Tudjman, who has been trying to display his democratic face abroad, has recently proposed that the new Croatian currency bear the name 'kuna,' just as in the time of Pavelic's Ustasha state, although the Croatian Assembly has already agreed that Croatia will inaugurate the kruna instead of the dinar."

REPUBLIKA also points to the outright violence which the new Croatian authorities are doing to the language, remarking that "many educated Croats, when they look at television, listen to the radio, or read the newspaper," are asking themselves whether they know their native language at all? "What, then, has happened to Croatian reconciliation, and what will the Serbs say about that when they learn over the 'krugoval' and 'dalekovidnica' [new Croat words radio and television] that their dinar is to be called the kuna? But then, no one is asking the Serbs in Croatia anything anyway," REPUBLIKA concludes.

VOJSKA Warns Against Next 'Phase of Aggression'

93BA0619A Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Feb 93 p 12

[Article by N. Ostojic: "Current Events on Western Border of Krajina: Croatia Prepares for New Phase of Aggression"]

[Text] *More than 35,000 soldiers are concentrated on the border of eastern Slavonia, western Syrmia, and Baranja; units have been given the mission of breaking through to the administrative border of Croatia; the low morale of Croatian soldiers and the increasingly vocal opposition to Tudjman's tyrannical regime.*

The combat operations by the Croatian "motor dragon" near the town of Mirkovci in the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] is one of the numerous attempts by Tudjman's top functionaries to use air reconnaissance to gain information on the distribution of Serbian military forces on this part of battlefield, and based on that knowledge to prepare for new offensive operations against eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Syrmia. It is very likely that another mission of this "flying dragon," since it was hard to spot on radar, was to drop explosives on petroleum installations near Djeletovci, but to Tudjman's misfortune it was shot down by the watchful and skilled antiaircraft personnel of the RSK Armed Forces. In recent times, moreover, several flights have been made by Tudjman's ultralight aircraft on reconnaissance missions.

Mobilization of New Ustashi Forces

The aforementioned, frequent armed incidents in the border zone between the RSK and Croatia indicate that the enemy is engaged in numerous activities, most likely in keeping with the combat operations by its soldiers in the Zadar hinterland. A further argument supporting this assertion is the recent statement by the head of the Croatian Staff, Gen. Bobetko, who said that the attack against the RSK in the Zadar Plateau area is one of the more important phases in the "liberation" of Croatian territory and the restoration of Croatia to its borders. The fact that the Croatian Staff has also made preparations for other variants and phases is indicated by the concentration of military units along the borders of the RSK, especially in Slavonia. In the third operation zone, which comprises eastern Slavonia, Syrmia, and Baranja, Tudjman has concentrated 12 brigades up to 35,000 men strong, and he has put Maj. Djura Decak in charge of them, having previously replaced the former commander, Maj. Karlo Gorisek, after last year's unsuccessful attack on Baranja, and also Maj. Vinko Vrbanac. Maj. Ivan Turkovic was also recently appointed as commander in chief on the Slavonian theater. All brigade commanders were also replaced, as were certain officers in lower units.

At the end of January, six new brigades were mobilized in eastern Slavonia, among them the 107th in Valpovo (mobilized on 22-23 January), then the 135th in Osijek and the 109th in Vinkovci (mobilized on 23-24 January), then the 131st in Zupanja, and they were supplemented by two guard brigades (the 3d and 5th in Osijek and Vinkovci), in which professionals serve who have signed a contract for military service over the next five years. Besides these forces, there is the 132d Brigade of the ZNG [National Guard Corps] in Nasice, the 122d in Djakovo, the 124th or so-called Vukovar Brigade in Ivankovo (comprising soldiers who were captured in Vukovar and released from captivity last year), and the 106th and 160th Brigades of the National Guard Corps in Osijek. Also along the border are five regiments (with a company structure) of home guard forces (approximately 4,500 people) who guard the border every day at occupied observation points. They are relieved every day. The home guard units consist mostly of refugees, and they are armed with light infantry weapons and antitank equipment.

Grouping for Attack

The forces are grouped in such a way that they can easily launch attacks from Osijek to Dalj, Djakovo to Vukovar, and Vinkovci to Sid. Some of the forces would probably be committed to an attack in the direction from Zupanja to Sremska Mitrovica, in the Sava basin. The units have been given the mission of breaking through to the administrative border of Croatia, but it is assumed that Tudjman's commanders have also prepared variants for provoking conflict with the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and for operations all the way to Zemun. In Syrmia, operations would be carried out by three brigades from Vinkovci and Zupanja, supported by three divisions of artillery and R-65 missiles with a range of 65 km, located at Nabrdje. There would be five ZNG brigades committed against eastern Slavonia, supported by their own artillery and that from the operation zone, while three brigades would be committed to directions leading toward Baranja. The Nasice brigade would be held in reserve. The combat groups would include around 90 T-55, T-72, and M-84 tanks. Moreover, there are plans to infiltrate refugees from Hungary, organized into terrorist-sabotage groups, whose goal will be to destroy the bridges at Bezdan and Bogojevo and to leave the forces in the Krajinas without support and supplies.

According to some reports, UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] forces in eastern Slavonia, Syrmia, and Baranja would not be attacked, but only blocked from preventing the actions by the Croatian units, while a plan has been drawn up for the Belgian battalion in Baranja to withdraw to Hungary, and it is expected that they will be admitted there.

During the combat operations, the Croatian units will be supplemented by personnel from western Slavonia, where it is anticipated that after the third day of the war another five brigades will be mobilized from Virovitica, Koprivnica, Slavonska Pozega, and Zagreb.

In order to ensure certain success in the combat operations, Tudjman has also sent two independent (elite) mechanized brigades, under the direct command of the Staff, to the area between Nabrdje and Nasice.

Aggressor's Morale at Low Level

The standard-bearers of combat operations in an attack would be the two professional brigades from Osijek and Vinkovci, the Vukovar Brigade, and the aforementioned mechanized brigades, because the other units are affected by problems with maintaining combat morale. Response to mobilization was less than 30 percent, many soldiers are brought in by the military police, and every day dozens of people desert from the units, even though the punishment for disobedience is severe. The constant fear of attack by "Serbo-Chetnik gangs" and the ongoing uncertainty have diminished the combat zeal of the Croatian soldiers, even of the refugees. In cities, quiet resistance to Tudjman's tyrannical regime is emerging, and even the Croatian press has written about the appearance of anti-Hitler graffiti in Osijek and Vinkovci. The losses by Croatian units in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] have had an especially destructive effect. For example, the 106th Brigade of the ZNG suffered more than 50 percent losses at Kupres; the 107th was decimated at Orasje; the 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade suffered more than 70 percent losses during the withdrawal from Bosanski Brod; and the same was suffered by the 111th Rijeka Brigade.

Present in the Croatian units, besides worldly mercenaries, are instructors from Germany and other Western countries, and most of them are in Nabrdje, where a center for training all specialists is located.

The main communications center for the Croatian military is located in Osijek, in the underground of the former opstina near the cathedral, and five radio-listening centers, supplied with foreign equipment and instructors, are spread over a broad area. With four hydroelectric power plants, they are capable of controlling the water level of the Drava (now it is at its lowest level), to make it easiest for their forces to cross, which confirms the assumption that all immediate preparations for attack have already been executed.

Sabotage groups are also being infiltrated, one of which was recently liquidated at Mirkovci. They tried for a short time to infiltrate six sabotage groups into Baranja, but all were discovered and thwarted. Recently Tudjman personally conducted an inspection of forces on the Slavonian front, and while in Osijek he opened the still unfinished bridge over the Drava.

Tudjman is mobilizing the Serbs who have stayed in Slavonia into labor teams to dig trenches and produce fortifications for Croatian units. One labor brigade of mobilized Serbs from Virovitica, under the name St. Sava, was used in Nabrdje to create military facilities. Many Serbian villages have been destroyed; Budimci, Koska, Vuckovac, Poganovci, Cokanovci, Ledenik, Klenak, and Bela Loza are no longer on the map.

The latest mobilization of Croats, on 7 and 8 October, has already been carried out in order to supplement the units, and because of a shortage of people some units are being supplemented by conscripts from Istria. The response to mobilization is only a little above 10 percent. But despite this, the latest information indicates that Croatia is grouping its forces for an attack on Baranja.

Foreign Minister on Relations With Slovenia

93BA0633B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 13 Feb 93 p 21

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Zdenko Skrabalo by Peter Potocnik and Veso Stojanov; place and date not given: "It Is Primarily Good Will That Is Important"]

[Text] [Potocnik] How do you assess what is now the very topical logging by Croatian foresters on the disputed piece of land near Sneznik, which is just one of a series of incidents on the border between Slovenia and Croatia, especially in view of the October agreement between Presidents Kucan and Tudjman and your agreement with the new Slovene foreign minister, Lojze Peterle, that both sides would refrain from any sort of activities in the border area until the border between the states was finally drawn?

[Skrabalo] Look, Mr. Peterle and I met at Otocac a week ago. In my opinion, the meeting was very successful. His desire, and I think that we achieved this, was to turn over a new page in our mutual relations. Today the interior ministers of both states (we spoke with Dr. Skrabalo on Wednesday, 10 February—author's note) have already met, and will talk about possible solutions for the two disputed issues—how to resolve temporarily the issue of navigation in the Piran Bay and the dispute over Sv. Gera. In two weeks, or three at the latest, government delegations from both states will meet in Ljubljana, when we will talk about all these issues and try to resolve them in a friendly spirit. That is why Mr. Peterle and I agreed that both sides would avoid all actions that could lead to incidents or any other unpleasantness.

The day after the meeting at Otocac, we received a request from the Slovene Government that we cease logging in the disputed area. I did not know anything about it, neither that it was a disputed area nor that people were logging there. We at the Foreign Ministry requested an explanation from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. We then forwarded its answer to the Slovene Foreign Ministry. It explained precisely the land-registry status of the disputed piece of land, which is obviously entered in the land registries of both states. Ever since 1933, however, that piece of land has not been managed by Slovene foresters, but rather Croatian ones, and now the Croatian Forests public enterprise. Nevertheless, since we again received a request from the Slovene Foreign Ministry that we prevent further tensions in the spirit of the Otocac agreement, we recommended to our Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry that it cease logging on the above-mentioned piece of land.

To the best of my knowledge, at 2:00 PM today the foresters there received an order to stop logging on the disputed piece of land, which we have recorded in the Prezid land-registry municipality, and Slovenia has recorded in the Sneznik land-registry municipality. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry also ordered the foresters to take the trees already cut down away from the piece of land. We also agreed that the ministries of agriculture and forestry of both states would talk about the technical details and prepare everything necessary for the meeting of the two governments, when this border problem should be solved at a high level. We have shown good will, and I hope that such incidents and similar ones will be immediately prevented in the future. All disagreements should be "frozen" immediately, and then resolved jointly. When Minister Peterle heard that I was a doctor, he said that doctors were familiar with curative and preventive measures. I told him that it was true, but why not reverse the order in relations between Slovenia and Croatia?

Of course they are.

[Potocnik] In your opinion, how should the border issue be settled, since several difficulties are appearing precisely in connection with specifying it? Let us just cite the example of the well-known Kalin inn close to Zagreb, in which the border runs between guest rooms. There are probably many more such examples, and they may aggravate relations between the states even further.

[Skrabalo] Clearly such problems will continue to appear. Since you have already mentioned the Kalin inn, I would like to continue to go to Kalin, as I have already been doing for 20 years, but not as it is now, when I have to leave my car at the border. But look—both states are in a certain phase, i.e., the childhood period of sovereignty. Since we both came out of the former Yugoslavia, we have to get used to the fact that relations between both of us are different now. They have to be like relations between states in Western Europe, where there are no difficulties in crossing the border, for instance, between France and Germany. It is quite understandable that relations between Slovenia and Croatia are not like that. Since both of them are new states, both of them are still getting used to freedom. In addition to freedom, however, one more factor arises—responsibility, and good-neighborly relations are precisely that, since the establishment of good-neighborly relations as a factor in international responsibility has to be among the most important standards and goals of every state. That is why I think that all the disputed issues between Slovenia and Croatia can be resolved. I have said several times, not only to Peterle but also to his predecessor, that the disputes between the two states remind me of disputes within a family. I do not see any other reasons. We people are different, however, and it has simply not been possible to talk with many people on both sides. It seems to me, however, that we have now established the kind of relations with which we will be able to start talking.

[Potocnik] With whom in Slovenia have you been unable to talk?

[Skrabalo] That is not for a newspaper.

[Potocnik] What do you see as the reason why Slovenia and Croatia, already almost two years after independence, have not yet started to talk more seriously about the problem of a final delineation between the states, even though it is clear to both sides that it is for this reason that very diverse incidents are occurring that are crippling the attempt to reach agreements in other areas of cooperation? Whose interest was it in to keep from dealing more seriously with this problem?

[Skrabalo] The problem is that we have to learn how to live with each other. As far as the reasons that you are asking me about are concerned, I see at least three. The first one is certainly the characteristics of individuals. You can talk with some people, with others you cannot, and so on. The "troublemakers" are certainly in the minority, but unfortunately, they are here and they are usually the most vocal. Some politicians, both in Slovenia and in our country, have started fires because of party interests. The second reason is completely objective in nature. As I have already said, we became independent, and now everything has to be straightened out. Another objective reason is that Croatia was and still is at war. This, of course, was in the forefront of our attention, even though we appointed the best Croatian expert, Dr. Davorin Rudolf, to head the Croatian government's working group on the border. If you want to listen to the reasons why your government did not want to hurry, I can tell you that in the October meeting in Brdo near Kranj, President Kucan told President Tudjman that the settlement of these matters would be postponed until the period after the elections in Slovenia. Mr. Peterle recently told me in Otocac that the problem of the Sentilj-Zagreb highway was solved a long time ago and agreed upon with Mr. Gregoric's [as published] government. Then there was a change in governments in your country and ours, and everything stopped. I view the problem of Croatian-Slovene relations approximately as follows: we are both too small compared to the world, and why not regulate mutual relations in such a way that we stand shoulder to shoulder and not the other way around?

[Potocnik] Doesn't it seem to you, however, that the disagreements, incidents, and other disputes to date have disrupted one state's trust in the other to the extent that it will be very difficult to achieve that?

[Skrabalo] That is why I say that first of all preventive measures are needed, so that curative ones will no longer be necessary. Let me also state one more example or reason for the deterioration in relations. It is at your expense, but to a considerable extent at ours as well. Immediately after both states became independent, we said, "Why should we build two separate border stations at every border crossing, if we can just build one jointly?" In the first place, it is worth it, and furthermore

it is no longer customary in Europe to have two customs stations. I have heard—I do not know exactly—that it was your people who rejected this. Or take the unfortunate Piran Bay. The problem could already have been solved a hundred times. Solutions can be found for all these disputes, if only people of good will talk. It is clear that there will still be disagreements and conflicting interests. It is necessary to reach an agreement and seek compromises, however.

[Potocnik] Even though it can be seen that on the most important strategic issues there are no differences at all between the ruling HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the opposition, the latter is trying in vain at least to open a discussion of your state's foreign policy in the Assembly. It seems to us that this policy has not yet been formulated, and that it is in some way fumbling between the North and South, and also between the East and West?

[Skrabalo] Regardless of what you mean by the opinion about our fumbling, what you just said objectively reflects the Republic of Croatia's position on the map of Europe. The former East-West political highway, i.e., Paris-Bonn-Moscow, has been lost in post-Berlin Europe, with the entire area of the former Yugoslavia—with the states that have emerged and are emerging—actually gaining new geopolitical value. We think that two geopolitical vectors are being established: The first pertains to Europe and Asia (the relationship between Germany and Turkey), and the other is between Central Europe and the Middle East, with all the special features that apply to North-South relations.

Our state, so to speak, is at the heart of both political highways, and it is also for that reason that we have strengthened relations with the United States through business agreements, exchanges of opinions, etc., and at the same time, because of the Russian influence on the southern Balkans and on Serbian policy, we are also not underestimating those very important elements with respect to the incomplete formation of the post-Berlin world. That is proven precisely by the example of the U.S. and EC attitude toward Bosnia-Hercegovina, that central crossroads of the most important European geopolitical challenges in preparations for Europe's future geostrategic map. In fact, the most important factors are not yet prepared to accept the concept of a "division"—not of Bosnia-Hercegovina, but rather of precisely defined spheres of interest in Europe, by which Russia would gain patronage over the Serbian-Orthodox bloc, etc. It is thus a question of the border between the old "Roman Europe" and the "new Byzantium." The problem, however, is that Croatia does not want to be "something in the middle" with some sort of role of a "new military district," because its interest is fully joining the free democratic West, without a "border station" to the undefined and unstable southern Balkans, with Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia. We are therefore advocating a truly lasting, just solution and the political pacification of the entire southern Balkan region.

[Potocnik] The disputes, however, not just with the Serbs, but also with the Muslims and us—virtually with all Croatia's neighbors, except for Hungary and partly Italy—cannot be an expression of the peaceful nature of Croatian policy.

[Skrabalo] It is impossible to stuff everything in one basket, because there is also a completely different background for each of the disputes mentioned, and in at least one case of the quarrel or quarrels that have to do with Croatian-Slovene or Slovene-Croatian relations; they are all a result of the three variants of national independence and the efforts to fulfill the national interests of these three peoples in this region after the collapse of communism. Croatia is historically and territorially at the center of precisely these processes, when in its struggle for state independence it once again has to face a threat to its territorial integrity (Serbia), the problems of national independence and the formation of real self-awareness in the situation in the sundered former Bosnia-Hercegovina (the Muslims), and finally, to the least extent, the problems of forming new relations after the independence of both new states, Slovenia and Croatia, which can be solved considerably more easily just because of the fact that in this case we do not have the national factor to deal with.

[Potocnik] Nevertheless, isn't the Croatian-Serbian partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina the main reason for the present Croatian-Muslim conflict, which has been reeking of gunpowder and bloodshed for some time now?

[Skrabalo] Those are completely wrong explanations, which have already been imposed for a long time now by Belgrade's policy. Croatia is represented on the map as a sort of crescent, which Bosnia-Hercegovina's territory eats into. If Croatia really did divide Bosnia-Hercegovina's territory with Serbia, it would at most gain a crescent thicker at both ends, while Serbia would be at Croatia's soft underbelly. That is by no means in the interest of Croatia, or Slovenia either, since you cannot be indifferent either to who is living in your neighborhood. It is in our interest, and probably yours, to have a traditional, historical border established on the Drina, with an independent Bosnia-Hercegovina. What does that mean?

Let us try to go back 1,000 years, to the western and eastern Roman Empires, Rome and Byzantium, to the time of the separation of the two churches in 1054. Half a millenium after that separation, the Turkish campaigns against Europe and the wars between the Turkish and Austrian empires broke out. After World War II, in the relationship between Western democracy and Eastern communism, Tito tried to create a sort of bridge between the two system, which did hold up for a while, until it collapsed like the Maslenica bridge. I am saying the latter from my experiences as Tito's personal physician, which I was for 14 years, among other things. I know what Tito was actually thinking when he spoke in our private company. He once stated that after Napoleon I a stronger Napoleon would never come; by that he was

thinking of his legacy with the hopeless attempts to establish some sort of "paradise communism" through so-called self-managing socialism in the area that historically belongs to the above-mentioned dividing line between Roman and Byzantine Europe, which I knew would collapse after his death.

[Potocnik] That is a rational view, which was frequently seen in Milan Kundera's essays before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, but irrational events have pushed the dividing line between civilizations somewhat further to the north, as finally also proven by the current Croatian-Muslim dispute.

[Skrabalo] It is true that we have to deal with some of the crudest forms of irrationality, which also include the current Croatian-Muslim dispute, but I do not agree with your division, according to which we Croats are the kind of Balkan people recorded in the metaphor for all the present and past evil in Europe. There are too many hotblooded people everywhere, on both the Croatian and Muslim sides. We are convinced, however, because we have suitable evidence, that individual Muslim army commanders are blind to an extreme, since the main disputes broke out precisely when Alija Izetbegovic was supposed to sign the peace agreements in Geneva. Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot exist without Croatia, even more than we, for instance, could not have done without you at the time when we needed all sorts of assistance. In the Bosnian case, all the assistance is coming through the Croatian sea or Croatian territory. It is also on that account that there is no reason for a Muslim-Croatian dispute, but of course, in the background there was a thoroughly prepared plan to disrupt Muslim-Croatian ties. In this regard, one also should not forget about the happiest period of life in Bosnia, which lasted from the annexation in 1978 to 1914 (equality for everyone, large investments in commerce, the economy, etc.), until the Sarajevo assassination of Prince Ferdinand, staged by the Russians and carried out by the Serbs. Now the Americans are playing their own game with the Russians, whom they cannot bring to their knees just because a shift of the so-called Balkan circus to the former Soviet empire would be even more tragic for the world than the bloody collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

[Potocnik] The biggest burden of all your country's foreign relations—not just with the neighbors—is quite certainly the occupied areas which are officially still under the direct supervision of the blue helmets, but actually there is still considerable vagueness about how and when what was taken away from you by force will come back under Croatian jurisdiction.

[Skrabalo] You have touched upon the core of all Croatia's current problems. Because of current international relations, we must constantly weigh our policy, to put it simply, toward the relationship between the world and Milosevic. That is why it probably really does seem from the outside that one would have the face of Janus to deal with in our policy. So far we have even had very clear indications, by which the world at least indirectly encouraged Serbia in its bloody conflicts with non-Serbs, and, so to speak, unleashed it for the devastation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The situation has now changed at least to the extent that the efforts are aimed at some sort of political agreement that would more or less satisfy the local interests of Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and thus prevent a dispute of considerably broader and more fatal dimensions among the West, Russia, and the Islamic world.

An integral part of this relationship is the so-called Vance peace plan, and our demands and proposals that its implementation also be specified in terms of time, which the UN has received with complete understanding. I can say that we are now also capable of liberating all the occupied areas with our own army, which would cause new international disputes. Just as we did with the Maslenica operation, which I portrayed in the Council of Europe a few days ago in terms of the role of a good child and a bad one. Specifically, when a good child steals a bonbon, everyone scolds him, but when the naughty one sets fire to the house, no one gets upset. We Croats and the Serbs, for whom everything, so to speak, is permitted, are in a similar situation. We Croats, however, must get rid of that great burden that you cited in your question as soon as possible, by peaceful means or military means. It is true that the settlement of this issue is also indirectly influenced by the Clinton Administration's recent proposals, according to which the entire Krajina in the Bosnian Sava basin, so to speak, would be cut off from its Belgrade base. The settlement of the problem by peaceful means is also influenced by the fact that 550,000 Serbs, or 11.2 percent of the total population, lived here in Croatia before the war, and barely 26 percent of them lived in the current occupied areas, but only 13 percent of all the Serbs took part in the war against Croatia.

[Potocnik] Let's go back to the issue of Croatian-Slovene relations, which were also on the agenda for the last meeting of your Council on Defense and National Security. It is impossible to overlook the Croatian procrastination in settling economic, border, and other matters. After your recent specific proposals, will it be different from now on?

[Skrabalo] I hope so! The draft economic agreement that was prepared by new Deputy Prime Minister Mladen Vedris and in which we are proposing the introduction of a duty-free zone for trade with Slovenia, since we both have to sell goods somewhere, especially now that there are no longer markets in the east, is now in the hands of your ministers and Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. The caricature that you published in DELO, which shows me sitting on a log and sending a valentine to your Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle, should consequently be corrected at least to the extent that from now on Minister Peterle and I will be going hand in hand and heart in hand, not just because Slovenes are personally closest to my heart, since I have spent my life to date in their company, so to speak, but rather because a solution can be found in associating with people of good will. It was in that spirit that the interior ministers of both states spoke today, even though the agenda included the Piran Bay and how to settle the border regime at sea, which has caused too many unnecessary quarrels in the past.

Agreement To Buy Oil From Iran Signed

AU0303180093 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] After returning from a two-day visit to Iran, Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle called a news conference. At the news conference he summarized what seemed to be successful talks in Teheran. Edo Zitnik reports:

[Begin recording] [Zitnik] The Slovene delegation, which also consisted of the representatives of the industry, was received in Tehran with greater attention than the protocol envisages for such occasions. Foreign Minister Peterle was, beside his host Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, also received by Iranian President Rafsanjani, chairman of the parliament, chairman of the economic chamber, and some other ministers.

[Peterle] We agreed to cooperate closer in the future. The two deputy foreign ministers will be in charge of the coordination of future work. Our delegations will meet at least every six months. Minister Velayati and myself shall meet at the ministerial level in Ljubljana and Tehran alternately. Therefore, it is his turn next year.

[Zitnik] Despite what was in the diplomatic language described as versatile talks, the emphasis of the Slovene visit focused on economic cooperation. Namely, the Iranian partners owe relatively large sums of money to some of the Slovene companies that are encountering huge cash flow problems.

[Peterle] This resulted in a promise that some backdated payments by some of the companies will be settled in the next few days. Regarding Litostroj, which is owed, I would say, a rather large amount, the Iranian side will settle backdated payment within 10 days at the latest.

[Zitnik] A concrete agreement that was signed during the visit—which is probably also directly linked to Iran's interest in cofinancing the modernization of Lendava oil refinery—marks the beginning of the Slovene import of Iranian oil.

[Peterle] This means that Petrol [enterprise] will also partially purchase oil in Iran. It has been proposed, and confirmed by the other side, that we would purchase approximately 100,000 tonnes of oil in Iran. I would also like to say that the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran repeated the invitation to our president, Mr. Kucan, to visit Iran. The talks will probably concentrate on making it possible for President Kucan to visit Iran toward the end of the first half of 1993. [end recording]

Peterle, Czech Minister Stress Need for Cooperation

AU0303170593 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 26 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by M. K.: "Mutual Support on the Way to Europe"]

[Text] Ljubljana—"Problems encountered in cooperation between Slovenia and the Czech Republic are primarily of a technical nature, as all the accords were signed prior to Slovenia and the Czech Republic gaining independence," Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, who is on a one-day visit to Slovenia said at yesterday's news conference. He and Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle agreed that the countries have friendly contacts and that, owing to their similar economic and political circumstances, they will need to deepen these contacts in several spheres. The ministers emphasized the significance of mutual support in joining international organizations and European integration processes. "The Czech Republic would like to participate actively in resolving the crisis in the Balkans, subject to its capabilities. Our soldiers are stationed in Croatia as part of the UN Protection Force and we are also willing to cooperate in hunting down and punishing war criminals," the head of the Czech Foreign Ministry stressed. Lojze Peterle favored accelerating contacts at the ministerial level and indicated the similar views held by the two sides on the economic potential of the Visegrad Group countries and the free trade project. The Czech guest was also received by President Milan Kucan, Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, and Ljubljana Mayor Joze Strgar.

Undelineated Border Causing Disputes

93BA0613A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 Feb 93 p 1

[Article by Veso Stojanov: "Persistent Croats"]

[Text] Even though on 3 February in Otocac Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle and his Croatian counterpart Zdenko Skrabalo enthusiastically announced a new wind in Slovene-Croatian intergovernmental relations, the persistent logging by Croatian foresters on the disputed piece of land near Sneznik does not indicate that anything has essentially changed in eliminating the problems between the neighbors. The meeting in Otocac brought, at most, only a new gust of wind, since the day after the Slovene Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to Zagreb, the Croats stopped logging. The biggest problem, however, has not been solved. The border between the states, in spite of the agreement in principle that it will follow the former (and present) republic border, in fact, has not yet been drawn, even though a full half year has passed since both states became independent.

Until the young states show sufficient willingness for a final delineation of the border, intergovernmental incidents similar to the present one near Sneznik and the one in the Piran Bay will be repeated. It is actually surprising that the Slovene and Croatian diplomatic services have not dealt more seriously with solving this principal

intergovernmental problem, which looms as an encumbrance over all other unresolved issues, which would certainly be incomparably easier to settle if there were no border incidents. In this regard it is not even important which state has not shown enough interest to date in regulating the border. The Slovene Foreign Ministry, now that the time for grand diplomatic actions has passed for it, should therefore direct most of its attention primarily to concluding an agreement with Zagreb on where the real Slovene-Croatian border will run. Otherwise, the persistent Croats will certainly find some other piece of land in the border zone and claim that it is theirs, and the border will not be drawn for a long time to come.

Radical Right Party Proposed

93BA0613E Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 9 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Svato Krasnik: "Union of the Slovene Radical Right"]

[Text] Trbovlje, 9 Feb—These days Slovenia is being offered one more new party, although for now only as an initiative: the Slovene Alliance, which is to represent a political union of the Slovene radical right. Its initiator, Trbovlje resident Ales Zuzek, will find a model for the Slovene Alliance in the French National Front of the 1970's and the German National Democrats, and also in the more recent right-wing movements of the 1990's. The principal characteristics of the still unregistered party are nationalism, a racial orientation, and conservativism.

An ethnically cleansed Slovenia is the first and reiterated goal of the new party's proposed program, and the cut-off time for the cleansing of Slovenia has been set as the end of World War II, i.e., 9 May 1945. A plan has also been prepared for returning all immigrants and refugees to their original homelands.

The future party's members blame the former and present governments for today's number of refugees in Slovenia, and at the same time they are demanding a Slovene decision on whether Slovenia is to be an economically successful European state or a Balkan charitable institution. They likewise support Janez Jansa's policy of strengthening the Republic of Slovenia's defense forces with the goal of having the Slovene army equipped and trained in as modern a fashion as possible.

While advocating an ethnically uniform Slovenia, the Slovene Alliance will fight for the ethnic rights of the indigenous Slovene minorities in Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Croatia. As an instruction to Lojze Peterle before negotiations with the Italians about the Osimo agreements, they are pointing out the fact that Slovenia can only negotiate on shifting its borders toward the west, and not by any means into the interior of the state. Likewise, from now on we should only do as much for the minorities of neighboring peoples here as is done by the states where the indigenous Slovene minorities live.

[Box, p 3]

From the Tentative Program

An integral part of the tentative program for the substantive activity of the Slovene Alliance is also the Plan for Returning Immigrants and Refugees, as a final solution to the foreigner question in the Slovene state. They wrote: "The planned return encompasses all residents of Slovenia who are not of Slovene descent and moved to Slovenia after 9 May 1945, and likewise all of their descendants, regardless of the area of their birth and the generation to which they belong after immigration.

"A mixed marriage is considered to be Slovene only in the case of a marriage between a Slovene man and a non-Slovene woman, and the descendants of that marriage are also considered to be Slovene. Such families are exempt from being returned. A marriage between a non-Slovene man and a Slovene woman is considered to be a non-Slovene marriage, the descendants of such a marriage are non-Slovenes, and those families must also be returned to the homeland of the non-Slovene spouse."

Left Parties Preparing To Merge

93BA0613B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Matjaz Erkoznik: "In the Long Run a Merger Is Necessary; Otherwise, the Left Does Not Have a Future"]

[Text] *It would be inconvenient for the related parties on the left if the right-wing bloc succeeded in merging first, Dr. Joze Pucnik thinks; the Socialists have several offers; the SSS [Socialist Party of Slovenia] label would be an awkward burden for the LDS [Liberal Democratic Party]; ZSDS party?*

Ljubljana, 5 Feb—With its failure in the December elections, the Socialist Party of Slovenia, which proposed the plebiscite on Slovene independence, lost its chance to participate more actively in forming Slovene political life during the next four years. Before the elections, the Socialists were predicting that they were certain to enter parliament and that they would have a strong influence on events on the left.

At that time, the Social Democrats proposed cooperation with them, but the Socialists, convinced of their electoral success and in the desire to keep their own strong identity, rejected their offer. Then Social Democratic Reform also offered them its own vision of the unification of the parties with a socialist and social-democratic orientation; before the elections, with the united approach by the parties under the name of the United List, it had already taken the first step toward a merger on the left, and confirmed the successful cooperation with the relatively high electoral outcome. In recent days, more rumors have also begun to spread among the public about the Socialists' merger with the winners of the elections, Drnovsek's Liberal Democrats.

The Socialists will probably agree to one of the forms of a merger, since the outcome of the December elections showed that in spite of their strong base and their internal solidity and homogeneity, they cannot survive by themselves, but as a nonparliamentary party they cannot set their own conditions for a merger. According

to Borut Suklje, the electoral failure is supposedly the only reason for agreeing to a merger. The party does not have any financial difficulties, and consequently it is not treating the merger as a means of covering debts, as is happening to the parties on the political right wing that failed in the elections. The Socialists themselves are even advocating embarking upon the merger only with the financial accounts settled.

Borut Suklje said that the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, the LDS, and the United List had offered the party a merger. A special negotiating group has already spoken with representatives of all three bidders, and the party's republic committee will decide on which party they will merge with. It will meet on 13 February, and submit the positions it adopts for discussion by the Socialists' congress. According to Suklje, there is also a fourth alternative, in which the Socialists would completely retain their independence and prepare independently to participate in the local elections.

Because of the party's unity, Suklje is not afraid of a split in the event of a merger, and he hopes that a majority of the members and the people in the leadership will also remain together within the framework of a larger party.

Dr. Joze Pucnik, president of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDSS], confirmed that the SDSS and SSS leaderships had unofficial talks, in which the merger offer was coordinated. The Social Democrats thus expect a response from the Socialists in a few days, but they do not have any reliable information about their intentions. Pucnik said that if the Socialists reject the merger, the Social Democrats will receive their decision with regret. In fact, that will slow the unification of the parties with a social-democratic orientation.

According to Pucnik, a merger between the Social Democrats and the United List is not feasible at this time. More time will be needed to overcome the obstacles and change the situation, and above all, Social Democratic Reform will have to take more than merely symbolic steps to move away from its historical burden. According to Pucnik's predictions, we in Slovenia will therefore probably need several years to ensure appropriate conditions and the adjustment of partners with different legacies, if we want to obtain a basis for a joint approach by the parties with a social-democratic orientation. In the long run, a merger is necessary, since otherwise the political left does not have a future. It would be particularly inconvenient for the related left-wing parties if the right-wing bloc succeeded in merging before the left, Pucnik thought. The parties of the united right wing would thus be too strong a factor at the given moment, and the question is whether fragmented social democracy would be capable of successfully competing with them.

In the LDS, opinions about a merger with a party at a crossroads are divided, of course. By taking the Socialists under their wing, they would gain several good politicians and strengthen their network in the field, of course, but the SSS label could be a burden to them, with all the consequences entailed by the "socialism" in their name. By merging with the Socialists, the LDS would probably strengthen its image as a left-wing party. According to LDS Secretary General Gregor Golobic, however, the Liberal Democrats are prepared in principle to listen to the Socialist Party. Thus, these days an attempt is being made to coordinate a concrete offer that could at least thus be treated as an offer from the United List and the Social Democrats. A final decision has not yet been made.

The United List parties are preparing for a merger congress of the left-wing parties next month. A party with the working name United Social Democracy of Slovenia [ZSDS] is to emerge then. The United List also sent an offer to cooperate to the Socialists, who would have an opportunity to keep their independence within the framework of the ZSDS, whereas in the event of a merger with the Liberal Democrats, they would probably have to merge completely with Drnovsek's party after the expiration of a specific transitional period.

Islamic Leader on Croatian-Moslem Relations

93BA0613D Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 Feb 93 p 22

[Interview with Sefko Omerbasic, president of the Mesihat for Croatia and Slovenia, by Peter Potocnik; place and date not given: "Vance's Fatal Plan"]

[Text] *During the period of gaining independence, he sought and found support from the Islamic countries for the Croatian and also the Slovene state, but now the president of the Mesihat for Croatia and Slovenia is trying hard to resolve what can still be resolved in Croatian-Muslim relations through his old ties with Tudjman.*

[Potocnik] The Mesihat represents the body of elders of the Islamic religious community in a given country, but you are still performing the role of its head in both countries. When will Islam adjust to these changes?

[Omerbasic] Our Mesihat, as the last one in the former Yugoslavia, was only established in 1989, because until then both Zagreb and Ljubljana were under Sarajevo's religious jurisdiction. Since its main task is to plan and conduct supervision of the Islamic religious community's activity, I do not see this as the kind of problem that you presented in your question, especially since before the present war a small number of our believers lived and worked in Slovenia. It has been increased now by about 14,000 people, who are being cared for by seven imams, together with the hosts, which is too few, of course. In spite of this, since Slovenia's independence we have left almost all the tasks involving the Mesihat to the Muslims there, and we only intervene in any administrative matters. A step toward establishing a mesihat for Slovenia has thus been taken. I should also mention that the very fact that there is not yet one mosque in Slovenia is not as big a problem for our community as those unfamiliar with the situation would conclude, since we

ourselves are giving priority to organizing spiritual and religious life over matters concerning premises.

[Potocnik] Why did the Muslims react too late to the Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Hercegovina? Because of religion, or the policy of the so-called Muslim leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which can be embodied in Alija Izetbegovic's statement that the war in Slovenia and Croatia is not (was not) his or yours?

[Omerbasic] After battle and battles it is easy to be intelligent, especially after having lost the illusions that were so terribly punished, that the problems within Bosnia-Hercegovina could be solved by peaceful means in that "little Yugoslavia," as Bosnia-Hercegovina was portrayed. That is also why there is no sense at all in seeking a principal culprit or culprits to blame for the fact that the Muslims waited for the war without weapons and an army of their own. I come from heroic Gorazde, which the Serbs condemned to death among the first of the major cities, but it nevertheless arose from the ashes like a phoenix, even with some sort of production of its own of simple weapons, which were first of all manufactured from water pipes, and today its army is already penetrating toward Visegrad, something that is also not discussed or written about in the Croatian media—just like the young Bosnian Army's successes in general.

[Potocnik] In Pavelic's NDH [Independent State of Croatia] the Muslims were the flower of "Croatianism," but actually both the Croats and the Serbs treated them as members of their own people when necessary. How much of a role does that sort of "appropriation" of Muslims play in the present Croatian-Muslim dispute?

[Omerbasic] Admittedly, the Muslims' ethnic origin has still not been scientifically established, in order to deal fully with the question of who we are and what we actually once were. The findings to date, however, also refute even the slightest possibility that our ancestors were once Serbs, because we had quite a bit more in common with the Croats, who were once masters of Bosnia up to the Drina, and in the final analysis both of us use the same or similar symbols for our statehood. The Bosnian lilies in Bosnia-Hercegovina's present coat of arms are also the old symbol of the Croatian rulers in Bosnia. I think, however, that a big mistake was made in the former regime, which named us Muslims instead of Bosnians. The Serbian share of the problem that you mentioned in your question claimed large casualties from the Muslims three times in this century alone, at least half a million people killed. The casualties in the present slaughter stand out both in terms of number and in terms of the terrible torture and butchery. The current Croatian-Muslim dispute is therefore not a result of history or of the present situation before the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina; its background is entirely policy, and is also best explained by the so-called Vance and Owen map of a Bosnia-Hercegovina with 10 provinces, among which more Muslims than Croats would live in the so-called Croatian provinces. It is therefore to be feared that such a partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina might cause even worse mutual clashes, because one also should not overlook the fact that the emerging Bosnia-Hercegovina Army had to accept anyone into its ranks, including commanders with a dubious past, who were more or less Yugoslav-oriented JLA [Yugoslav People's Army] officers before the war. The secondary reasons for the Croatian-Muslim dispute include very poor control over the roads and routes by which humanitarian aid is traveling. In this regard there have been and still are tragic and also tragicomic scenes, which, in the so-called Croatian provinces, have caused Muslim resistance to the payment of some sort of tolls and duties for the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, and finally, the last straw was the simple theft and appropriation of packages with humanitarian aid and weapons for Muslims, even though there was some sort of agreement on dividing it. Of course, disputes were inflamed by the ill-considered decree by the Bosnia-Hercegovina defense minister that in the so-called Croatian provinces the Bosnian Army had to subordinate itself to the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] command, even though the Bosnia-Hercegovina state leadership warned him that it was necessary to wait until the end of the Geneva negotiations, in which, as we could see, the Muslims were still not prepared to sign their own death sentence.

[Potocnik] That was the Croatian representative in the Sarajevo government, Bozo Rajic. If we were to judge by the Clinton administration's recent reactions, we can expect some sort of correction of the injustices that, as you hint, were done to the Muslims by Vance and Lord Owen.

[Omerbasic] All the international negotiators seeking peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina to date have not even touched upon the essence of the problem. Perhaps they reached the first level, but they were drawn backward by the very fact that none of the opposing sides trust each other, and that means the beginning of a very dangerous theory of guilt, both on the side of the executioners and on the side of their victims. The Muslims have seen that they only have two ways out: either the international community will allow them to arm themselves and thus drive the occupiers out of their territory by themselves, or it will be done through international military intervention. Since they have actually lost everything, they are prepared to go to the end....

[Potocnik] And for that purpose fundamentalism and other "isms" with a negative sound are being attributed to the Muslims, the kind that were recorded in the Bolshevik trials of Muslim intellectuals, including Alija Izetbegovic's trial as well?

[Omerbasic] From the very beginning, we have been faced with the phenomenon of the fundamentalism and extremism of the so-called Muslim state with respect to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who often raises these things to the level of some sort of central problem in Bosnia-Hercegovina. That is why I have warned

President Tudjman several times that with such name-calling he is using communist platitudes. If our Muslims really wanted a fundamentalist, Islamic state, then what happened to them would not have happened, since in the final analysis they would have had opportunities to arm themselves. All the truly reasonable assurances that we do not want any sort of Islamic state in Europe, that we do not want any kind of fundamentalism, that our religious remains the domain of our souls and not of the state or society, were in vain. We can only guess about the reasons for that kind of conduct, which may be broader, both European and worldwide, since for some time now we Muslims have been the "black sheep" of Europe. Nevertheless, in this regard as well one should not forget that Croatia gained a great deal with international recognition by the Islamic countries, and it will be in severe need of that world in healing the deep wounds that it received in Yugoslavia's bloody collapse. It will be very difficult now. I am speaking from my own experience, because before the war in Croatia and during it I traveled as a member of the Croatian delegation to visit the Islamic countries, where former Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic and I likewise strove for the international recognition of Slovenia. I hope that now that the problem of war and peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina has been transferred to the UN Security Council, there will be less manipulation with respect to the Bosnia-Hercegovina question, and more real attempts to prove that Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot be broken up into three states or some sort of Bantustans with ten provinces.

[Potocnik] One of the paradoxes in the Croatian-Muslim dispute is also the fact that the Catholic Church's reputation among Muslims has grown, as the institution that has possibly done the most in the humanitarian area in order to relieve the suffering of the victims of Serbian aggression. Didn't the Bosnian Franciscans, whose great services in preserving the Croatian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot be denied, also point out unsuccessfully at the very beginning of the disputes the serious consequences of a partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which have now, unfortunately, been fully manifested?

[Omerbasic] I am convinced that with this war the Catholic Church has gained lasting value, which we Muslims will know how to foster and develop. That quality is actually also the biggest guarantee that it will be possible to resolve the Croatian-Muslim dispute considerably more easily than it appears at this moment.

[Potocnik] In Alija Izetbegovic's recent letter to Franjo Tudjman, the Muslim side, in an awkward surprise, publicly said for the first time that the half million refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina were not a burden to the Croatian state. The Croatian side has also been raising that issue for a long time now in connection with the social distress of its citizens. What is your truth?

[Omerbasic] The truth is that the Croatian population has not felt our refugees to be a burden, either before or now; for the most part it has been borne by the Islamic countries, which are also assisting Croatia. I myself know of two humanitarian organizations that contribute half a million dollars apiece every month for Croatian refugees; this is obviously not publicly discussed and written about, even though any assistance is too small. I think, however, that Slovenia, which is bearing a large burden of Bosnia-Hercegovina refugees on its own shoulders—according to our information, equal to as much as 10 percent of its population—deserves at least as much praise as Croatia; this also will not be forgotten when the at least 10 years of rebuilding everything destroyed in Bosnia-Hercegovina begin. To be completely clear, I must emphasize that after the big shock caused by the war, the Croatian community acted correctly when it organized some sort of authorities on its own territory and thus prevented the spread of illegality. They crossed the Rubicon of intolerance with respect to the Muslims, however. That has led us to the present situation, which cannot be eliminated through contaminated national populism, even though the background may be completely irrational. Both "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia" do not fit into any of the Muslims' calculations. As long as that is the case, it is impossible to find any sort of peace at the negotiating table.

President of State Council Explains Functions

93BA0633A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 13 Feb 93 p 19

[Interview with State Council President Ivan Kristan by Alenka Leskovic; place and date not given: "A Veto Is Only a Cry For Help"]

[Text] After every session of the State Council there is a meeting, in which the members of the State Council have an opportunity to assess the deputies' work from their own point of view as the advocates of labor, professional, and primarily local interests. Their strongest weapon is voting for a request that the State Council decide once again on an individual law. So far that opportunity has already been used five times, although according to the Slovene constitutional system the Council has primarily an advisory role. How does it work, and how should it work as a representative of various social groups, which is, and at the same time is not, a second chamber of parliament? We spoke about this with the State Council's president, Dr. Ivan Kristan.

[Leskovic] Dr. Franci Grad wrote in a commentary on the Slovene Constitution that in a broader sense, we could consider the State Council parliament's second chamber. In terms of the role that the Constitution gives it, the Council, if we may say so, is more of a hybrid institution than a second chamber of parliament.

[Kristan] The term hybrid, certainly, is used in various cases of relativizing a certain issue. The concept that the State Council would be an equal partner of the State Assembly was one of the possible alternatives, which did not receive any support. There has already been consideration of the idea that the Council would be the

advocate of professional interests. That was also proposed by the draft constitution. In the constitutional debate, however, the demand for a regional second chamber, or second chamber of parliament, prevailed. In the concluding talks on the Slovene constitutional order, there was then a combination of both concepts, and thus the Council is composed of representatives of both professional and regional interests. The legislator is the St[illegible] Assembly, but the State Council can indirectly [illegible]e the legislative process.

[illegible]c] As a professor of comparative constitutional law, how can you classify the Slovene State Council?

[Kristan] It fits into the group of bicameral parliamentary systems, which predominate in the world. Constitutional systems are very different, of course, from a pure bicameral system when both parliamentary chambers adopt the same text of individual laws, to a system in which the upper or lower chamber is more influential. An individual chamber—as a rule, it is the lower one—has more authority. The system in Great Britain, where they have a bicameral parliament, is characteristic in this regard, but it was actually bicameral only until 1911, when the lower chamber and the House of Lords actually had equal rights. Later, the legislative function was assumed by the lower chamber, and the upper one has the right of a suspensive veto, i.e., halting the legislative process for a specific period of time. It is thus a case of asymmetric bicameralism.

In contrast to this, in the United States the Senate, as the upper chamber, has more authority than the lower one, the House of Representatives. The state president, for example, has to obtain the Senate's consent to appoint the highest state officials. Furthermore, we are also familiar with systems in the world where there are two chambers, but with very different powers. In Germany, the Bundestag is a representative legislative body. On the other hand, there is the Bundesrat, or in our language the Federal Council, in which representatives of the German federal states are gathered. Although this Federal Council participates in the legislative process, it is not the second chamber. In certain legislative cases, the Constitution gives it the right to an absolute suspensive veto. Perhaps it is precisely the system in Germany that the constitutional concept of the Slovene State Council is closest to.

[Leskovic] What were your expectations about the Council's work when you were a candidate for one of the 22 representatives of local interests?

[Kristan] I ended up in this Council more or less by chance. When the previous Assembly did not elect me as a Constitutional Court judge, I decided, somewhat regretfully, that I would no longer be involved in politics. I am convinced that in view of everything that I did for Slovenia as a judge in the Federal Constitutional Court in Belgrade, an injustice was done to me. Then my colleagues, former youths, prepared me to campaign as a representative of local interests for certain Gorenje municipalities. The response in the field was very good, and I received more than 50 percent of the electoral votes. I consequently have a suitable base and support among the people.

[Leskovic] The Council consists of 39 men and one woman, who, according to the Constitution, represent social, economic, professional, and local interests. You represent the latter.

[Kristan] When I ran I thought that through the State Council I could influence legislative work and decisions from the standpoint of my own region's needs. Certainly, that is also in accordance with my own views, since I supported a regional second chamber of parliament. In the otherwise short campaign in the Kranj, Skofja Loka, and Trzic municipalities, we had also reached an agreement on permanent ties and relations, which I will also establish, as soon as the work stops a little. Contacts with my constituency are necessary, if I really want to represent my region's interests.

[Leskovic] Your election as president of the State Council was a bit of a surprise.

[Kristan] That proposal occurred upon the establishment of the Council. It would be immodest to claim that I declined that position. It also seemed to me that in that position I could suitably satisfy the expectations.

[Leskovic] Is your point of view regarding the State Council's role different now than at the moment when you signed your candidacy?

[Kristan] Yes, new views are being opened up for me. Furthermore, my outlook is no longer as unidirectional as I imagined at first, since merely local interests were in the forefront of my attention.

[Leskovic] The members of the State Council have a five-year term, and this time, since we do not yet have the new local communities, the representatives of local interests were elected in direct elections. How did that influence the composition of the Council? Is the Council more left-oriented now than it would have been if the members had been elected by the municipal assemblies, as originally planned?

[Kristan] It is characteristic of the 22 representatives of local interests that they are primarily people who the voters think will be able to transfer regional demands into parliamentary events. There has already been a great deal said about the Council's left-wing orientation, but in time that will be gradually forgotten, even though the parties were also involved in these elections. And to answer your question, I think that the staffing of the Council would have been different if the representatives of local interests had been elected by the municipal assemblies. I must also add to that, however, that even the first meetings of the Council showed that it was clearly acting as a body without any clear party logic. It is organized solely on the basis of interests, among the

groups mentioned in the Constitution. The representatives of employers, employees, farmers, tradesmen and independent professionals, noneconomic activities, and local interests do not have any party clubs, because representatives of social, economic, professional, and local interests are obviously gathered in the Council.

[Leskovic] How do those groups function?

[Kristan] A vertical organization of them is necessary. The employers, for example, work with their constituency no matter how broad it is. The four representatives of employees do the same thing, although there are different views of what their base is. This has to do with the problems of trade union organization, the representativeness of trade unions, etc., but the laws of vertical organization cannot be bypassed. The flow of information, opinions, and demands is obviously a key condition for the Council's effective work.

[Leskovic] You are now talking about organization in the way that it was intended for the delegate system.

[Kristan] Of course, it is a very old idea of linking the representatives of the working people with their constituency, which was adopted by the delegate system. Unfortunately, it went its own way, and we presented the normative model as if it had been realized, although it was actually far from that. In the case of the Council, however, it does not involve anything more than have the base's interests represented in the State Council in a live, daily, and undistorted way. That is the task of the representatives of each of these five groups. If the Council were still organized along party lines, the threads of vertical organization would be broken. They would become a duplicate of the State Assembly and of the logic of party ties, coalitions, etc. The tasks that the Constitution gives us could not be performed that way.

[Leskovic] The Constitution talks primarily about the Council's advisory role, its legislative initiatives, opinions, and similar indirect effects on the State Assembly's work and decisions. After the Council's three regular sessions and one correspondence one, we can already talk about how the Council's members are most enthusiastic about an extreme measure—the so-called delaying veto, which requires that the State Assembly decide again about an individual law. Is its use on five occasions an expression of representatives' interests, or merely a rebellion by the Council's members upon realizing that they really do not have any influence upon legislative events?

[Kristan] I think that the suspensive veto against the above-mentioned laws is primarily an expression of the interests and attitudes among people in the above-mentioned areas of interest. The representatives of these interest groups obviously see problems differently than the State Council did, and they are not satisfied with the solutions adopted.

[Leskovic] What have you as the Council achieved with the red cardboard, if I may use soccer terminology?

[Kristan] We have achieved primarily what the delaying veto is intended for. We halted the process of proclaiming laws, which is a new opportunity for the State Assembly to reconsider the contents of legal decisions that have already been adopted.

[Leskovic] What did you have in mind when you used the word reconsider?

[Kristan] When the Constitution lists the State Council's powers, it mentions among other things that the Council can demand that the State Assembly, before proclaiming any law, decide on it once again. Consequently, it is thus not a matter of voting, but rather deciding. The State Assembly can discuss the above-mentioned laws from the standpoint of the arguments cited by the State Council. In the end, it will have to decide again whether it will even take into account any of these considerations or not. The responsibility, of course, lies with the State Assembly. The State Council has only made use of its constitutional ability. Furthermore, it is not necessarily just a matter of the State Council's interest, but rather of regulating a certain legal issue more appropriately. The State Assembly must also be interested in that.

[Leskovic] It has been heard among deputies' circles that the State Assembly will just vote once more on the laws that are changing the contribution rate for employment, the fund for succession, the fund for agricultural land and forests, the salaries of constitutional judges, and salaries in the judicial system. Since all the above-mentioned laws against which the Council issued a delaying veto were passed in the State Assembly by a large majority of votes, there is no doubt about what the outcome of another vote will be.

[Kristan] I repeat that the Constitution talks about deciding, and not voting. If the consequence of a delaying veto were another vote in the State Assembly, that would also have been stated. In my opinion, "deciding" is a term that indicates a certain process. One starts with an idea, continues by defining it substantively and coordinating positions, and ends by voting, as the last phase in this process.

[Leskovic] Do you then expect another substantive discussion about the above-mentioned texts of the laws?

[Kristan] Yes, a majority of the State Council thinks that the State Assembly has to reconsider its decisions.

[Leskovic] How are you cooperating with the president of the State Assembly, who has to inform you, according to the law on the State Council, about all the Assembly's sessions, and send you all the materials on the agenda of Assembly sessions and also all the laws that have been passed by that Assembly?

[Kristan] So far, M.A. Herman Rigelnik and I have cooperated well, and I hope that our requests for another decision on the above-mentioned laws will not lead to different relations between the Assembly and the Council.

[Leskovic] Some harsh words about the State Council have been uttered among the State Assembly deputies, however.

[Kristan] I have heard proposals that the State Council should be eliminated, and that some people regret that it is part of the Slovene state system. If some people consider the Council a disruptive factor, that still does not mean that it should be eliminated. It would be harmful if intolerance regarding the Council's decisions grew, since the Council has only made use of a legitimate constitutional institution. The State Council, with its interest-based and not party concept, can in fact be a valuable corrective for the State Assembly, in which the will of individual parties has decisive influence.

[Leskovic] In comparison with the previous Assembly, the deputies are now like obedient soldiers in a strict army with respect to their parties. The State Council, however, also includes people with a party orientation, who would have to support everything that their parties support. Now, however, they are acting in opposition to that.

[Kristan] It is not a matter of opposition. We in the Council are only making use of a constitutional ability to represent those interests that we know about from the positions of our constituencies, to the extent that that is possible, of course.

[Leskovic] Isn't the word constituency somewhat exaggerated?

[Kristan] I think that each of us has his own constituency, although daily contacts with those who elected us are not possible. Each of the elected representatives in the Council, however, naturally has a certain view concerning certain issues, and also enough overall positions for which he is known by the voters and because of which he was also elected, so that he make decisions as those whom he represents expect. This will not work without contacts, of course, since stocks of opinions are not inexhaustible and views also change.

[Leskovic] The Council only has a week available to adopt a decision on whether it will issue a delaying veto or not.

[Kristan] It is precisely because of the possibility of consultations and changes in opinions among the Council's members and their constituency that the State Council should not pass laws in accelerated proceedings. In explaining the requests that the State Assembly decide again, I emphasized in particular that the State Council really did not have any opportunity to state its opinion before these laws were passed. It is thus not a question of any sort of opposition to the State Assembly, or, as I have also heard, pestering, but rather that the Council, in accordance with its best knowledge and its honesty, has recommended that the deputies think once again about whether they have adopted the right decisions or not.

[Leskovic] If we understand correctly, you are decisively rejected all the insinuations.

[Kristan] As long as the Council and the Assembly are acting in accordance with their constitutional powers, any sort of imputations are really inappropriate. Everything is subordinate to the interests of the voters and the Council has every right to propose the passage of laws, give the Assembly opinions, request the scheduling of a legislative referendum, or vote for a suspensive veto.

[Leskovic] Will issuing requests that the deputies decide again be the predominant form of the Council's work?

[Kristan] Certainly not. This time was an exception, and the reason, as I have already stated, was the accelerated proceedings in which the State Assembly passed the laws.

[Leskovic] The Council is requesting that the State Assembly decide again on the laws on salaries in the Constitutional Court and in the judicial system. For some time now, the size of deputies' salaries has upset the Slovene public. In the remuneration for the members of the State Council, however, who are performing honest work, to be sure, you are acting according to the deputies' salaries. Isn't this a case of hypocrisy?

[Kristan] I must emphasize that the State Council did not issue a suspensive veto against the above-mentioned laws because it did not agree with the size of judges' salaries. It primarily did so in order to point out that these laws are continuing the destruction of the former system of salaries, built on uniform foundations. The law on the deputies was the first one that interfered with the established ratios. The destruction of the system continued with the law on the government, and at the last session of the State Assembly, the law on the salaries of Constitutional Court judges and the law on salaries in the judicial system were also passed ad hoc. The State Council therefore thinks that the deputies should think once again about the entire salary system—whether to permit a further domino effect, or to form a uniform system of salaries, such as there was before. It is thus an appeal to the State Assembly to settle things in the shortest possible way.

[Leskovic] Do you expect the State Assembly's president to invite you to the session when the Assembly will decide once again on these laws?

[Kristan] It depends on how the Assembly handles deciding again. If it conducts a substantive discussion of the solutions that the Council considered controversial in the individual laws, I expect that we will be invited to the Assembly session.

[Leskovic] And what about the pay of the Council's members?

[Kristan] They receive compensation for their work. We decided that they would be, as before, nonprofessional deputies, who used to receive one-third of the deputies' salaries. In this regard, we also concluded that the bases for this compensation would be lower by half than

permitted by the law on the deputies. Consequently, until the system of deputies' salaries is settled, the Council's members will receive only advance payments on their compensation, in the above-mentioned amount of half the base salaries provided for the deputies' salaries.

[Leskovic] You are a professional Council president. Will you continue to teach at the Law School?

[Kristan] I will resolve my status in the same way as some faculty teachers who are deputies in the State Assembly. I would not like to quit working at the school.

Federal

Explosion at U.S. Embassy Caused by Grenade

LD0403110693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1039 GMT 4 Mar 93

[Text] Belgrade, 4 Mar (TANJUG)—Members of the Belgrade Secretariat for Internal Affairs are intensely searching for the perpetrators of a criminal act which took place outside the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade last night, the Secretariat for Internal Affairs said in its statement today.

The statement says that at around 2245 on 3 March, an as yet unidentified person hurled a grenade, in all probability a "spoon- type" hand grenade, outside the U.S. diplomatic mission in Belgrade, 50 Knez Milos Street.

The piercing shrapnel released in the explosion caused material damage as it smashed the windows and partly damaged the facade, the statement points out.

No one was injured in last night's incident outside the U.S. Embassy, the statement says in conclusion.

'No Damage' Reported

AU0403114793 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 93 p 26

[Text] An unidentified person threw a defensive bomb [defanzivna bomba] at approximately 2245 yesterday that exploded a few meters from the main entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.

Employees of the city's Secretariat for Internal Affairs arrived 10 minutes after the explosion and can only conclude that the bomb caused no damage. The inspector on duty announced that a news conference was scheduled for about midnight, but the switchboard operator informed us that it was postponed until this morning.

The security cameras monitoring the entrance to the building probably filmed the perpetrator of this crime. It is questionable how helpful this will be in the investigation since no other information is available "besides the fact that he had long hair and wore a white jacket" (according to the security guard on duty).

Government Assesses Political, Economic Tasks

LD0303175793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1527 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Mar (TANJUG)—Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic chaired the first session of the new Federal government in Belgrade today.

According to a statement issued by the Federal Information Ministry, the government has set up its own working bodies and examined its priority tasks: introducing financial discipline into the economy and rooting out the "grey economy," curbing hyperinflation, coordinating the laws and competences of the federation and the republics, building a joint energy plan, balancing the FRY's foreign currency and materials, and protecting personal safety of citizens and their property.

The Federal Government has decided to set up a special coordination body for all affairs involving the peace conference on former Yugoslavia and the establishment of relations with former Yugoslav republics. The government will launch a comprehensive diplomatic program for the FRY to become a member of the IMF, the World Bank, GATT [General Agreement on Tariff and Trade], and other international financial and trade organizations. The government will prepare a long-term program of economic stabilization which will serve as a basis for negotiations with the mentioned institutions. The government will regulate the implementation of privatization and protection of socially owned property by the law on the transformation of socially owned capital.

Given that one of its responsibilities is material welfare of workers who are being laid off because of the sanctions, the Federal Government decided to draw up a program of social protection of the needy, while the emphasis will be put on protecting the family. The government will take measures to finance branches of economy such as agriculture, civil engineering and tourism, since they depend much less on imports and rely on domestic market.

The government has condemned the kidnapping of passengers on Belgrade-Bar rail line and has decided to examine the entire case.

Premier Kontic stressed that the Federal Government must be in a "mobile position," that "it must work around-the-clock," and that one of its priorities will be saving. This will also refer to the use of official vehicles, the statement says in conclusion.

TANJUG Editor Calls UN Sanctions 'Absurd'

LD0303163393 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1543 GMT 3 Mar 93

["Pool" item—by TANJUG diplomatic editor Stevan Cordas]

[Text] Belgrade, March 3 (TANJUG)—New Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic has singled out the lifting of the U.N. Security Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a priority task of his government.

It remains to be seen, however, which additional conditions will Yugoslavia have to meet for the unjust sanctions to be lifted.

According to well-informed circles in the U.N., two main conditions still remain to be met—the ending of the war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the recognition of all breakaway Yugoslav republics.

Until those two conditions are met, the world can hardly be expected to end the nine-month old denunciation of Yugoslavia, according to the same sources.

An additional problem is the fact that the sanctions are daily growing more absurd, which in practice means additional punishments for Yugoslavia. Many countries are so "conscientiously" implementing the sanctions against Yugoslavia that the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee has to intervene.

It recently happened, for instance, that a Bulgarian captain mistreated at the Bulgarian-Turkish border Turkish drivers who were transporting flour bought in Turkey by a Swiss humanitarian organization for the Orthodox Church in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Head of the Turkish convoy N. Sirel informed his employers that the Bulgarian captain was mistreating his team and even slapping them around.

Swiss authorities called on the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee to intervene, and Committee Chairman Ronaldo Mata officially informed Bulgarian and Swiss authorities that food was exempted from the sanctions. However, not even the official U.N. interpretation was enough. Belgrade had to intervene too, and it was only after much trouble that Bulgarians agreed to let the humanitarian convoy through.

The latest example of an absurd situation in the implementation of the sanctions was the recent blockade of the Danube, when Romanians showed to be so "conscientious" that they stopped empty Yugoslav vessels.

When several Yugoslav vessels blocked the Danube in protest, the world got very excited, disregarding the very essence of the problem, i.e., the fact that Yugoslav shippers reacted because Romanians did not, although obliged to do so, enable Yugoslav vessels to use the Romanian slide gates for internal river transport, which is naturally not covered by the sanctions. Under the Danubian Convention, the respective traffic is exempted from customs or any other form of control.

The U.N. Security Council condemned the action of the Yugoslav shippers at the initiative of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia.

The example of Slovenia best shows that some other interests were involved and that it was not at all a matter of the Danube's blockade.

The Danube does not pass through Slovenia but it does go through Austria, a country which has, together with Germany, done the most for the international recognition of Slovenia's forcible secession from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Cooperation With Bosnian Radio Amateurs Banned

LD0303140193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1327 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Belgrade, March 3 (TANJUG)—Moslem authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina have forbidden Bosnian radio amateurs to cooperate with their colleagues in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thus cutting all communication between refugees who found shelter in the F.R. of Yugoslavia and their relatives in the war-torn Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The ban will continue until relief supplies have reached the whole endangered Moslem population of Bosnia, the Belgrade daily BORBA on Wednesday [3 March] writes.

Nevertheless, the paper says, members of the Sarajevo-based University Radio Club Huso, Djana, Dino and Sinisa have not broken communication with their colleague, radio amateur Tomo Valcic in Belgrade. Huso called the decision by Bosnian Moslem authorities "ill-considered and unacceptable" for him.

"Hundreds of refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina were at the Matica radio amateurs' club in Belgrade on Saturday, waiting to hear from and speak to their dearest ones," recalls BORBA.

About half a million refugees of all nationalities are at present in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Commentary Considers Turkish Interest in Balkans

AU0303123293 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Feb 93 p 7

[Commentary by Ljubodrag Stojadinovic: "Ominous Threats"]

[Text] Turgut Ozal, the stocky chief of the Turkish state, is probably the first sultan in the history of the true or imagined Turkish empire who decided to besiege a country alone. Unfortunately, this is not at all an attempt to replace the atavistic military symbols by relatively civilized official visits.

Since his matchless military charisma provoked fanatic demonstrations in Ankara, Ozal truly has set out to besiege Serbia and is looking for friends among Serbia's neighbors and enemies. Turgut is not a man who finds it a pleasant task to encircle the odious country of Serbia. This could have been seen already during the first hours of his visit outside Turkey, in which he replaced his uncontrolled and undefined war cries by a kind of diplomatic parody.

His hosts more or less understood him. They obviously did not understand everything, as their participation in the "remake" of the domination of the turbans in the Balkans would be a risk to their own territories.

This is seemingly the key problem for Bulgaria and Macedonia, especially for the latter, because its national history is characterized by futile attempts to cast off the Turkish yoke.

Based on what Kiro Gligorov [president of Macedonia], the former president of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, said and with what servility he welcomed Ozal in Macedonia, it can be concluded that Macedonia, our neighbor to the south, is more interested in a radical row with Serbia than a dangerous friendship with Turkey. When choosing friends and allies, the current interests are, however, more important than the bitter memory of the past and the truth that without Serbia the Turks would never have left Macedonia—in which case Ozal's visit to Gligorov would have been unnecessary.

The Skopje leadership obviously very quickly forgot about the Albanian-Macedonian drama at Bit-Pazar [Skopje market] and enabled the Turkish president to meet with Kosovar Albanians in the parliament—the same people who organized the rebellion at Bit-Pazar, which was coordinated by the Albanian group from the region of Tetovo and Debar.

It could be said that military and political confusion in the Balkans is complete, but it is not quite like this. Ozal's attempt to "besiege" Serbia has its logic, in spite of the fact that this mode of travel was not approved by Suleyman Demirel. The "siege" planned by the Moslem, accompanied by servile Serbia's neighbors, is coming at the moment of greatest strategic hesitation concerning the Balkans by the Clinton administration. Ozal is a man who is symbolically offering decisiveness, but the Serbian neighbors are not his ultimate goal, which includes Kosovo and Sandzak as well as the corridor to Bosnia. If Turkey decided to set out for Bosnia without Security Council permission, it would not be able to do so without the blessings of Macedonia and Bulgaria, without a war with Greece, and rebellion in Kosovo and Sandzak.

This burden would be too heavy, and Turgut, as a lone avenger in the Balkans, inspired more by hatred than by plans of rational expansionism, is looking not only for the easiest way to his "brothers" in Bosnia but for friends along the way.

The Turkish leadership thinks that the most important caravan-serai in its campaign toward the heart of the nonexistent Bosnian state is Sandzak. In this part of Serbia much more has been invested than is known. Novi Pazar and Sjenica are, in spite of efforts to the contrary, thriving markets for smuggling weapons, drugs and foreign currencies. The main protagonist, though, is the former boxer and dentist—Sulejman Ugljanin, head of the extremist SDA [Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia-Hercegovina]. He says that he is a Turk, a fighter, the Asian ambassador, Allah's soldier, and the one who hates the Serbs more than anyone else.

In spite of the appeasement policy, Ugljanin is still pleading for rebellion and war because of two reasons, as he says. First, the world would at last see that there is no other possibility, except for war against the Serbs. The second reason, even more important for Ozal's "siege," is that it would be an ideal military occasion for a "legitimate Turkish intervention."

The Serbian state has so far been more than kind to Mr. Ugljanin, trying to interpret his terroristic extremism as political freedom. Shaken by constant shifts in the country's leadership, Yugoslav diplomacy seems to have applied its sterility in relations with Turkey, of all countries. Our official gentleness, was in the case of Turkey, depressingly humiliating, practically without any tone in the demarches, without protests or answers which would at least approximately correspond to the excessively serious and brisk threats from the other side.

Naturally, such steps have not been applied to our neighboring countries which played host to Ozal, supporting him in his calls for war and expressions of hate toward Serbia.

Average Serbians, who battle against economic uncertainty, are right in thinking that we have to do anything possible to avoid war because we already have enough misery. At the same time, they do not understand and do not even try to understand (which is all right, in our opinion) why that conspicuously suppress the Turkish threats and the janissary [officer in the Ottoman Empire] exaggerations of their "ambassador" Suljo Ugljanin. Only for this reason does the "siege" announced by Mr. Ozal sound like an ominous threat. We think, however, that this is more of a threat to our southern neighbors than to us. The Turkish formations will be able to stay only in those places where they will be welcomed as friends.

West's 'Nuclear Scenario' for Balkans

93BA0636A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 93 p 33

[Article by Dragan Jovanovic: "Umberto Ecco on the Peruca"]

[Text] Following the war games over the Peruca Dam, it was the turn of the dam on the Peruca storage reservoir, which is holding back the force of 540 million cubic meters of water. The dam on this largest artificial lake in Dalmatia is not a concrete dam, but is built with stone, which is to say that it is very vulnerable. Destruction of that dam could annihilate all the towns and settlements along the river. To tell the truth, all the way to Split, and even it would not be left undamaged. Opening wide one of the discharge gates at the Peruca HE [Hydroelectric Plant], combined with the breakdown in the machinery to close the dam, pursues the purpose of leaving the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] without power, because both the Split HE (with a capacity of 432 megawatts [MW]) and the Peruca HE (42 MW), which supply power to Knin and nearby Serbian settlements, would shut down.

If the Gracac Dam, which turns the turbines of the Obrovac HE, were not spared, it would annihilate all the Serbian villages on the slopes of Velebit with its 450 million cubic meters of water.

These environmental disasters would accomplish ethnic cleansing, and at the same time, according to certain information obtained by the intelligence services of the RSK army, Franjo Tudjman would begin to carry out the dictate of the international nuclear power lobby. In other words: Having destroyed the dams, he would bring about a power shortage not only in Serbian Krajina, but also in Croatian Dalmatia, and then it would be easier for him to begin construction of nuclear power plants, as he promised and indicated when immediately after he came to power he revoked the Federal Law on the Moratorium on Construction of Nuclear Power Plants in the SFRY.

Of course, this most recent nuclear story about destroying the dams and building nuclear power plants could also be part of psychological warfare and meant to disturb the Croatian citizenry, which certainly will not be at ease and happy if nuclear power plants are their "neighbors" instead of the displaced Serbs. One thing is certain: The story does have its logic.

Velebit, Papuk, Psunj

Dr. Budimir Kosutic, former Yugoslav ambassador in Tel Aviv, was also logical in an interview last week in VECERNJI NOVOSTI. He recalls that big-world capital, invested in nuclear technology and the chemical industry, is interested in space on which nuclear power plants will be built because science still has not solved the problem of obtaining clean electric power without extremely bad radioactive consequences. This could be mitigated by locating nuclear power plants in the countries of the Third World—that is, on the Balkan Peninsula. The nuclear and chemical waste disposal sites in the countries of West Europe could be placed in the Balkans, and the energy lacking, especially petroleum from the Near East, which is not inexhaustible, would be made up by using the exceptional energy potential that exists on the soil of the former Yugoslavia.

According to Professor Kosutic, the West's main emphasis is on placing the regions where these sources exist (the watershed of the Drina, Danube, and Una Rivers, as well as coal reserves and other important raw materials) under control of the people or religious communities whose principal feature down through history has been vassalage toward the western Catholic countries and doing their dirty work.

Foucault's Pendulum

There is even no dispute about the "economic interests of powerful multinational companies whose right-wing political organizations were the principal instigator of the forcible breakup of Yugoslavia." Nor is there any dispute about the "major nuclear lobby and chemical concerns which are behind the suffering of all the Yugoslav peoples and also the sellers of weapons being completely aware of how many citizens of Yugoslavia have died and in particular whether an entire people, the Serbian people, will be annihilated in certain areas." For big capital, nuclear and otherwise, the essential thing is not whether or who will leave in the regions intended for storing nuclear and chemical waste, which include the areas around Velebit, Papuk, and Psunj? Kosutic rightly says that the destruction of 193 Serbian villages in Slavonia did not worry anyone, but those villages would have been leveled to the ground even if they had been inhabited by Croats and Muslims provided they were marked on the nuclear world map for nuclear disposal sites. Kosutic indeed says this in a way when he asserts "that it is not a matter of love toward the Serbs, Croats, or Muslims, but of the interests of the large companies in carrying out plans and projects of this kind on the soil of the former Yugoslavia, in which billions of dollars have already been invested or are scheduled for investment."

But if all that is so and if this satanic nuclear scenario is well-known not only to Ambassador Kosutic, but also to Cosic, Tudjman, Milosevic, as well as Karadzic, Izetbegovic, and Boban, is it then really so difficult to sit down and reach an agreement, not in Geneva or New York, but right in Bascarsija? Provided they are not all implicated in that nuclear scenario or do not have the strength to get out of that nuclear witch's dance.

The theory of intention about which Budimir Kosutic speaks can be cast into doubt, because he is a man of the ruling Serbian establishment who transformed this theory from one that was mystical and magic into one that is counterproductive by applying it where such intention does not exist. But the theory of the world nuclear conspiracy—to be sure, not only against the Serbs—is also backed by Umberto Ecco in *Foucault's Pendulum*, in spite of such an authority as Karl Popper, who says that the conspiracy theory is as widespread as it is untrue.

Foucault's Pendulum, that is, which happens to be an extremely hermetic and important book of the 20th century, can also be read as a compressed conspiracy theory concerning ownership of Noah's coffin, which contained the philosopher's stone (i.e., uranium ore) down through the centuries; from the Gnostics, the Knights Templar, the Masons, all the way to Teutonic neotemplarism and Hitler. Von Sebontendorf was writing in 1924 and noted that "in the first experiments with atomic fission, the neotemplars were stating the old truth about the Great Platform for conquering the world."

Someone might say—nevertheless, this is just worthy literature. But if two years ago someone had said that today we would not only be killing one another, but even cutting each other's throats, roasting each other over the

spit, that we would be blowing up dams and the long-distance power transmission lines of the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant, we certainly would tell him that that was bad literature.

Even Umberto Ecco would not think of destroying the dams of hydroplants in order to build nuclear power plants.

Publication of New Army Journal To Start

93BA0619B Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Feb 93 p 10

[Article by M. Susnjar: "New Journal Coming: Specialized Publication From the Modern Military"]

[Text] *The publication of a military interservice journal by the VJ [Armed Forces of Yugoslavia] is an expression of the real needs and desires of its members; reader allegiance through quality; mandatory subscription not anticipated.*

Based on the need to examine the special problems of the military more rationally, with higher quality, and on a higher professional and aesthetic level, as is appropriate for a new-quality military, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia on 14 January of this year issued an Order on the Establishment and Publication of a Military Interservice Journal by the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia—GLASNIK. The basic purpose of the new publication is to contribute to raising the level of professionalism of VJ members and their success in carrying out professional obligations, and to encourage them to critically examine the theory and practice of preparing, developing, and deploying the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. According to the plan, which was defined in accordance with the demands of members of the VJ expressed in a survey of their opinions on a new interservice journal, with the demands of a new age, and with the possibilities and needs of the VJ, GLASNIK will have a modern look and graphic design. It will examine in a professional and scientific manner, within tactical and operative contexts, the themes of the preparation, development, and combat deployment of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, achievements and trends in the development of military equipment and technology in our country and in the world, news from foreign armies, experiences from the military past and from contemporary wars, and instructive examples from the history of the Serbian and Montenegrin nations.

First Issue in Late March

In terms of content and form, and especially its design, graphic layout, and openness, GLASNIK will differ substantially from previous military journals. With its original look and variety of military information, it should satisfy the professional demands and interests of members of the VJ. There will be no room in the journal for apologist and empty articles. The contributions published in the pages of GLASNIK will encourage a worthy, critical, and creative attitude toward professional obligations and defense of the fatherland.

GLASNIK will be published once every two months. The first issue should come off the presses by the end of March of this year. Besides the regular issues, special supplements will also be published in the form of offprints dedicated to specific, current military topics. The editors will also prepare and publish thematic issues of the journal dedicated, for example, to the field of rear-line support or military technology, i.e., to subjects essential to the development of the VJ that are not covered more broadly and with the necessary scope in the regular issues and supplements.

Precious Assistance of Readers

The founder and the publisher have committed themselves to a military publication with modern layout and production, which will use quality to compete for the allegiance of readers in the VJ and outside it as well. Because of this, no mandatory subscription is anticipated for the journal, although it is expected that it will be read by the majority of VJ officers. The trump card through which it will be favorably judged by the public will be originality, a high professional and aesthetic level, and topicality and dynamism in examining military issues. One particular characteristic of GLASNIK will be its openness to well-argued critical and creative examination of the theory and practice of preparing, developing, and deploying the VJ.

The publishing concept of GLASNIK is neither coincidentally nor unnecessarily ambitious. It is that way because of real needs in the process of transforming and developing the VJ—a military of a new quality, which will be reflected in the professional attitude toward the VJ callup and in the status of its members in society. The journal's Editorial Staff and Editorial Board will concern themselves with its execution. However, the broader assistance of readers and of unit commands and VJ institutions will also be indispensable to them. Suggestions and proposals received by the Editorial Staff will contribute to the more rapid and higher-quality expansion of the journal.

Cooperation with the journal is desirable and indispensable. However, it must come on the level of new demands and characters for the journal, which aims to be characterized by its quality and sound argumentation in examining military issues. Because of this, the Editorial Staff will continuously develop contact with readers. Only through joint efforts is it possible to create a publication that will successfully represent the VJ in this country and in the world.

Besides subscription responses, which can be directed to the Military Publishing and Newspaper Center, the Editorial Staff also expects contributions for publication: short, succinct, and well-argued articles on problems with the development and combat deployment of the VJ, enriched by drawings, photographs, or sketches.

Serbia

Milosevic Interviewed on War, Ties With Turkey

NC0303162793 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 1 Mar 93 p 15

["Exclusive" interview with President Slobodan Milosevic by HURRIYET columnist Ertugrul Ozkok and correspondent Nerdun Hacioglu in Belgrade; date not given, individual questioners not identified]

[Excerpts] [HURRIYET] Since being in Belgrade, we have observed that inflation is very high. Considering this, how long can you continue the war?

[Milosevic] The monthly 4 percent increase in inflation has created a difficult situation for our people. However, I am convinced we will take effective measures. The economic embargo imposed on us is unjustified. In fact, it is unprecedented in international relations. Those who made the decision and their grandchildren, in fact, should be ashamed of what they have done. [passage omitted]

[HURRIYET] Serbia launched a verbal protest against Turkey last Tuesday [23 February]. That indicates that bilateral relations have further deteriorated. Why was the protest made Tuesday and not earlier?

[Milosevic] I am also concerned. However, I know that the officials who dealt with this issue know the facts. That applies to the officials of the two countries as well. As far as we are concerned, the Turkish Government's approach is unacceptable. Turkey has been interfering in matters that only concern us.

[HURRIYET] What made you feel uneasy?

[Milosevic] The chants of war we have heard. They will not yield any results. In fact, they will disrupt our relations even more. Turkey's view that its empire will be established from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China threatens Serbia's and Greece's interests. However, this does not mean we are afraid. I want to say that such remarks damage relations. The current policy on the Balkans is unrealistic. [passage omitted]

We Do Not Fear Pressure

[HURRIYET] The Turkish people hold you primarily responsible for the war. In fact, they hold you responsible for the massacre of Muslims. Many other countries have a similar impression.

[Milosevic] The Turkish people must not be deceived. They must not be misinformed. The Serbian people are not the enemy of the Muslim population. The Muslim leaders in Bosnia are to blame for the incidents. The support given to Izetbegovic is hurting the Muslim people. We want the Serbs and Turks to establish relations based on equality and mutual respect. We do not have a spare house in the Balkan region, nor can we agree to surrender our property. We do not covet foreign territory, nor should anyone covet our's. We will not be pressured, nor will we accept an ultimatum. Any pressure will met with a strong reaction.

[HURRIYET] Are you saying that a political solution should be found to the problem?

[Milosevic] Yes, a political solution should be found. The internal war will not solve the problem of Bosnia-Hercegovina. No side in an internal war can achieve victory. All the sides stand to lose. Everyone is responsible. All of the sides are responsible. The civilian people suffer most in this war, regardless of their nationality. The people are affected most by such a war. We have been calling for a political and peaceful solution from the beginning of the fighting.

[HURRIYET] What is the peaceful approach required on the matter?

[Milosevic] We clearly explained our approach before the clashes began in Bosnia. We clearly explained our official position as follows: Serbia will accept the decisions adopted by the three peoples in Bosnia on the basis of a consensus; that is, on the basis of equality. We discussed the matter with President Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel when I visited Ankara some time ago.

[HURRIYET] How did the Turkish officials react?

[Milosevic] Demirel described our policy at the time as a fair one. However, the concept of consensus and the principle of three equal peoples were undermined later. Unilateral aid and support was given to one of the sides. This continued until the Geneva talks. The sides in Geneva drew closer to the idea of consensus; that is, the principle of three different but equal peoples. Bosnia's unilateral decision to separate has caused bloodshed. Foreign support to Bosnia has caused bloodshed. That is a deadly and fearful policy. As far as I am concerned, it hurts the Muslim population.

[HURRIYET] Can you comment on the policies of President Ozal and Prime Minister Demirel? Is there a difference in their approaches against you?

[Milosevic] I do not believe their approaches are similar. Ozal has a fundamentalist approach; Demirel is a very reasonable politician. He wants to adopt a contemporary approach on developments.

[HURRIYET] Many Muslim women have been raped in Bosnia. That is an international crime. What does Serbia plan to do to those who are responsible for committing war crimes?

[Milosevic] We, too, want them to be penalized. That is the basis of a lawful state. However, do not make a mistake on the matter, do not think we are criminals. Individuals on both sides have done similar things.

[HURRIYET] Very few Serbian women have been assaulted; many Muslim women have been raped.

[Milosevic] According to our evidence, very few Serbs are responsible for that. There is an internal war going on. I do not want to describe one of the sides as an angel and the other as a devil. However, cases of rape have been seen on both sides.

[HURRIYET] Can you promise that those responsible will be punished?

[Milosevic] Assaulting women is a crime against humanity. The responsible elements must be punished, regardless of which side they belong to. This is a most serious crime.

We Are Prepared To End The Disgusting War

[HURRIYET] Can you comment on the U.S. decision to air-drop aid to Bosnia?

[Milosevic] Extending aid to those in an unfavorable situation is an auspicious approach. That is my conviction. However, I do not believe that aid delivered by air will be any better than aid delivered by land. We took measures to facilitate the aid delivered by land. We created the conditions required for the delivery. [passage omitted]

Turkey May Send Aid

[HURRIYET] How would you react to proposals by countries other than the United States to send aid by land? For example, would you allow Turkey to send aid by land?

[Milosevic] Our approach on the question of humanitarian aid has not changed, regardless of from where it comes. In other words, we do not discriminate. However, we have discovered military material in several trucks used for transporting aid.

[HURRIYET] We do not have any information on that. Do you have any concrete evidence?

[Milosevic] Yes, Serbian forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina have concrete evidence on the matter. They can brief you on the matter if you wish.

[HURRIYET] Do you have a new proposal for solving the problem in Bosnia?

[Milosevic] We want a solution that will establish full equality among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim people of Bosnia. Such an approach should establish a basis for their future existence. There is no alternative solution to the crisis in Bosnia. That is the only way to solve the problem.

Muslims Have Been Used

[HURRIYET] The world cannot understand the actions against the Muslim population. As far as we can see, the Muslims are being massacred.

[Milosevic] Muslims do not only live in Bosnia-Hercegovina. They also live in Serbia, Karadak, and Macedonia. It would have been better if the Muslims had decided to live in the same state. That would have been better from the point of view of their interests. They have been divided into four countries now.

[HURRIYET] Can we say that the fact that the population in Bosnia-Hercegovina is Muslim is one of the reasons for the incidents? Are you attacking those people just because they want to leave or because they are Muslims?

[Milosevic] We have not reacted because they are Muslims. You are aware that Muslims also live in Serbia. They have never been discriminated against. The problem was created by forces that want to fragment Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Muslims have been used as an instrument for that fragmentation. [passage omitted]

The War Is Inauspicious

[HURRIYET] Considering the blood that has been shed to date, it is possible to discuss a republic in which the three people can live together? How will the problem be solved?

[Milosevic] You, too, have observed that an inauspicious war is being fought at the cost of significant bloodshed. The fighting must stop immediately. The three peoples must then try to reinstate their severed relations in a peaceful atmosphere. The principle of peace, tolerance, and mutual respect must be realized in the Balkan region. We all live together in this country.

[HURRIYET] Is it not true that the Serbian side must make the first move to end the bloody and merciless war? Are you prepared to make a move in that direction?

[Milosevic] The Serbian side is prepared to contribute to efforts to end the war. You are well aware of that fact. However, this has never been reported in Turkish newspapers. The Serbian side unilaterally declared a ceasefire several times. Unfortunately, Alia Izetbegovic and his colleagues failed to comply and violated peace. They are convinced that the world will intervene if the fighting is prolonged. They launched two wide-scale attacks during the Geneva talks. They want to provoke international intervention. However, that is meaningless; what is taking place is an internal war, and internal wars can end only if the sides involved get together and find a political solution.

Muslims Protest Prijepolje Train Kidnapping

AU0203163293 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Report by Radovan Brankov]

[Text] After the kidnapping of a group of passengers from the express train on the Belgrade-Bar line in Strpci, on the territory of the Serbian republic [of Bosnia-Hercegovina], there are still no precise and reliable data about who the kidnappers were.

At about 1300 today, people started gathering together in Prijepolje. Several hundred people have gathered in front of the Prijepolje Communal Assembly building. The people gathered are Muslims, organized by the Party of Democratic Action, and they are demanding that the authorities tell them where the kidnapped passengers are and have these people released as soon as possible.

The group gathered in front of the Prijepolje Communal Assembly building has been growing, I have just learned from Mr. Mile Novakovic, commander of the Prijepolje militia station. Buses full of people are coming from Brodarevo and bringing people to the protest meeting. For the "News of the Day" newscast, Mr. Novakovic has given the names of the passengers who have disappeared, Muslims from the Prijepolje Commune. They are as follows: Fikret Memovic, a ticket inspector; Rasim Coric, a worker in a footware factory, as well as (Habdem) Alomerovic, Ferzija Zekovic, and Nijazim (Kajevic), all workers.

New Premier Continues With Old Policy

AU0203203793 Kragujevac POGLEDI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Feb 93 pp 14 - 16

[Commentary by Dusan Vesic: "The Continuity of a Betrayal"]

[Text] On Wednesday, 10 February, Nikola Sainovic, new prime minister of Serbia, disclosed the bases of his future program. Sainovic said the following: "Our foreign policy will mainly be characterized by the fight for peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and through its participation in the peace process within the framework of the United Nations, we will strive to get the Serbian people, living in currently war-torn areas, the right to make their own decisions regarding their fate. By now we have enough experience, gained from Brioni through The Hague to New York, from the EC through the CSCE, from the United States through Russia to Turkey, so that we can maintain, in a stable way, the continuity of Serbia's foreign policy, a policy that has very often been attacked, but that has received recognition always when international conditions for justice and the equal treatment of all peoples on this territory were satisfied. Allow me to remind you: the adoption of the Vance plan, the closing talks in Geneva, etc. We are going to support these peace efforts by actively engaging in spreading the truth about Serbia and the Serbian people in general. Into this labor we will invest the necessary professionalism and methodology appropriate for the public makeup of certain countries."

"A Fight for Peace"

Thus spoke Sainovic. All parliamentary parties, except for DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], participated in the following debate. The Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], who have the largest membership, won the elections precisely on "patriotism".... However, out of these 185 individuals, only one Serb said that the government "must take an interest in protecting and helping the Serbs in the Serbian Krajinas and say once and for all that Serbia will support its Serbian people regardless of where they live." The Serb in question, Stevan Vukajlovic, also said the following: "Not being straightforward and avoiding openness when it comes to this issue, benefits our eternal enemies in the north of our former country."

Unfortunately, the man who saved the honor of the Serbian parliament, did not understand his prime minister very well. Not for a single moment was Sainovic not straightforward, nor did he try to avoid being open. On the contrary. Although in other parts of his speech he was rather foggy, when it came to the Serbian issue, he was very concrete. First, his government is a continuation of Bozovic's government, which means that the president of the republic, Milosevic, does not intend to change his policy—something that he himself publicly promised. Secondly, although it is clear that with Croatia's attack on the Republic of Serbian Krajina the Vance plan is no longer relevant, Sainovic will not recognize the Krajina and thus correct the historical error made by his predecessors. Thirdly, the insistence on the "recognition" that Serbian foreign policy received when it accepted the Vance plan, implies that Sainovic's government will continue the policy of capitulation, and that the "fight for peace" will be based on further sacrificing Serbian sovereignty. Fourth, Sainovic's claim that he will "support peace efforts by actively engaging in spreading the truth about Serbia and the Serbian people in general," cannot be true if, at the same time, Sainovic retains as heads of the most important ministries two of the least capable ministers—Vladislav Jovanovic, who heads the Foreign Ministry and Milivoj Pavlovic, who heads the Information Ministry. Jovanovic is a man totally incapable of understanding the process surrounding the Serbian issue, while Pavlovic has always exhibited more interest in what BORBA was writing against Bozovic's government than what was being written about Serbia worldwide. Lastly, we did not hear why the "necessary professionalism and methodology appropriate for the public makeup of certain countries" were not introduced two years ago, under these same ministers.... how can we hope that things will get better if these two bunglers are rewarded with new portfolios instead of being thrown out into the street?

The Policy of National Precipitation

Unlike his predecessors, an indecisive Zelenovic and a corrupt Bozovic, Sainovic at least honestly and openly implied that he would conduct a policy of betrayal. Of course, it is not good that we once again have such a government, but this time we at least know what to expect. On the other hand, it is now clear that by looking at Sainovic's policy, we are looking not at Serbia's policy but at Milosevic's policy. The fact that Milosevic's policy is at the same time Serbia's policy, has to do with the blatant deception of an honorable people on whom a

traitorous policy masquerading as patriotism has been forced, and who are still unaware of it.

Not only is Milosevic's policy not patriotic, it is also a policy of national precipitation. This policy, which started out by concealing the real goals, managed to establish and maintain itself first through self-deception, then by expecting and belatedly parrying others' moves, then through blatant lies, and finally through international pressure. Given the circumstances under which this policy evolved, this is not surprising, but what should worry us is the fact that so far no strong Serbian option has emerged, one that would unmask this policy from top to bottom and assemble forces loyal to the national interest. All of Milosevic's opposition opposed him on economic issues, but they left the national sphere unguarded; if a part of it did oppose him on national issues, then its platform was even more traitorous than Milosevic's. That communism ruined us is understandable. However, we have only ourselves to blame that it continues to ruin us.

What did Milosevic want? Today, we know for a fact that his program "all Serbs in one state" was not a program for creating a strong Serbian state, but a program aimed at maintaining Tito's weak Yugoslavia. His historical error is that he obstinately and stupidly believed that this Yugoslavia would survive and that within it he would have ultimate power. On the other hand, the Serbian people's historical delusion is that it believed that one of Tito's orthodox communists could turn into a Serb, a man whose father was chosen by Tito and who married a relative of Davorjanka Paunovic [Milosevic's wife's aunt and Tito's personal secretary and alleged mistress], so that he too, just like Tito, could have his own Davorjanka. Instead of sacrificing his beliefs for the Serbian people, Milosevic sacrificed the Serbian people for his beliefs. His people, instead of sacrificing him to their national interests, agreed to sacrifice their national interests in order to keep him in power.

The chronology of Milosevic's betrayal cannot be listed in these few columns. This calls for at least two or three fat volumes. However, we need to consider some of it, precisely because Sainovic is going to continue along these well-defined lines. We must immediately and radically end this practice. What does an appeal for peace mean? Is there anyone here who wants to fight? Milosevic's peace however, could prove to be more dangerous than any war. War on this territory might achieve something, whereas Milosevic's peace can only mean capitulation.

There can be no doubt that Milosevic wanted Tito's Yugoslavia. In addition to the fact that he wanted a Yugoslavia that no one else wanted, he made two essential errors when deciding on the ways in which to achieve it. First, he is a follower of the "Memorandum", and it is not true that he never read it. The "Memorandum" is a communist creation that does not advocate Serbian unity, but rather Serbian equality within the framework of Yugoslavia. This is the starting point of Milosevic's policy. However, by spring of 1991 at the latest, Milosevic should have realized that even the Yugoslavia he desired could not be achieved without the unification of all Serbs. Secondly, one could never be sure what he really wanted. He always made it clear what he wanted; the problem was that nobody believed him. To the Serbs, to all other Yugoslav peoples, and to the world in general, he always seemed to be the bearer of a pan-Serbian idea. Had he looked for allies, he would have had a hard time finding them; his mistake, however, lies in the fact that he did not look for them.

A Romantic Communist

He never envisioned the Serbian regions in Croatia being outside of Croatia's borders: it was Kosovo that brought him to power, and after that, he viewed everything through Kosovo. Irritated by Tudjman's support of the ethnic Albanians, his ambitions regarding the Krajina had to do with showing Tudjman what it was like to have an uprising in areas under one's authority. He did not have the slightest intention of recognizing the independence of the Serbian Krajinas; when it became "common knowledge" that Babic [Knin municipality president] had proclaimed independence in collusion with Milosevic, the latter phoned Babic and ordered him to retreat. Upon his return to Zagreb after the last secret meeting in Kardjordjevo, an elated Tudjman announced how Milosevic had promised him that he would not recognize the Krajina's independence, but that he would do his utmost to secure for the Serbs the rights that are included in the status of an autonomous region in those Croatian areas where the Serbs are a majority. Tudjman agreed to the autonomy, with the exception that he did not agree to a purely Serbian police, but rather to a half Serbian-half Croatian police in these areas. In return, Milosevic asked Tudjman to help him remove Ante Markovic [former SFRY prime minister], who at the time, was prime minister of the federal government! Tudjman was ecstatic: instead of a hard-core Serb nationalist, he had before him a typically communist, Yugoslav masochist.

Why did such a Milosevic have to appeal to Tudjman more than Milosevic as a Serb nationalist although he was legitimate, whereas Tudjman was a separatist? Because it was easy to tear Yugoslavia apart, whereas with the pan-Serbian idea, things would have been a lot harder. On the other hand, not even the bloody attack on Borovo Selo helped Milosevic to come to his senses. He was already making one mistake after another. When Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed independence in June, he should have automatically recognized the Krajina, but he was still trying to keep Yugoslavia together. He kept at it even when it became clear that he could save it only by using military force, yet he was incompetent for the job. Instead of distributing the army along the border at Sentilj, he accepted the EC as mediators, which implies absolute political infantility. After this, he mindlessly withdrew the army from Slovenia to the border with Croatia, instead of immediately positioning the army along the ethnic border between the Serbs and the

Croats and defending it to the end. As far back as 1990, the CIA possessed a map of greater Serbia with its western border running along the Serbian ethnic territories. So it turned out the Americans had been greater Serbs than Milosevic himself. The Americans were "greater Serbia" people, while the "greater Serb" Milosevic remained a romantic communist.

How the Krajina Was Liberated

The Vance plan for the Krajina was the result of fumbling around in Croatia and Milosevic's political inefficiency rather than an accurate reflection of the situation in the field. This plan would supposedly bring peace; it goes without saying that nobody could have anything against peace, but this was not peace, it was just a temporary truce. This truce was supposed to consolidate Tudjman's military and political situation; on the other hand, it did not leave the Serbian issue open, it closed it. In theory, the Vance plan made all options possible; in practice, it relegated the Krajina to an autonomous region in Croatia. Milosevic exhibited it as his victory, while in reality, it was a defeat for Serbian national interests.

However, this is not Milosevic's final betrayal of the Krajina. The final blow is yet to come. The world has recognized Croatia within the borders of Tito's Yugoslavia, and it is very unlikely that it will break its word: as soon as the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina is more or less over, the international community will get down to solving the situation in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. According to Vance's third plan, Krajina will remain Croatian territory with a special status and UN officers who will monitor Serbian rights and feebly protest that Tudjman is not honoring any of the things agreed upon. When he could not convince Babic, Vance called Milosevic. When he could not convince Karadzic, Vance once again called Milosevic. When the time comes for him to convince Hadzic, will Vance once again resort to calling Milosevic? Of course he will. On Wednesday, 10 February, Sainovic clearly and openly said that Serbia could hardly wait to once again exhibit its readiness to "cooperate," and collect new "recognition" for "the continuity of Serbian foreign policy" which is nothing less than betrayal. All of this Serbia would do through its noble president. If this is not betrayal, then what are 60,000 deserters from Krajina doing roaming around Serbia? Instead of sending them home, Milosevic issued them Serbian identity cards and gave them the right to vote. In this way, the Krajina has been weakened to such an extent that it now depends on such marginal characters like Sainovic.

Stories about a pending lifting of the embargo have no basis in reality and can fool only the naive. However, when the embargo is eventually lifted, we will go out into the world either with a fundamentally solved national issue, or strewn about in numerous, clumsy little Balkan states, incapable of anything else except hating one another. Although the road is equally long regardless of which option is chosen, with Milosevic we cannot hope for anything else but a final national precipitation. Isn't it high time that we show him and his Sainovices the door?

Rising 'Chauvinism' in Republic Noted

93BA0636C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 93 pp 23-24

[Article by Svetlana Djurdjevic-Lukic: "Lest It Be Too Late"]

[Text] In a school in Zemun, a pupil whose last name does not end in "ic" had an immense "U" drawn in color on his jacket. In an elementary school in Slankamen, a teacher began the class hour: "And now we will put questions to the little Croats." In a small Vojvodina town, where the Serbs have the highest percentage of the population, a Syrian who has lived here for 20 years or so, who has a wife and family, has been threatened: "Go off to be with your mojahedini!" A small-businessman has a little cafe in the interior, but he longs for Belgrade: "It will happen. I am waiting for these Croats and Muslims to finally leave, and I will take over their business."

When a popular actor is attacked in the middle of Belgrade, when the yellow press writes about the secret "Chessboard" Association whose members supposedly included Ivo Viskovic, Ivan Vejvoda, Vladimir Stambuk, Jasna Sakota, Mirjana Jakelic...all of them reputable public figures who even have entire political parties behind them, when the president of a party, the second strongest in the parliament, accuses a trade union official ("21 Maja"), Milan Nikolic, of being a Croat from Imotski who is acting as a broker and says of a respected specialist, Dr. Vladimir Goati, that as a Croat from Mostar it is not his place to deliver lectures to the Serbian people and deliver slaps on the wrist, what is the ordinary anonymous man of non-Serb origin feeling and thinking?

People do not want to talk about the threats they are receiving every day. In a way they have become accustomed to fear, and they do not have the strength to offer opposition. Many of them are quietly moving away. Where is this leading, and has not the word Nazism ceased to be a bad word?

It was said long ago that fascism is a contemporary disease which is at home everywhere and no country is free of it. Dr. Ratko Bozovic, a cultural sociologist who is a professor in the School of Political Science at Belgrade University, believes that even now we can say "resurgent fascism is not happening just to others.

"Our reality has forced us to admit this. Manifestations of neofascism and neo-Nazism, although these expressions are not very precise, are creating a chain of violence and an immense fear that all this will end in madness and a bloody drama, in a tragedy of civil war. Surely we did not expect that after the fierce waves of vulgar national-chauvinism, which recently have been

splashing over our community, we can avoid resurgences of fascism. Back even in the time of the so-called antibureaucratic revolution an untamable populist wave came splashing down on our political community and defined its points of departure to a great extent. Almost overnight, certainly under cover of darkness, all civilized standards here were lowered and degraded. We wonder every day whether they even exist any longer. In the universal vulgarity which has come to prevail in our country, everything is possible now. Nothing can surprise us, because low-mindedness and mindlessness can publicly and without hindrance obliterate even the greatest authorities both in culture and politics," NIN was told by Professor Bozovic.

The Climate Has Been Created

We are becoming accustomed to ever more terrible things. Who still remembers the kidnapping of 17 Muslims from Sjeverin, the exodus from Hrtkovci, Nikinci, Priboj?... The machine gunning of houses, the bombs that have been thrown, the firing on the Catholic church in Novi Slankamen, the demolition of the 230-year-old Catholic church in Banovci, the shops of Muslims set fire to in Pljevlja, the mistreatment of schoolchildren of Slovak nationality in Kisac, the firing on the mosque in Novi Sad and the detention of activists of the Islamic community there during Ramadan, the Hungarian houses set fire to in Irig, the murder of Omer Omerovic and Jasmica Klinger in Belgrade...memory is getting too short. By and large there is no information about the attackers.

According to the figures on the ethnic composition of the Republic of Serbia in 1991, Serbs do not comprise even two-thirds of the population (65.8 percent). At the same time, Croats, for example, represent only 1.1 percent, Muslims 2.4 percent, and that was before their exodus, which was nevertheless appreciable, and their discharge from various services, beginning with the army.

"Persecutions on an ethnic basis are intolerable in any state, especially in a state which defines itself as a state of citizens," recalls Dr. Dragomir Pantic, a social psychologist. "Unfortunately, a dangerous climate of xenophobia has already been created. According to recent research done by the Social Sciences Institute, the earlier favorable stereotypes about the various nationalities are now being transformed, and other nationalities are perceived as a threat. About two-thirds of the citizens display some form of xenophobia, which, of course, some people who want power can use for their own advancement."

Radical Solutions

Nor is it any consolation at all that the wave of neofascism or, at least, of immense intolerance, is rolling over all of Europe. One survey in Russia included the name of a completely fictitious nationality, and a large number of the respondents placed blame on that nationality for their own difficult position.

Dr. Predrag "Braca" Ognjenovic, a professor of general psychology in the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University, recalls that exclusiveness and regression accompany the fall of every great idea.

"Threatened, frustrated economically, ethically, and ethnically, a man becomes inclined to look at things in black and white and resorts to radical solutions. What is more, every great crisis diminishes rational individual freedom. The simplest thing is to squeeze into the crowd of similar people, leave the space for decision-making to others. The situation of our citizen is complicated still more, because there is the sense that he is being unjustly punished, and that very easily leads to aggression," Professor Ognjenovic says.

The role of the media needs to be added to all this. When the newspapers publish what are literally arrest warrants; when they publish the list of non-Serbs who belong to a secret organization planning the assassination of a well-known painter and writer, how long does it take for one of the frustrated citizens to get the idea that it would be a patriotic gesture to prevent that assassination and carry out the assassination before the others?

All the mechanisms which generate tendencies toward fascistization are present. Dr. Mladen Lazic, a sociologist of the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University, says: "The sudden and drastic deterioration of the economic conditions of life, which results in a loss of the conventional status characteristics of the middle class, the interethnic war which turned the earlier rise of Serbian nationalism into aggressive chauvinism, the international isolation, which is shutting the country into a self-sufficient cell which feels the entire outside world to be hostile.... We also have here the traditional undemocratic structure of the patriarchal type which has always associated the political organization of society with the existence of the leader. Sociological surveys just before the war showed that the authoritarian mindset is widespread in the population over the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia," Mr. Lazic says. "We can expect unorganized and mass social protests to occur because of economic conditions, and they could easily be channeled in the opposite direction, that is, of fascistoid populism."

How are such tendencies to be resisted? Why does history repeat itself and why do most people take part in this, pretending not to know anything? Is a turnaround possible? How, when in the opinion of those to whom we have talked, it is obvious that there is a linkage between the government and organized crime in the economy and politics? Are protest evenings like the ones in France sufficient? Are they not without any major effect, just a way of salving our consciences, as it has been put by Prof. Zagorka Golubovic?

Civil Resistance

"I advocate refusal to consent to the universal decline, civil resistance, and civil disobedience. I am not certain that there is any other way to arrive at the initial aspects

of democracy or a civil society. Unfortunately, no conflict with any ideology would be created here, because it obviously does not exist, but it would be a conflict with a pathology of government which quite probably has lost power even over itself," Professor Bozovic says.

Most of the opposition is also talking about civil resistance, but that phrase has never been seriously stated in specific terms. Dragan Radulovic, M.A., a deputy of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] in the republic Assembly, who is also an asistent in social pathology, describes the climate of insecurity as legal anarchy, anomie, which the government is nevertheless keeping under control, all in order to frighten the population so as to prevent social unrest.

"It is very dangerous to respond to force with force. Active resistance to the government is revolution, and I am against revolution, because it means many casualties, especially many innocent victims. All the opportunities that exist should be used, some form of civil disobedience should be organized, but the crucial thing is to establish a law-governed state."

Dr. Dragomir Pantic also believes that change is possible, above all through the operation of a law-governed state and unambiguous media condemnation of attacks on non-Serbs instead of passing over them in silence.

"We need to point out clearly what has always been characteristic of the Serbs: our cordial hospitality and openness to the world, our acceptance and esteem of others always and solely as individuals, not as members of 'good' and 'bad' nationalities. Every case of such threats and attacks recalls examples of seeking a 'scapegoat,' which have always been tragic in history. This phenomenon will be interpreted abroad as proof that ethnic cleansing began in Serbia itself and that the law-governed state here is an empty declaration," Mr. Pantic warns.

Professor Ognjenovic believes in the experiment that began through the Parent Culture Club in Zemun.

"The resistance must start from the grass roots, enlightened absolutism died out in the 19th century. Our idea is through the day nursery and schools to develop more tolerance and flexibility. People have to discover that they gain riches not from those who are just like them, but through people who differ from them. We are trying to create an oasis in which the most humane aspects of our tradition will be nurtured and tolerance and the advantages of the right to be different will be built up. Creativity arises solely from the right to be different. This is a step away from the uniformity that is being offered, our little utopia is based on the belief that places have their own special color and that success is contagious, that this kind of approach will spread."

Even if the experiment succeeds, one city is, of course, a drop in the ocean.

Really, When?

"The nationalist not only does not condemn the crimes his side commits, but he also possesses an exceptional ability not to hear about them at all," George Orwell said long ago. Gunther Grass says that the past is tapping us on the shoulder once again. In Germany, it was not before three Turkish women were burned to death that mass protests were organized: 300,000 people in Berlin, 100,000 people in Munich, the banning of a neo-Nazi party, revoking the civil rights of two extremists....

In our country, chauvinism is referred to as merely "a rise of crime." The government-controlled media are silent or at best report that Tomislav Filipovic, No. 97 Red Army Boulevard, was arrested in connection with the attack on Irfan Mensur. At that address, this journalist checked it out, there is no such person! The Belgrade police do not want to make statements about further proceedings. They refer inquiries to the judicial system. The investigating judge on duty refuses to make a statement alluding to the secrecy of the inquiry: "When are you journalists going to realize that it is senseless to seek any kind of information at all?"

Really, when?

Precisely in order to break through the wall of cover-up and to show the silent majority that resistance is possible, public and large-scale protests must continue. That is also the opinion of Mladen Lazic: "The difficulty in that is that a considerable portion of the intelligentsia who have to head such protests were nationalistically infected even earlier, and so to a large extent they have lost their sense of reality."

Mr. Ratko Bozovic warns that there is a moment when civil resistance may be too late.

"The moment when the charmed circle cannot be broken, because one hatred is engendering another one, one violence another violence. Halting that plunge into the abyss is not a matter of ideology, but of intelligence and the possibility of survival. I believe that the violence which has already gone down as far as the day nursery indicates that that moment has passed."

Chronology of Purges in Serbia

93BA0632A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 93 p 23

[Unattributed article: "Purges Have Followed One Upon the Other"]

[Text] Both chambers of the Yugoslav Assembly, on the initiative of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], voted a lack of confidence in the federal government and its prime minister last 29 December. The decision was adopted on the initiative of the Serbian Radical Party. Deputies in the Citizens Chamber passed a decision whereby Dr. Radoje Kontic would perform the office of acting prime minister. Article 106 of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Constitution states: "A federal

government whose mandate has been terminated shall continue to perform its functions until a new federal government is formed."

"Wherever we are in power and wherever we take part in the government there will be purges," Vojislav Seselj [Serbian Radical Party head] promised in a press conference on 6 January of this year. In the "purge" of the media, Seselj would most readily concern himself with Radio-TV Serbia. The discharge of undisciplined and party-tainted journalists should, in his opinion, affect more than 30 percent of those employed, "in order to make operation more effective and so as to completely straighten out the situation in Radio-TV Serbia."

Djordje Romoda, general director of Istra in Kula, a joint stock company that makes fittings, submitted an irrevocable resignation to his board of directors. He gave as his reason "pressure of the government, which is removing successful managers considered unfit."

Following the unexplained hijacking of a truck of Studio B, the independent television station, which occurred in late September of last year, an attempt was made in mid-January to also hijack that station's radio repeater. In a direct broadcast by the director of Studio B (who personally escorted delivery of the repeater), the entire event was described as a "poorly directed film about the Chicago underground"—in addition to the throwing of a Molotov cocktail, threats were made with automatic rifles and pistols.... The Serbian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] says that it has no information about the attack on the Studio B vehicle.

On the basis of "rationalization measures," about 1,500 employees have been put on mandatory leave at Radio-TV Serbia. Many learned they were on the "vacation list" when their pass was taken away as they arrived for work. They included many distinguished journalists, members of the Independent [Nezavisni] Trade Union. Last year, incidentally, 147 new employees were hired, and on 6 January of this year a competition was announced to hire on a permanent basis certain collaborators who until that time had worked by the job in the news department of TV Belgrade.

A decision of the Serbian Government in a meeting on 13 January removed Milos Sretenovic, director of the University Clinical Center, and appointed Milivoje Stamatovic, member of the Executive Council of the Assembly of Belgrade and former secretary of the Belgrade Self-Managed Community of Interest for Health Care, acting director. Embittered by this, a collegium of 38 directors of clinics and institutes of the University Clinical Center, the largest health care institution in Serbia, signed a collective resignation.

The only candidate for rector, Dr. Rajko Vracar, until now the head of Belgrade University, did not receive support of members of the University Council (half of whom are appointed by the government of Serbia) to continue as head of the oldest academy institution in Serbia. He received 29 of the 32 votes needed. Dr. Mihajlo Pesic, pro-rector, and Dragan Djilas, until now student pro-rector, did not pass either. Dr. Dragan Kuburovic, chairman of the University Council, who also received 29 votes, was proclaimed acting rector.

On 20 January, the government of Serbia appointed Aleksandar Bercek, actor and member of the Main Committee of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], the new director of the National Theater in Belgrade. The republic government also appointed Milomir Petrovic director of the National Library of Serbia, Radomir Stanic director of the republic Bureau for Protection of Cultural Monuments, and the painter Radislav Trkulja head of the Museum of Contemporary Art.

Certain artists have begun to leave the institutions with which they were associated as a sign of protest. (The National Theater—Vida Ognjenovic, Svetlana Bojkovic, Miki Manojlovic, Predrag Ejdus...).

At the request of Education Minister Danilo Z. Markovic, new principals have been chosen in Serbia's schools; by all appearances, a selective approach was used—most of the new principals are members of the SPS. Where they are not, the competition is being repeated. Depending on fitness, the nomination of the school committee is respected in certain schools, but in those where that nomination is undesirable, the minister made the appointment personally. Incidentally, in Serbia there are 5,120 elementary and secondary schools (262 in Belgrade alone).

In the resumption of the installation session of the Assembly of Serbia, on the motion of the Serbian Radical Party the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Election of Federal Deputies was adopted by urgent procedure in the Chamber of Republics of the Federal Assembly. Whereas for the previous convocation of the Federal Assembly the delegation of deputies to go from the Serbian Assembly to the Chamber of Republics was to conform proportionately to the makeup of the Serbian parliament, under the new provisions each deputy group has the right to nominate a complete list of 20 deputies for the Chamber of Republics, and those who receive the most votes will become federal deputies. Six opposition parties did not accept that law and left the Assembly chamber before the election. In future, then, 12 deputies of the SPS and eight deputies of the SRS will sit in the Chamber of Republics of the FRY Assembly from Serbia.

Macedonia

'Reprisal Campaign' Against Turks Assailed

LD0303184593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1535 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Text] Skopje, 3 Mar (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party of Turks [Demokratska Partija Turaka—DPT] in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia issued a statement today saying that the authorities have been

waging a reprisal campaign against parents of Turkish nationality whose children have been boycotting primary school education in Macedonian and demanding education in the Turkish language.

The authorities are trying to break the resistance of this section of the population by meting out fines and filing criminal charges against parents, the statement says. The DPT demands that the Macedonian Government and the Education Ministry stop putting pressure on and threatening parents, pupils, and teachers of Turkish nationality, who are only asking for their constitutionally guaranteed human rights.

Since the beginning of this school year, boycott of education in Macedonian has been going in many schools in western Macedonia, and numerous demands for the introduction of classes in the Turkish language have been made.

A team of experts of the Education Ministry rejected demands for classes in Turkish a few days ago, explaining that "the main reason for this decision was linguistic, not ethnic." The team, however, gave its approval for the introduction of optional classes in the Turkish language, if pupils desire this and if there are adequate resources.

Montenegro

Trebinje Muslim Refugees Accuse Paramilitary Units

93BA0636B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 93 p 22

[Article by Dragan Cicic: "The Dream of a Wartime Night"]

[Text] "I thought: So long as I save Trebinje, I am also saving my own house," said Sabahudin Kapetanovic, a 25-year-old Muslim from Trebinje, who is now living in refugee accommodations in Rozaje, a little town in the north of Montenegro. Because of the large number of refugees—about 4,000 of them—a state of emergency has been declared in the little town.

Sabahudin was mobilized and spent seven months in the front lines of combat in units of the army of the Serbian republic [of Bosnia-Hercegovina]. He, like the other Muslims from Trebinje, were promised that so long as they were loyal to the authorities of the Serbian Republic, they would be able to live in their city without harassment or discrimination. The men went off to the army—during the war, some 20 Muslims from Trebinje were killed at the front—and the women mainly stuck to their jobs.

And then in late January everything changed. Paramilitary groups which had flooded the town began to terrorize the population. First they frightened those with different names through telephone calls, and this quickly escalated to insults and provocations in the street, and finally their homes were being broken into.

Esref, age 50, tells about a late-night visit to his brother's family. Four men broke into the dwelling and with curses broke a bottle on the table and then the television set as well. The woman cried out: "Why are you not ashamed! Do you have some order to do this?" One of the men said: "Yes, we do," and showed her the pistol, which he immediately put to her forehead: "This will go off if you do not leave in 24 hours!" A neighbor, a Serb, called the police and told what was happening. They told him: "Risto, mind your own business!"

Muslim refugees by and large do not accuse their Serbian neighbors. They consider the paramilitary formations and local authorities to be mainly responsible for their suffering, while in some cases their neighbors helped them to get to Montenegro and save some of their property.

Fear

They explain the absence of a public protest by the Trebinje Serbs in terms of fear and pressure to which the "nonconformist" Serbs are subjected. Dr. Edin Catovic explained that he and his family had been brought to Rozaje by a Serbian friend who also helped him to covertly transport some equipment.

"My Serbian friends expressed sympathies in private, but they were too afraid to do anything in public. They assured me that they feared for their lives," Dr. Catovic said. "One of the rare ones who openly and publicly attempted to prevent the persecution of the Muslims was the young amateur actor Srdjan Aleksic."

Aleksic, who owned a store, hired a certain Glavonic, a Muslim who had become disabled while he was fighting as a Serbian soldier. When in late January Glavonic was selling Srdjan's goods on the square right in front of the police station, a group of uniformed men came up to him. They began to mistreat him. Aleksic ran up to protect him, but the attackers fell upon him. They knocked him down and kicked him and pounded him with rifle butts until he lost consciousness. He died a few days later in the Trebinje Hospital without recovering consciousness. All the Muslim refugees know about Srdjan Aleksic. Immediately before his death he had been preparing a production of "Dream of a Wartime Night." There was almost no one at his funeral except the very immediate family. "My son was his best friend, but he did not dare to go to the funeral," says Ramiza, now a refugee in Rozaje.

Deceived and Abandoned

Because of such events, a group of about 1,000 Muslims protested in front of the opstina building, but the only answer they got was an announcement of the Trebinje authorities, who on 25 January announced over the local

radio that "they could not guarantee anyone's security." Two days later, the 300-year-old Osman-Pasha Mosque was set on fire.

"This was a clear sign to us that we should leave," said Dr. Catovic, who believes that the authorities were also involved in what happened in Trebinje.

He bases his belief on the fact that the authorities not only rejected any responsibility for the safety of Trebinje Muslims, but they even suddenly and without any explanation discharged all Muslims from the Serbian Army over the period from 26 to 29 January of this year.

What is more, male Muslims able to fight were allowed to leave the city without special permits for the first time since the war began.

In the last three days of January, trucks of men began to cruise the city buying up for a song the property of the Muslims who were preparing to leave. Sabit, a 70-year-old and, he says, probably the richest man in his village, sold two cows, 35 goats, more than 150 kg of dried meat, and five tons of straw for 1,100 German marks.

In one week, the time they have been in Rozaje, he and 18 members of his extended family have already spent half of that amount even in spite of the accommodation and food provided them by the Red Cross.

"I feel deceived, abandoned, and rejected," says Sead Sahovic, age 38, a former soldier in the Serbian Army in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] whom a piece of shrapnel left with a mutilated face, missing a part of his brain, without one eye, and with the optic nerve severed on the other.

Word went around among the refugees in Rozaje that a few days before an appeal had been heard over Trebinje Radio for the Muslims not to move away and for those who had left to come back. But none of them believes any longer in the sincerity of such appeals.

"It turned out that for the authorities there a Muslim is a Muslim, whether loyal or not. We will never go back there, we have nowhere to go back to," says 34-year-old Suada.

Kosovo

Rugova Welcomes U.S. Stand on Serb Repression

LD0303180393 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Mar 93

[Report by Pristina correspondent Bedzet Baraliju]

[Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of Kosovo Albanians, welcomed the latest stand by U.S. President Bill Clinton, who warned Serbian President Milosevic about Serbian repression in Kosovo. Rugova stressed that this was a concrete step of the new U.S. Administration aimed at ending violence and preventing conflicts in Kosovo, and, at the same, it gave support for the peaceful resistance of the people of Kosovo. The warning, which amounts to U.S. readiness to get involved militarily in the case of the escalation of conflicts in Kosovo, confirms that the administration drew the line here and the aggressor would be punished for crossing that line severely, stresses today's statement by the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [Demokratski Savez Kosova].